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Writing the Revolution : Poulantzas and the 
Political Project. 
 
 
1.  Context and Biography. 
 
There is an unmistakable sense of urgency in the writing of Nicos Poulantzas.  Curiously, he was not 
writing to get tenure – the universe he inhabited was entirely different.  He wrote from his 
experience in Greece, as well as the setting he found himself in Paris., with an intent to understand 
how revolution could happen, and what might bring it about.  Such reasoning seems antique and out 
of place from the perspective of 21st century late capitalism.  But the world in which Poulantzas 
grew up was, in some ways, entirely different.  While many had blithely assumed that, with the 
overthrow of Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese Empire, that an era dominated by fascist 
dictatorships had come to an end, no-one raised in Greece after World War Two could reasonably 
entertain such a view.  Indeed, dictatorship remained in the heart of Europe well after 1945, 
sporadically in Greece, but consistently in Portugal and Spain.  In Portugal, a military dictatorship 
came to power in 1926, and lasted, in various forms, until 1974.  In Spain, a long and bitter civil war 
had resulted in the rise of General Francisco Franco in 1939, who then maintained his power until 
1974.  In Greece, the 4th of August Régime had been established as an authoritarian government 
from 1936 until 1941, and from 1967 until 1974 ‘The Régime of the Colonels’ came to power, which 
was, if not formally fascist, then certainly did meet all the criteria for a dictatorship. 
 
These three active dictatorships, which soon became the focus of attention for Poulantzas,1 brought 
an immediacy to his writings that was compelling.  In the introduction to The Crisis of the Dictatorships, 
he comments : 
 
The past two years in Europe have witnessed a series of events of considerable significance: the 
overthrow of the military dictatorships in Portugal and Greece; and the accelerated decay of the Franco 
régime in Spain, so that its overthrow is now also on the historical agenda.  
 Both the path taken by the fall of the Portuguese and Greek dictatorships, and the process 
now under way in Spain, raise a number of important questions which are still far from being resolved.  
The basic pivot in these is as follows. The Portuguese and Greek regimes were evidently not over- 
thrown by an open and frontal movement of the popular masses in insurrection, nor by a foreign 
military intervention, as was the case with Italian fascism and Nazism in Germany.  What then are the 
                                                 
1 See especially The Crisis of the Dictatorships, New Left Books, 1976, London. (First published by Maspero in Paris in 
1975)  The earlier Fascism and Dictatorship text, which was published in 1970 ( Maspero, Paris) looks back to Italian and 
German fascism, whereas The Crisis of the Dictatorships writes about contemporary conditions as Poulantzas found them in 
the mid-1970’s. The continuing existence of fascism and these three dictatorships leads Poulantzas to take up many of 
the same themes that had concerned Gramsci.  Indeed, there are many references to Grasmci in Poulantzas’s writing.  
Poulantzas was criticised by Althusser for his Gramscian tendencies.  The connections between the two are inescapable.   
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factors that determined their overthrow, and what form has the intervention of the popular masses 
taken in this conjuncture?2  
 
Poulantzas was in the middle of these struggles, and the intensity of his interest could not be clearer.  
We must remember how Poulantzas came to be writing these books.  He had been born in Athens 
in 1936, and was a child during the Second World War.  He was born into a prominent Greek 
family.  He came to maturity in Greece during the 1950’s.  He moved to France when he was 25 in 
1961.  James Martin3 usefully highlights the key biographical elements of this period : start here. 
 
Poulantzas was born in Athens on 21 September 1936. He grew to adolescence during a turbulent 
period which encompassed the authoritarian regime of General Ioannis Metaxas in the late 1930s, 
followed by the Nazi puppet regime during the war, the civil war of 1946-49 and the Western-backed, 
conservative democracy of the 1950s … Graduating in law from the University of Athens in 1957 and, 
following compulsory military service, he set off in 1960 to undertake doctoral studies in German legal 
philosophy in Munich. That decision was soon aborted, however, and Poulantzas relocated to Paris, the 
home of a large Greek diaspora that included figures such as Kostas Axelos, Cornelius Castoriadis and 
other exiled left-wing intellectuals.  Poulantzas enrolled as a teaching assistant at the Université 
Panthéon-Sorbonne and continued his research on law, submitting a mémoire de doctorat in 1961 on 
natural law theory in Germany after the Second World War.  By 1964 he had completed his doctoral 
thesis, published in the following year as his first book, Nature des choses et droit: essai sur la dialectique du 
fait et de la valeur. 
 
Poulantzas came from an academic background.  His father, Aristedes Poulantzas, was a ‘forensic 
graphologist’ and a ‘leading figure in Greek legal establishment’.4  His mother, according to Jessop, 
was a traditional woman who ran the house and stayed at home.  He was a brilliant student, 
destined, one imagines, to go far from an early age : 
 
His secondary schooling was undertaken at an experimental school, the Peiramaticon Gymnasium, 
attached to the University of Athens, and at the local Institut Franc ̧ais, where he studied for the 
Baccalaureate. He had already acquired fluency in the French tongue through private lessons. He 
graduated first among Greek students of the 'Bac' in his year and obtained 'very good' in both the 
general examination and the second, philosophical part.5  
 
There is no full-length biography of Poulantzas available in English as far as can be established.  Bob 
Jessop has perhaps the most detailed account of these early days.6  Poulantzas was an early believer 
in socialism – where precisely these ideas came from is unclear.  Liam O’Ruairc reports that his 
family were major landowners, and that his father was a senior legal official in the ‘Régime of the 
Colonels’.7  Perhaps, though, his family’s involvement in this notoriously autocratic régime was 
instrumental in shaping his thinking – this certainly seems plausible.  In any event, it is clear that 
Poulantzas completed his early training in law in 1957.8  Jessop’s account tells us that, in line with 
many young Greek intellectuals, disaffection with Greek politics and with Greek intellectual life led 
                                                 
2 The Crisis of the Dictatorships, op. cit., (now referred to as CD), page 7.  This is the second of his books on fascism. It is 
telling to read the tone of this text.  It is cautious, lacking any intellectual hubris, or any sense that a final analysis has 
been made.  The introduction emphasises the preliminary nature of the remarks.  He calls the work only an essay, even 
though it runs for 162 pages.  He also ends the introduction by admitting he has had a change of mind since he wrote 
Fascism and Dictatorship, not just because conditions have changed, but also because his views have altered. 
3 James Martin (editor), The Poulantzas Reader ; Marxism, Law and the State. Verso, London and New York, 2008. 
4 These words come from Bob Jessop’s Marxist Theory and Political Strategy, Palgrave, 1985, London, page 6. 
5 Ibid., page 6. 
6 Op. cit.  Much of this material is based on Jessop’s introduction, from his 1985 book, pages 3-24.   
7 See footnote 1, Introduction. 
8 Jessop, page 7.  
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them to seek training elsewhere, and he followed many of his contemporaries in moving to 
Germany, and then, very quickly, to Paris.  During this time, he was clearly affected by the leftist 
currents flowing through the intellectual sphere, and in its early manifestation, this infatuation led 
him to Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir and existentialism.9  It is also fairly clear that Poulantzas exhibited 
some relatively orthodox male attitudes towards women, and spent much of his time in romantic 
entanglements, a trend that was to carry through to his life in Paris, and on into his marriage to 
Annie Leclerc.10  In Paris, he did his first post-graduate thesis on a legal topic, and his legal training 
seemed a useful precursor to wider concerns, not just with law, but with the broader apparatus of 
the State.  His first major piece of graduate research was on ‘The Rebirth of Natural Law in 
Germany after the Second World War’,11 followed by his doctoral dissertation entitled ‘The Nature 
of Things and Law : an essay on the dialectic of fact and value’.12 
 
Poulantzas, who was now teaching law at the University Pantheon-Sorbonne, was becoming heavily 
involved in both the politics and in the thinking of left intellectuals in Paris in the early 1960’s, and 
this could only mean Sartrean existentialism.13  Sartre was a dominant figure of the left during this 
period.  His particular brand of existentialism focused on the essential nature of human existence – 
what does it take to make us human?  In Being and Nothingness14 Sartre claimed that all human 
existence takes place in a social situation, but is not entirely conditioned by it.  Individuals 
experience freedom to act in a variety of ways, and each of these choices is an expression of that 
freedom.  Indeed, we are doomed to choose – we don’t have any choice about that!15  Human life 
comprises a series of choices that constitute a life project, and this system of choices forms a 
structure of meaning for individuals.  But choices always invoke ethical decisions, and these choices 
are not to be left to the theory of the unconscious to be explained.  Freud had proposed that ethical 
decisions often arise from the unconscious, and were the result of conditioning which was not 
understood by the individual.  Sartre would have none of this.  For him, the choices that we make 
were ethical choices, and we were responsible for them.  Freud’s argument denied the role of 
individual responsibility.  Sartre argued for the opposite position.  We were fully and consciously 
responsible for the choices we made.  These choices we made create the values we embodied, and 
                                                 
9 Jessop, op.cit., pages 7-8. 
10 He married the writer Annie Leclerc in Paris on the 6th of November 1966.  Jessop comments : ‘It was also during this 
period that Poulantzas married the 'budding novelist', Annie Leclerc. They met for the first time in 1963 and were 
married on the 6th December, 1966. Their daughter, Ariane, was born on 2nd July, 1970.’ Jessop, page 10.  Leclerc was 
an important philosopher within the feminist movement who claimed that the entire construction of feminism 
originated in the masculine mind, and that women should learn to celebrate their everyday lives, rather than mimic men 
in the ‘public world of achievement’.  Becoming ‘men’, Leclerc famously claimed, was no great advance for women, and 
the notion that the ‘hard, tough, public world’ of business, politics and law was somehow valorized against the small, 
private and soft world of domestic life was a distinction to be directly challenged.  This line of reasoning turned Leclerc 
into a feminist dissident, a dissident within the movement itself.  Some saw that this line of reasoning merely reinforced 
old systems of patriarchy.  Others saw it as a radical critique, from the ‘left’ of feminism.  She took a break from 
academic life to write novels. 
11 Jessop, page 9. 
12 Jessop, 10. 
13 Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir sat at the center of a group of writers and thinkers, and ran the journal Les 
Temps Modernes, to which Poulantzas contributed.  Their famously open marriage showed the way forward to many of 
their acolytes, and their critique of bourgeois lifestyle, of which they were both products, sat easily with the leftism of 
Poulantzas and others.  It readily bridged the gap between personal challenges, the reinvention of marriage, and 
progressive politics.  
14 Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (1958) transl. Hazel E. Barnes, intr. Mary Warnock, Methuen, 
London. 
15 Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, recovered at http://www.iep.utm.edu/sartre-ex/#H3 on September 28, 2016. 
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this creation of values has a social element to it, because these values could be understood, and 
perhaps taken up, by other people.   
 
In Critique of Dialectical Reasoning16 Sartre extended this argument in a political direction.  If we think 
of political life as an extension of the individual life project that people undertake, we can begin to 
see that while people are born into a given social world, a given social structure, social expectations, 
class structures, a particular moment in history, and so on, this is merely a beginning.  Their 
individual projects act against the existing order and ‘negate’ the old, in Sartre’s terms.  How far this 
individual can go in this reconstruction is very much a product of the condition in which they find 
themselves.  It is obviously constrained, by class, gender, sometimes religion, ethnicity and other 
structural limits.  This argument clearly narrows the wider freedoms he argued for in Being and 
Nothingness.  In Sartre’s political philosophy, which resulted from his war experience, we see a 
movement towards Marxism, and it in this original synthesis of existentialism and Marxism that his 
contribution lies.  He accepted the importance of social classes, but he denied that all human 
behaviour could be reduced to economic class differences, as some were proposing after World War 
Two.  Class analysis, combined with an understanding of the individual project, the personal history, 
might do the trick. 
 
What is important about the Sartrean contribution is that, in the movement from existentialism to a 
kind of modified structuralism, Sartre injects the individual back into class structure.  While he was 
always of the left, and briefly established his own leftist, non-communist party in the 1940s, he 
refused to accept that all human behaviour could be reduced to structure, to social class, to 
economics.  Instead, he claimed that all struggles, whether they be about social class, economic 
scarcity, relations between men and women or whatever else, should not merely be seen as struggles 
of systems, but as battles between living, breathing people, full of their own desires and challenges, 
constrained by the world they lived in, and its objective choices.  This way of thinking was to 
influence Poulantzas as he began to write less about the law, and more about the State. 
 
Poulantzas’s early writing on the State is strongly influenced by several currents.  He came to Paris 
under the influence of a traditional Marxist-Leninist philosophy, in which it was assumed that the 
revolution would take place under the management of the vanguard party, replete with intellectuals, 
not unlike Poulantzas himself, and that the dictatorship of the proletariat would follow.  This would 
result from a ‘War of Manoeuvre’, a phrase we have met before in Gramsci’s work, which implies a 
direct assault on the State, and its subsequent collapse.17  But it is clear from his writing that he never 
fully succumbed to this orthodoxy, even though it was the prevailing current of thought among 
communist parties following the Soviet line, including the KKE, the exterior branch of the 
Communist party of Greece.  His association with the Sartre-de Beauvoir group must have pushed 
this resistance further away from this orthodoxy in the direction of human subjectivity, agency and 
choice.  Yet, as he came under the influence of Althusser, a pressure to consider the importance of 
structure was brought to bear.  These contradictory currents of thought manifest themselves in the 
early writings on the State.18 
 
                                                 
16  Critique of Dialectical Reason 1: Theory of Practical Ensembles (1982) transl. Alan Sheridan-Smith, ed. Jonathan Rée, Verso, 
London. 
17 Jessop, op. cit., 11. 
18 I am concerned here only with his five major books, and I exclude many of the articles he wrote at this time. 
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There are five major books to consider.  The first of his major writings on the State that came to 
light was Political Power and Social Classes,19 published in France in 1968, and according to Jessop’s 
account, widely available to students as they took to the barricades in the quasi-revolution in Paris of 
that year.  Whether many of them understood this dense and extraordinarily complex book is 
another matter.20  The second book to be published was Fascism and Dictatorship, published in 1970 in 
Paris as Fascisme et Dictatures, and which looks back at the situation in Germany and Italy under the 
fascist régimes.  This was followed by Les Classes Sociales Dans le Capitalisme Aujourd'hui, published in 
France in 1973.  With the fall of the dictatorships in 1974, Poulantzas naturally returned to his study 
of fascism with La Crise des Dictatures, which appeared in 1975.  Then, in his final major work, he 
tried to respond to the rise of Michel Foucault in his L’Etat, Le Pouvoir, Le Socialisme, a book that 
appeared in Paris in 1978, just one year before his death. 
 
I take these books out of sequence.  I turn, first of all, to his assessment of fascism as a logical step 
from Gramsci’s own similar preoccupations.  Then I look at his two books on the contemporary 
State and social class – Political Power and Social Classes, and Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, 
and I end with his final riposte to his critics, a case that he sets out in State, Power, Socialism.   
 
 
 
2.  Poulantzas and Early Fascism : Fascism and Dictatorship 
 
In 1970, Poulantzas was living through a tumultuous period, not just in Paris, where the events of 
1968 were still ringing in his ears, but also through his connections in Greece, where the régime of 
the colonels was stumbling towards its end.  He was deeply involved in both these political systems, 
both as a self-proclaimed militant, and as a theorist.  His life seems to have been a mixture of lively 
social activity of various kinds, of political engagement at several levels, and of the most serious 
intellectual activity. A colleague of this time told me informally that his days had a clear pattern.  He 
would rise late, have a drink on the way to the campus, teach, then, in the afternoon, work a little, 
socialize and meet with friends and colleagues.  In the evening, he would go to meetings, social 
gatherings and public occasions before going home to work intensely until the early hours of the 
morning.  No-one who has read Poulantzas seriously can accuse him of being a foppish dilettante.  
However he did it, how he found time for his family, his friends, his political activities, his teaching, 
and still produced so much work is unclear.  Whatever his method of getting things done, his 
intellectual work is of the most extraordinary quality, reflecting his already-established and deep 
commitment to scholarly work.  Like Gramsci, it is full of highly original ideas. 
 
In 1970, Poulantzas published Fascism and Dictatorship.  Presumably he had been working on this text 
for some years, and doubtless back beyond 1968, which is somewhat surprising.  It is surprising 
because it seems to be little connected with the events of the day.  It looks back to the pre-war 
period, and particularly to Italy and Germany.  He takes this issue head-on in his early remarks.  
                                                 
19 Pouvoir Politique et Classes Sociales, (Maspero, Paris, 1968) The English language version is Political Power and Social Classes. 
His reputation was widely enhanced as a result of his debate with Miliband in New Left Review in 1969 in the wake of 
this first book.  We shall review this debate at a later stage when we discuss Political Power and Social Classes. (NLB, 1978).  
See also Poulantzas, Fascism and Dictatorship : The Third International and the Problem of Fascism. NLB, 1974. (originally 
published in 1970); Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. NLB, 1975 (originally published in 1973) ; The Crisis of the 
Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece, Spain. Humanities Press, 1976 ; Poulantzas, Nicos. State, Power, Socialism. NLB, 1978.  
20 Jessop, pages 12-13. 
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Why, he asks, should we be studying fascism right now in 1970?21  But his answer is not immediately 
clear.  He believes that the international system of imperialism is in crisis, and that this crisis ‘is only 
just beginning but … already reaches into the imperialist heartlands themselves’.22  But unless the 
imperialist system was about to turn to fascism, the urgent necessity to write this book on fascism at 
this particular juncture is still not in evidence.  It is clear, as he says that ‘the question of revolution is 
on the agenda’23, but it isn’t at all clear that fascism is on the horizon.  Indeed, within the next five 
years, the dictatorships in Greece, Spain and Portugal were all to fall. 
 
What, asks Poulantzas, is the Soviet Comintern’s24 policy on Fascism?  This will be one of the 
central concerns of the book.  But Poulanztas also hopes to elucidate the broad nature of the 
capitalist State itself : 
 
… the study of fascism as a specific phenomenon of crisis makes it possible to elucidate certain aspects 
of the very nature of the capitalist State.25 
 
Fascism, Poulantzas begins, is a phenomenon of a certain stage of capitalism, according to the 
Comintern.  It is the imperialist stage of capitalism, and in Lenin’s theory, the highest stage of 
capitalism.26  Poulantzas then engages in a long dispute with the economism27 of Lenin and the 
Third International.  Here he sets out a clear separation from the orthodoxy of Moscow : 
 
Imperialism … is not a phenomenon which can be reduced to economic developments alone.  To put 
it more strongly : only in so far as one sees imperialism as a phenomenon with economic, political and ideological 
implications, can the internationalization of social relations particular to this stage be understood.28 
 
Poulantzas has immediately opened the door to a wider understanding of State functioning, an 
understanding that must consider cultural, political and ideological elements, as well as the economic 
conditions.  It was an understanding that had already been offered by Gramsci.  Poulantzas wants to 
argue that fascism arises in Italy and Germany because these two states constituted the weakest links 
in the imperialist chain.  In both cases, industrialization came late, and in both cases the countries 
were dramatically weakened economically by the effects of the First World War.  Here we see the 
first signs of Gramsci’s influence.29  In the Poulantzian view, the Soviet Comintern failed to grasp 
                                                 
21 Fascism and Dictatorship, (FD), page 11. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 The ‘Comintern’ is an abbreviation for the Communist International, or the Third International, an international 
communist organization that Lenin, Stalin and the Soviet Government supported through several congresses.  It was 
dissolved in 1943.  The aim of the Third international was to fight “by all available means, including armed force, for the 
overthrow of the international bourgeoisie and for the creation of an international Soviet republic as a transition stage to 
the complete abolition of the State”.  From http://spartacus-educational.com/RUScomintern.htm. Recovered 
September 29, 2016. 
25 FD, 12. 
26 FD, 18. Lenin, V.I. Selected Works, Progress Publishers, 1963, Moscow, Volume 1, pp. 667-766. 
27 The reduction of all social facts to economic facts.  In historical materialism, it often refers to the reduction of causes 
to a single material cause.  Poulantzas wants to argue more causes were at work than the merely economic, even if these 
economic causes were also important. 
28 FD, 22. My italics. 
29 FD, 31.  
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what was going on, and made a fatal error in judgement.30  Fascism is ‘a form of State and of regime 
at the extreme ‘limit’ of the capitalist State.’31  For Gramsci, Poulantzas reminds us, the Italian 
political crisis is characterized by a crisis of hegemony, which leads to the rise of a new form of State 
and a new dictatorial leader.  The bourgeois class have already lost, and the working class has not yet 
gained the ability to govern the nation.32 
 
The writing in Fascism and Dictatorship may be obscure, but the structure is straightforward enough.  
Having spent the first sixty pages setting up the problematic,33 and arguing with the Comintern 
position, Poulantzas deals with the dominant class, the working class and the petty bourgeoisie in 
turn, each as they relate to fascism.  He ends with sections on the countryside and a general 
discussion of the fascist state.  Let us therefor consider each of these three class relations one by 
one, following the logic of his exposition.   
 
 
 Fascism and the Dominant Classes 
 
In his section on the dominant classes,34 Poulantzas begins by arguing that in capitalism, a complex 
class structure presents itself, and that a ‘power bloc’ must be formed of various classes and 
fractions of classes for there to exists a functioning dominant class.  The nature of this power bloc 
will determine the nature of the State.35  Economic analysis on its own will not suffice ; we will need 
also to deal with political and ideological issues.  Fascism is defined by the way in which the class 
struggle has become politicized.36  This a very Gramscian moment, because Poulantzas is replicating 
the Gramscian argument that, at a particular moment in history, such as the post-war moment in 
Italy, no single element of the class structure can manage to gain hegemony, and that this situation 
provides the gateway for fascism to enter, for the rise of a ‘Master’.  
 
We should start by asking what exactly we are talking about here.  When Poulantzas starts talking 
about the dominant classes, he takes a good deal for granted.  We perhaps should begin by asking 
what constitutes the dominant class – what are its elements?  A major component of the ‘dominant 
class’ is clearly the category Marx called the bourgeoisie.  In The Communist Manifesto37 Marx and 
Engels assert that the rise of capitalism and industrialization brings into being a new class of people 
who own this industry, and thus dominate the new economy.  The new bourgeois class not only 
own and control the new industry, but they bring with them a dominant ideology, a controlling set 
of ideas.  Within this class, however, we may distinguish several components.  Poulantzas often 
refers to monopoly capitalism, and monopoly capitalists.  This is a familiar term in wide use in 
Marxist circles, and it defines those businesses that dominate a particular sector without 
                                                 
30 FD, chapter three.  Poulantzas then exhaustively sets out the positions of Lenin, and members of the various 
congresses of the Comintern, from 1922 to 1928. The result is that the communist movements in Germany and Italy 
also failed to understand the true nature of fascism in their countries. 
31 FD, 57. 
32 FD, 60-61. 
33 A term widely used in Marxism, and stemming from French philosophy which means to set up a question, and the 
method for solving that question, or, more usually, a matrix of questions connected by a system of logic. 
34 FD, 71-135. 
35 In his earlier book Political Power and Social Classes, the definition of the ‘power bloc’ has already been established. (See 
pages 296-303. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Marx, K., Engels, F., Harvey, D., & Moore, S. (2008). The Communist Manifesto. London: Pluto Press. First published in 
London in 1848. 
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competition.  Monopoly capitalism allows a few large companies to dominate economy and society.  
Oligopoly refers to the situation where several large companies agree not to compete, and to divide 
the spoils between them.  It is thus a close relative of monopoly capitalism.  Lenin claimed that the 
First World War allowed these large companies to emerge with the support of the State, and 
proposed that this was capitalism’s plan for the future.  Poulantzas considers this possibility in detail 
as it refers to fascism.  Could it be that the fascist State and monopoly capitalism could merge into 
one?  Poulantzas also mentions finance capitalism, by which he means bankers and those who 
provide the funds for capitalist development.  One of his major contributions is the notion that the 
dominant class, comprising these and other fractions of the ruling category, need to organize a 
‘power bloc’ in order to constitute a proper ruling class, and that without it, they are rudderless. 
 
Now that we have some sense of what Poulantzas meant by the dominant class, let us now consider 
the rise of fascism, and the dominant class’s role in it.  Following Gramsci, Poulantzas points to the 
conditions of the political parties at this crucial juncture, hopelessly unable any more to represent the 
will of the people they are alleged to represent.38  In the early stages of the rise of fascism, 
Poulantzas sees emerge, within the State itself, new forms of organization that seem to parallel the 
structures of the bourgeois parties, such that the emerging State appears to fashion itself into the 
shape of bourgeois interests.  But the bourgeois class are still in a very difficult situation.  They can 
longer represent the interests of their own people, and they are falling further into the hands of the 
new régime.  Here is Poulantzas’s very lively description of the situation : 
 
Cut off from (the people they represent) ... puppets in the death agonies of parliamentary cretinism, 
their fear of the working class only sharpens their delirium.  It is a situation which, before fascism comes 
into power, often gives rise to episodes of unprecedented bedlam.39 
 
Fascism arises, therefore when there is a ‘crisis in the dominant ideology’. 40  In traditional Marxist circles, 
ideology was taken to mean the ideas of a particular class, and especially the ruling class.  But here he 
is taking its use in the Gramscian direction by talking about hegemony and ideology simultaneously.  
The dominant ideology permeates every level of society, so that when there is a crisis of ideology, 
that crisis affects everyone.  Indeed, the ruling elements of society start to doubt their own beliefs – 
the ideological crisis is profound.  The steps in the rise to fascism can now be clearly spelt out.  The 
first is the defeat of the working class, then, second, a period of relative stability, and third, the 
establishment of fascism itself is accompanied by a move by the bourgeois class to take the 
offensive.41  Fascism thus represents a solution to a bourgeois crisis. And Poulantzas wants to argue 
that the rise of fascism is not a result of a simple military takeover but rather it is : 
 
… a mass movement with deep social roots.  It must be stressed that before fascism wins militarily, it 
has already won the ideological and political victory over the working class.42 
 
                                                 
38 The Poulantzas reference is to Prison Notebooks, page 210. 
39 FD, page 75. 
40 FD, page 76. 
41 FD, pages 79-81. Again, Poulantzas wants to continue to argue with the Comintern position that the rise of fascism 
means that big monopoly capital has total control of the fascist State.  In this view the State merely becomes the agent of 
this class fraction.  Too simple, cries Poulantzas, because the State then has no ‘relative autonomy’ from the ‘power bloc 
and its hegemonic fraction.’ (FD, page 83).  Poulantzas is attacking simple instrumentalism here – the idea that the State 
is merely the instrument of the ruling class.  This reflects his debate with Miliband, which we discuss in more detail 
below. 
42 Poulantzas is quoting Clara Zetkin, 23 June, 1923, address to the executive committee of the Comintern. 
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Nor is fascism to be understood merely as the dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie, the small 
landowners and self-employed business people.  Instead, Poulantzas wants to claim that the fascist 
State instead has some independence, some ‘relative autonomy’ from the ruling elements of society.  
It gains relative autonomy, not just from the dominant part of the ruling class, but also from the 
various elements of other classes who have now been subordinated. 
 
As time passes, and fascism establishes itself further, it becomes clear that this new State does not 
represent the interests of all elements of society.  The domination of the monopoly fraction of 
capital becomes more clear.  The small owning class, (the petty bourgeoisie) easily fit within the new 
arrangements.  Indeed, Poulantzas goes as far as to say that the petty bourgeoisie becomes ‘the 
ruling class’ – ‘the class in charge of the state’43 – for a period.  But this moment quickly passes when 
we reach a period of fascist stability : 
 
The period of the stabilization of fascism.  The monopoly capital fraction establishes its hegemony and also 
achieves the status of ruling class … dislodging the petty-bourgeoisie.44 
 
Poulantzas argues that the petty-bourgeoisie ‘continues to be in charge of the State’45, by which I 
take him to mean they provide the personnel for state office, but nonetheless the ruling bloc is now 
governed by monopoly capital.  Poulantzas thus insists both on the periodicity of State formation – 
that there are stages of development that need to be understood, rather than imagining an almost 
instantaneous emergence of the new State, but also he wants to claim that there are complex relations 
between the governing elements of society and the State.  The State is not merely the plaything of monopoly 
capital, as some in the communist party had claimed.  Rather, the State is engaged in an elaborate 
balancing act, seeking to sustain its position as the unifying element in a complex class structure, 
each element of which must be brought into the fold.  The State is not merely a crude instrument of 
capital.  For it to survive, it must maintain its relative autonomy, even from the rulers.   
 
This is a fascinating section.  Poulantzas’s theory of the ‘relative autonomy of the State’ is widely 
used elsewhere in explanations of how ‘normal’ democratic societies hold together.  Poulantzas’s 
powerful claim is that they do so by balancing the requirements of both rulers and dominated, not 
through some simple harmonious agreement, but by making necessary concessions to workers so 
that basic needs are met.  Capitalist interests still hold sway, so this is no simple equilibrium, in 
which everyone gets what they want.  Rather, it is a political necessity if capitalism is to survive.  But 
here Poulantzas is extending his argument to the ‘exceptional’ State under fascism.  Even here, 
where the monopoly of violence is so openly in the hands of the State, it is not enough merely to 
bully those who are dominated into submission.  Instead, following Gramsci, he insists that even 
under these conditions, hegemonic acceptance must be maintained by all parties, and the State must 
retain its relative autonomy from the rulers of society. 
 
Poulantzas then turns to the case studies of Germany and Italy in turn to illustrate these general 
propositions.  In Germany, he sees the rise of monopoly capital46 as one of the preconditions for the 
                                                 
43 FD, 87. 
44 FD, 87. 
45 FD, 88. 
46 By ‘Monopoly Capitalism’, Marxists here refer to a later stage of capitalist development than that widely discussed by 
Marx.  One line of argument suggests that competition defined the era in which Marx wrote, and this era of competition 
had largely disappeared by the 20th. century, with the rise of large, dominant corporations that overwhelmed their 
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rise of fascism.  The rise of monopolies gave rise to sharpened class conflict.47  First, these class 
struggles involved battles between business owners (the bourgeoisie) and large landowners.  
Landowners lost power, and industrialists gained power.  Then, legislation that controlled rents had 
the effect of reducing income to landowners.48  And landowners had to mechanize to survive, 
placing them further in debt.  Coupled with the control over prices for agricultural produce that 
monopolies held, the future was grim for the landowners.  Small and medium businesses tried to ally 
with rural interests, but these efforts were not successful :49  
 
… the whole economic policy of national socialism in this field was aimed at cementing the alliance between 
big monopoly capital and the large landowners, but to the clear advantage of the former and to the detriment of the rural 
masses.50 
 
The analysis is sophisticated.  It is not simply a case of fascism supporting the big money interests.  
Rather, Poulantzas is able to show us that these two fractions of the dominant class are both 
brought within the sphere of the State’s influence, but that one fraction predominates in the end.  At 
the same time, he tells us the rural masses are ignored.  And, in the following pages, he outlines how 
the various elements of the owning class were engaged in a struggle one with another.51  Small 
business tried to ally themselves with working class interests to avoid being overwhelmed by the 
large corporations.  And within the ‘large capital’ group there were struggles between industry and 
banking.  Industries tried to form their own banks but they were not successful.52  After 1929, in the 
crisis of the Depression, the pre-fascist State tended to support the big banks.  In the end, the 
economic crisis of 1929-1932 had the effect of further concentrating wealth, though not without 
considerable struggle and resistance from medium capital interests.53 
 
With the rise of fascism, these contradictions were diminished : 
 
 … this neutralization was the result of an economic policy favourable to big monopoly capital (i.e. to finance capital), 
favourable therefore to the establishment in the German social formation of the dominance of monopoly capital.54 
 
Again, the fascist State did not simply side with large businesses against their smaller counterparts.  
The economy gained strength with Hitler, and, to some extent, all boats rose together.55  The real 
losers were working people.  And indeed, given the needs of the emerging war State, with a massive 
and increasing demand for heavy industry, the slow, logical movement of monopoly capital towards 
the war economy was inevitable.  But this did not mean that the State ignored smaller businesses.56  
Again, Poulantzas is reminding us that no simple obliteration of one class fraction by another will 
suffice as an adequate analysis of the historical facts.  Poulantzas argued that the State regulated the 
economy, which allowed these class contradictions to endure, but to be managed.57 
                                                 
competition.  This is the rise of an advanced Monopoly Capital, in which wealth and political power concentrated in the 
hands of the few, isolated from economic competition by their dominance in the particular market that they occupy. 
47 FD, 89. 
48 FD, 90-91 
49 FD, 91. 
50 FD, 92.  The italics appear in the original. 
51 FD, 93ff.  
52 FD, 94.  
53 FD, 95. 
54 FD, 95. Italics in the original. 
55 FD, 96. 
56 FD, 96. 
57 FD, 97.  
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A familiar pattern of argumentation is now beginning to assert itself.  Poulantzas wants to claim that 
the State, and even the ‘exceptional’ fascist State, engages in the absorption of class struggles within 
its apparatus.  It does not seek to end or eviscerate class conflicts and class struggles.  Instead it 
attempts to manage them.  This argument is repeated widely in Poulantzas’s work, as we shall 
discover further into this discussion.  The complexity of this argument, allowing for the various 
strands and elements of class struggle to be assessed and evaluated, contrasts rather sharply with the 
Third International’s approach.58  While the Comintern suggested that monopoly capital was the 
‘death agony of ‘decaying’ capitalism’, Poulantzas wants instead to argue that fascism pushes 
capitalism forward dramatically : 
 
… fascism really represents a development of capitalist forces of production, that is within the limits of 
imperialist social relations.  It represented industrial development, technological innovation, and an increase 
in the productivity of labour – but all the while … reinforcing class exploitation and domination.59 
 
Poulantzas then turns his attention to the political and ideological elements, expanding his analysis 
of class relations well beyond the economic and into the spheres of the superstructure.60  Things 
were falling apart in Germany on a hegemonic level in the 1920’s.  While large capital was 
developing, these fractions of the ruling class were not carrying the nation with them ideologically ; 
they did have hold of the national common sense.61  The left gained power in 1928, but were hit 
immediately by the economic crisis of 1929, and no-one could put together a policy that was widely 
accepted : 
 
… no element was able to gain hegemony.  Internal political struggles within the power bloc became so sharp 
that no element in it succeeded, even for a short period, in imposing a policy which represented both 
its specific interests and the general political interests of the bloc.62 
 
In Prison Notebooks, Gramsci had earlier argued that the political sphere falls apart when political 
parties no longer manage to represent their constituents adequately.63  In the period just before 
Hitler’s rise to power, this was especially true of the landowners and large capital in Germany.64  
Some elements of the landowning class favoured military dictatorship ; at the same time, para-
military organizations started to form.  Given the break between constituents and parties, the 
parliamentary system became redundant.65  Employers’ associations now started to become very 
powerful.  Some thought they could use the Nazi party to further their own aims. 
 
At the same time, an ideological crisis had developed that paralleled the political crisis.  Bismarck 
had managed to create a ‘revolution from above’66, but this had been under the tutelage of the 
                                                 
58 The thinking of Soviet theorists, and especially those voices heard in the various congresses of the Third International 
are continually echoing in Poulantzas’s mind as he writes these pages.  He takes plenty of time to contrast his own view 
with that of orthodox Soviet thinking, being especially critical of the ‘economism’ and false thinking of this tendency. 
(FD, 97-99) 
59 FD, 98. 
60 FD, 100-108. 
61 FD, 100. 
62 FD, 101. 
63 PN, Pages 30-31. 
64 FD, 102.  
65 FD, 102. 
66 FD, 103. 
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landowning class.  The new industrial bourgeoisie had not been able to develop an ideology of their 
own : 
 ‘Liberalism’, an important aspect of bourgeois ideology in the process of laying the foundations of 
European capitalism, never succeeded in taking root in Germany.  The dominant ideology until the end 
of the First World War was in fact feudal ideology, but feudal ideology transformed to embrace the 
bourgeoisie’s own interests : militarism , the cult of State despotism etc., … none of the broad, liberal 
nationalist movements of other European countries could be found in Germany before the war.  
German nationalism took direct military expression : it was dominated at that step by feudal ideology.67 
 
It was then a logical step to move from feudal ideology to the ideology of big capital directly without 
the need to attend to the ideas of the middle classes – no period of competitive capitalism was 
required.  At this point, Poulantzas calls upon Althusser’s notion of the ‘ideological State apparatus’ 
a familiar element of the Althusserian theoretical armature, which refers to those institutional parts 
of the State that develop and support the cultural structure of society, viewed in the broadest sense.  
But he has little to say about the State itself at this point.  Instead he notes the rise of a variety of 
romantic nationalist movements harking back to the ideas of the Weimar republic, the significance 
of the universities, the extension of the media, the rise of the cinema and the radio as elements of 
the developing ideological structure, and the emergence of ‘various ‘intellectual circles, clubs, groups, 
etc.’68  These ideological movements not only establish a bulwark against working class ideas, but 
they also try to provide a coherent ideology for the ruling class in a period of substantial turmoil.  
The parliamentary system came under increasing attack because of its failure to achieve any 
substantial goals.  In this context : 
 
It was fascism that was to reunite the power bloc, under the hegemony of big capital.69 
 
Thus fascism represented a dramatic step forward for capitalism, and especially the monopoly 
capitalist interests.  Far from being the last stage of capitalism, it suggested a capitalism of the future.  
Perhaps this is why Poulantzas is fascinated by these old régimes when facing the new conditions of 
the 1970’s.  Perhaps, in that moment before the collapse of the dictatorships in Greece, Portugal and 
Spain, he thought that fascism might emerge again all over Europe.  It was certainly experiencing a 
resurgence in Latin America.  The 1920’s had seen a series of steps taken by the ruling classes against 
workers and peasants.  The momentary appearance of social democracy soon gave way to the 
interests of what Poulantzas now routinely calls ‘big capital’. 
 
How, finally, did the Nazi Party achieve power, and sustain its hegemony?  The Party was crushed in 
1923 after an attempted coup.70  But it grew rapidly again, so that by 1927 it had 72,000 members, 
108,000 in 1928 and 178,000 in 1929.71  At the same time, close connections were being built 
between large capital and the Party.  Some of the old elements of the landowning classes also came 
to be involved.  At the same time, the Nazi Party sought to maintain close ties with working people.  
The Party was playing both sides of the game.  Nonetheless when the Party came to power, it was 
clearly in close alliance with the largest capitalist interests : 
 
With the coming to power of national socialism, the political hegemony of big capital was secured, the 
dislocation between political hegemony and economic domination was resolved, and the growth of its 
economic domination accelerated.  In this process, advancing by steps and with not a few diversions, 
                                                 
67 FD, 103-104. 
68 FD, 105. 
69 FD, 107. 
70 FD, 109.   
71 Ibid.   
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big capital used the fascist party, the fascist State and fascist ideology to successfully impose a general 
policy which unified the power bloc under its aegis, overcoming politically the economic contradictions 
rife within it.72 
 
In its wake, traditional political parties were swept away, and major elements of the left-wing, anti-
capitalist elements of the Nazi party were purged.  Close ties were made with the petty bourgeoisie, 
who provided the needed officials for a rapidly expanding State.  But this was only a mechanism for 
establishing the State.  It was soon clear that those in charge came from the ranks of big capital, 
even though the Nazi Party established a relatively autonomous State quite capable of taking 
independent action if required.  The petty bourgeoisie still played a part in the State, and the Nazi 
Party continued to struggle to secure the various elements of the class structure into a coherent 
whole.73 
 
In Italy, fascism developed earlier than in Germany, but it also developed more slowly.  Agriculture 
was archaic, and industry was only partly formed.  During the establishment of the fascist régime, 
there was widespread land speculation and a surge in industrial development.  The two fractions of 
the ruling bloc were moving in different directions.74  There was some difficulty, therefore, in 
bringing the two fractions together.  Large and medium capital were also at odds.  Medium capital, 
concerned with consumer goods, were at loggerheads with heavy industry.75  Alliances formed 
between landowners and medium capital against large capital interests.  In addition, banking and 
industrial capital were at odds.76  This is a familiar pattern of exposition.  Poulantzas sees the Italian 
political landscape riven with class divisions, and we anticipate that the emerging fascist State will be 
faced with the problem of amalgamation, as we have seen outlined in the German case. 
 
In the Italian case, industry was less well-developed than in Germany.  There were attempts by 
industry to buy the banks, possible because of huge war profits.77  With the arrival of fascism, 
industrial monopoly capital finally succeeded in gaining a dominant position.  And, again in contrast 
to Germany, the State intervened to strengthen ‘big capital’ against landed interests.78  Similarly, 
fascism supported big capital against medium capital interests.79 
 
The relationship between landowners and big capital attracts special consideration.80  From 
the Marxist position these two class categories represent two modes of production, two ways 
of doing economic business.  The rise of large capital means both that agriculture becomes a 
more fully capitalist enterprise, but also that the old way of life dissolves.  Feudalism 
disappears, and the old relationships between owner and worker in the country disappear.81  
                                                 
72 FD, 111. 
73 FD, 111-113. 
74 FD, 114-115. 
75 FD,  115.  
76 FD, 116. 
77 FD, 116. 
78 FD, 117. 
79 Poulantzas uses the term ‘medium capital’ in much of this discussion, and it is not entirely clear what he means.  It 
seems likely he wants to distinguish between large-scale banking, finance and industry and smaller-scale enterprise, and, 
at the other end, from owner-run businesses, the self-employed petty bourgeoisie.  He provides no further clarification. 
80 FD, 118-123. 
81 This is not to suggest some utopian paradise in which the rural sector dissolves into an elysian landscape – far from it.  
But from a legal standpoint, the old structures of serfdom are removed. 
 14 
Capitalist agriculture proved far more productive that feudalism.  At the same time, however, 
industrial capital grew at a much faster rate than rural capital.82  
 
Following his pattern of exposition established in the German case study,  Poulantzas now turns to 
political and ideological issues.  It Italy, the emerging bourgeoisie had been able to provide 
leadership in the social democratic moment.  In these conditions medium capital was able to thrive.  
But from 1920, big capital started to work towards hegemonic domination, and this new impetus 
lead to hegemonic instability.83  The new offensive was a failure.  Rural interests and medium capital 
were never drawn under this new ideological umbrella.  Poulantzas points out that the Catholic 
Church, through the agency of the Popular Party, represented rural interests during this period.84  
Again, the moment was reached in which no-one was able to establish a lasting hegemony, and into 
this gap Mussolini and the fascist party were able to move forward.  However, the struggle was long 
and hard.  Medium capital held sway in parliament.  Political parties still represented important 
interests well into the 1920’s.   But soon the entire parliamentary and party system was being 
superseded by other interests : 
 
From 1920, the economic cooperative bodies (Confederation of Industry, Confederation of 
Agriculture) played an increasing part, by-passing the role of the political parties ; para-military 
organizations were formed as nuclei of class organizations … Big capital aimed for a coup d’état and a 
solution through military dictatorship … the political role of the army was growing … 85 
 
Initially, some liberal interests aligned with the emerging fascists.  At the same time, the ideological 
struggle was taking place.  Capitalism had come to fruition in Italy under bourgeois management, 
unlike Germany.  But this ideology experienced a substantial crisis at the end of World War One.86 
The old bourgeois system of ideas no longer met the requirements of big business.  Italian fascism 
was able to attach itself to this new movement.  While the emerging hegemony of fascism 
developed, it was resisted, as might have been anticipated, by medium capital and by landowners.  
Working class interests were also clearly being overlooked. 
 
In the ideological apparatuses, the struggle was especially sharp.  In the universities and in the 
Church, these struggles were powerfully felt.  Thus, Poulantzas concludes : 
 
… the rise of fascism represents a step of offensive strategy on the part of the power bloc, and, in particular, 
of big capital.87   
 
For all the differences between the German and the Italian cases, Poulantzas is able to show, in both 
instances, that fascism constitutes a revolutionary move forward for monopoly capital interests.  It is 
not the last gasp of capitalism, but rather a surge forward, not least because of the sophisticated way 
in which complex class struggles, both within and between classes, are held together within the 
structure of the State, and because of the huge technological and industrial strides that were made 
under these new régimes.  Poulantzas’s notion of the power bloc, his use of hegemony to extend his 
                                                 
82 Poulantzas breaks off here to attack his enduring enemies at the Comintern, showing how faulty their reasoning was 
on this question, adding to the list of their errors. See pages 120-123.  
83 FD, 124. 
84 Ibid.   
85 FD, 126. 
86 FD, 128ff. 
87 FD, 130. 
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analysis from the economic to the political and ideological, and his detailed historical analysis 
together constitute a significant advance in the analysis of the rise of fascism. 
 
Poulantzas now summarizes his argument.  Can we now see how the fascist party connected itself to 
the power bloc?  In Italy, big capital were slow to support emerging fascist groups.  Rural fascism 
developed early, and Mussolini very soon developed alliances with medium capital and with the 
socialists.88  This led to clashes with rural elements in the party, and, very soon, as the party moved 
in a rightist direct, to a breaking with the left tendencies.  Poulantzas argues that Mussolini was then 
able to neutralize medium capital by taking a liberal turn – indeed Mussolini seems to be turning left 
and right, twisting this way and that simply to hold the party together.89  In any event in 1921 he 
comments : 
 
The State must be limited to its purely juridical and political functions.  Let the State give us police to 
protect decent people from villains, a well-organized system of justice, an army ready for any eventuality, 
and a foreign policy to serve the national interest.  All the rest, and I do not even exclude the secondary 
schools, must return to individual private initiative.  If you want to save the State, you must abolish the 
collectivist State handed down by the force of events and by the war ... 90 
 
It is a very curious statement to make if he did not make it merely out of the necessity to 
compromise and embrace many categories in the broader fascist project, because this period 
immediately precedes an unprecedented extension of State activities in the service of large capital 
interests.  Very soon, by, 1922, the Vatican declared support for the new régime.  As the State 
developed further , big capital was able to secure its interests in a convincing way.  Medium capital 
were brought into the fold to keep the peace. And by 1925, all political parties were dissolved into 
the State.91  Mussolini had, until this time, been able to keep close ties with working class movement.  
Between 1923 and 1925, these elements of the party were purged from its ranks, sometimes in 
pitched battles.  And any other elements of resistance were cleared from the ranks of the army and 
the broader State apparatus. 
 
In Germany the petty bourgeoisie provided the personnel for the State, and acted as a ruling class, 
while Italian fascism initially used the bourgeois class, only later turning to the petty bourgeoisie.92  
In the final stages of the development of the fascist State, big capital interests took over the 
dominant positions in State institutions, both in Italy and in Germany.  Using the petty bourgeoisie 
in each case allowed the State to develop relative autonomy from big capital.93  Again, as we have 
seen before, the Poulantzian vision is of the State wrestling and controlling the class fractions and 
class conflicts of the past, while ensuring the emergence of an ever-stronger monopoly capital 
fraction into the future.94 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 FD, 132.   
89 FD, 133. 
90 Mussolini, quoted in FD,  pages 132-133. 
91 FD, 133 
92 FD, 134. 
93 Ibid. 
94 FD, 135. 
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 Fascism and the Working Class 
 
Poulantzas now turns his attention to the working class.  It is now clear in broad terms what is 
meant by the working class, the proletariat.  These are the people formed by capitalism into a new 
class, a people who have merely their labour to sell.95  They are the other side of the coin to the 
bourgeoisie, who require them to take part in the industrial process if profit is to be accrued.  In 
industrial society, this group constituted a vast majority of the population, as people flooded into the 
cities to join the new economic system. 
 
Poulantzas has already made mention of how working class interests were allied with the fascist State 
in the early years of its development, in both Italy and in Germany.  Indeed, it is well to remember 
how closely allied both fascist parties were to working class social movements in the early stages of 
the development of the fascist parties.  Now he fleshes out how this relationship developed in both 
countries more fully.  He begins by taking aim at his old enemies in the Comintern, who in his view, 
have again misunderstood the situation again.96  For Poulantzas, the situation is very clear – the rise 
of fascism constitutes a series of defeats for the working class.  There was indeed a revolutionary 
moment that presented itself in the wake of World War One in each country, but in each country 
the left failed to take advantage of the situation.97  Gramsci has already told us that in Italy, the left 
were long on rhetoric, but short on organization.98  It is a process of defeat that Poulantzas is pointing 
out, not a single moment of destruction.  This resulted from weak organization and poor strategy.  
Working class interests did survive the early years of fascism in each country, even when the State 
appeared to be moving decisively against them.  But not only did the working class lose in the 
political and economic realms ; they were damaged also ideologically.  The communist parties in 
both countries made a poor job of leading the mass of ordinary people.99  This failure was connected 
with the failure of Marxist-Leninist doctrines to provide the ideological leadership required in the 
specific conditions faced in Italy and Germany.  Instead, workers remained invested in the system as 
it stood.  They supported traditional trade unions and reformist policies, believing that their best 
chance of amelioration still remained with the established institutions of society.  Among small 
business and small farmers, the petty bourgeoisie, there were also strong anti-capitalist sentiments, 
including some interest in anarchy, a failure to believe in organizations, and a strong belief in 
violence to gain one’s ends.100  Of course, some of these ideological elements were not foreign to 
fascism, especially the resort to violence, and thus, in the early days, these sentiments were shared 
widely, both within the petty bourgeoisie and the fascist movement, as well as among workers.  But 
much of this thinking had little to do with Marxism or the revolutionary movements taking place 
elsewhere, and especially in Russia.  The strategies proposed were labelled ‘ultra-left’, too far left for 
orthodox thinking, so labelled because those who followed such a doctrine chose to go beyond the 
organizational umbrella of the party, and act on their own.  The Comintern were willing to go so far 
as to label such activities as opening the door to fascism.  If only these people had followed our 
direction, they would have avoided fascism after all, seemed to be the message.101 
                                                 
95 In the Marxist lexicon, the term ‘labour power’ is often used.  This refers to the notion that people sell their capacity 
to work, their potential labour. In the end they sell their labour, but initially they offer their labour potential, their mental 
and physical resources.  
96 FD, 139. 
97 Ibid.  
98 Gramsci, 37. 
99 FD, 144.  
100 FD, 145. 
101 FD, 146-147.  
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There was also the problem of social democracy.102  In the early days, fascism incorporated elements 
of social democracy within its structure.  Such a move promised a chance for working class interests 
to be represented within the structure of the emerging State.103  Social democracy, Poulantzas argues, 
provides a way forward in which the bourgeoisie are able to sustain power, while providing 
concessions to the working class.  It offers a moderate way forward.  It does this, according to 
Poulantzas, through ideological means : 
 
The bourgeoisie being unable to rule through organized physical repression alone, and ideology not 
existing only in ideas, the bourgeois State has as its disposal in all circumstances one or more ideological state 
apparatuses specially designed to inculcate bourgeois ideology into the working class.104 
 
The social democratic party represents the normal party of the capitalist State.  It has within it 
political parties that represent working class interests, as well as those of the ruling classes, along 
with small business parties, and other group advocates.  All in all, it offers a class compromise to 
each sector of society, even if, in the end, it remains under the tutelage of dominant class interests.  
For Lenin, such a party is a ‘ ‘workers party’ carrying out the policy of the bourgeoisie’.105  But this simply 
won’t do for Poulantzas.  In contrast, he wants to argue that the bourgeoisie just can’t use such a 
structure to get what they want, and thus their power is deeply compromised.  Instead, fascism, the 
‘exceptional State’, offers a far clearer victory for the ruling class, and thus the two forms of régime 
must be clearly separated.  In the end, social democracy must be destroyed if fascism, and the 
dominant hegemonic power bloc, is to succeed.  Social democracy offers the hope of a better world 
for working people.  For Poulantzas, this is a false hope and a way of stemming genuine change.  In 
this long discussion about social democracy and social fascism, it is remarkable how often the 
discussion moves back to Gramsci’s argument that the crisis is pushed forward whenever parties 
lose their connections to those they represent.106  The position is simple in the end, however.  Social 
democracy cannot provide the conditions that the ruling classes require for the furtherance of their 
interests, and the fascist solution is followed. 
 
Given this background, one can foreshadow what Poulantzas might have to say about the 
Communist parties in Italy and Germany, and their role in all this.  In Italy the party first followed a 
united front strategy, trying to bring all the left elements together under a single umbrella.  But the 
strategy fell apart, both in Italy and in Germany because of disputes about who was acceptable and 
who was not within the new political structure.  The left seemed to enjoy fighting among themselves 
more than fighting the ruling class.  Indeed, instead of fighting fascism, the strategy seemed to be to 
fight social democracy first, with disastrous consequences for the solidarity of the movement.107 
                                                 
102 By social democracy is meant a society committed to equality and social justice through non-revolutionary means.  
This strategy of government involves strong government intervention to regulate the excesses of capital in order to 
ensure a basic level of welfare support for the less well advantaged.  Some commentators, Bob Jessop, for example, have 
called it ‘the best possible shell’ for capitalism, allowing the State to smooth off the rough edges of the capitalist system 
while allowing the ruling class to get on with business as usual.  Poulantzas calls this the ‘normal’ state of capitalism, and 
refers routinely to fascism as the ‘exceptional’ State. 
103 Poulantzas now heads off into a long critique of Comintern policy on social democracy.  Lenin famously said ‘Social-
Democracy is objectively the moderate wing of fascism’, (FD, 148. cited from Works, volume 6, Moscow, 1952-1955, 
page 294) as if to suggest they are all one and the same thing.  Poulantzas goes to great length to show the errors in such 
thinking.  See pages 148-151. 
104 FD, 151. Italics in the original. 
105 Ibid. 
106 FD, 154. 
107 FD, 161. 
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How did the working class actually fare under fascism?  The political violence of the fascist 
movement is taken for granted.  In the early stages in the ideological sphere there were elements of 
working class ideology that still remained, but as the State developed, these ideas became embedded 
into the corporatist-syndicalism that Gramsci had already carefully outlined in the Italian case.  This 
new ideology included old elements of feudalism, nostalgia for a past that never existed, a 
commitment to a negotiated agreement between capital and labour, and arguments that suggested a 
level of control over the workplace that might be ceded to the workers themselves.108  Thus 
Poulantzas concludes that while the working class were never completely crushed by fascism, the 
joint effects of physical violence, the reshaping of the ideological apparatus, and the reduction of 
unemployment all had a significant role in limiting the possibilities for any realistic political 
alternatives.109 
 
Poulantzas now sets out the history of this process in Germany.110  It starts with the attempted leftist 
coup in 1918-19 ; then the Kapp Putsch of 1920, a right-wing attempt to wrestle control of the 
government from the leftist Weimar Republic ; the rising of the Ruhr workers, a brief leftist 
insurrection that momentarily gave control to workers in several cities, and which was cruelly 
crushed by the right ; a series of uprisings by the German Communist party, the KPD, in Prussia.  In 
1923, the KPD formed alliances with the government, and established workers’ councils.  This was a 
form of capitulation.  The Weimar Republic had established some concrete gains for workers : 
 
The Weimar Constitution … was based on the extension of universal suffrage to both sexes, and on 
direct and proportional election.  This made room for the presence of small parties in parliament, and 
the direct expression of the masses there.  The eight-hour day was introduced ; collective bargaining 
was instituted, and unemployment insurance was set up.  Factory committees … could … inspect the 
books of the factory and participate in trade-union development. Agricultural workers obtained the 
right of association and flocked into the unions en masse.111  
 
These advances were later undermined by fascism but not entirely ‘wiped out’.112  The Weimar 
Republic, established in a universe where 75% of the population were working people, had to be 
seen to be making concessions to the working class.  It would not have survived without such a 
strategy.  But as fascism started its rise, these working class institutions were gradually reduced in 
size and importance.  Exhaustion had set in, and declines in union membership were soon seen.113  
 
At the same time, the German Communist Party, the KPD, had become cut off from the majority 
of working people.  Once a truly mass party, by the end of the 1920’s, it had become a shadow of its 
former self.  Initially, because it took the parliamentary road, it gained electoral support.  In May 
1924, it secured 12.6% of the electorate, and by November 1932, 16.9%.  However, at the same 
time, membership in the party had reduced dramatically, and it had followed a social democratic 
path, giving up many of its traditional beliefs.  Calls for a general strike within the party membership 
fell on deaf ears on several occasions.114  There were strong divisions within the party. 
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The social democratic trend within the working class had become dominant, both within the KPD, 
and beyond it, among socialists in general.  German fascism in its early incarnation had some 
elements of this ideology within its structure.  Indeed, Nazism promised trade union representation.  
The Nazi Party also encouraged direct action, both in the shape of general strikes, and in the sense 
of forming action squads to meet certain specific goals.115  Corporatism and syndicalism, 
characteristics of Italian fascism in its mature stage, were also elements of Nazi ideology.  This 
model of unions and employers structured within the arms of the State was widely propagated.  
Trade unions were anticipated to have a substantial role in the evolving State to keep an eye on 
overly-greedy employers. 
 
Social democracy held powerful sway over a large number of workers, with the Social Democratic 
Party, the SPD, holding over 20% of the vote for many years, and experiencing an increase in 
membership.  The social democratic story in Germany can be seen as a long history of compromise 
with the established order.116  The social democrats had an armed militia, but they did not use it.  
Even after Hitler’s rise to power, they sought compromise with the new authorities. 
 
By contrast, the German Communist Party (KPD) have been characterised as ‘ultra-left’ during this 
period.117  But, in Poulantzas’s view, this was a mistaken analysis.  While the communist still 
favoured a direct attack on the State, they rarely acted in this way.  Some have argued that the KPD 
recruited only from the lower strata of the working class, and among the unemployed, but this 
appears to be a false position.  In fact, many of the membership were employed, and as many as 
40% were skilled workers.118  They did not collaborate with the social democrats, claiming that ‘the 
revolution was imminent,’119 and that the social democrats were in bed with the established order.  
But the KPD never set up alternative structures to promote a direct assault on the state.  On the 
contrary, they depended on trade union structures to promote their cause, hardly a revolutionary 
strategy.  Thus the communists came to be revisionist in practice, and hardly further to the left than 
the social democrats in many respects, whatever their revolutionary rhetoric might say.120 
 
The KPD believed that, as a result of an inevitable economic crisis, that a revolution was on the 
cards, and they sat back and waited for the crisis to happen.  Of course, a contrary view would be 
that the party ought to work towards this goal : 
 
Work for it? Rather they would wait for it, until the moment of insurrection arrive punctually on the ‘great 
day’.121 
 
The KPD continued throughout the 1920’s to believe that electoral success was inexorable, and that 
the real enemy was social democracy, and not Nazism.122  It is somewhat striking to realize the 
extraordinary animosity that existed towards social democrats, who one might imagine would be 
natural allies in the struggle for progress, but it stems, very clearly, from the KPD’s deep attachment 
to the ‘revolution or nothing’ position of ultra-leftism.  And the KPD did nothing in the countryside 
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among peasants and small farmers, who readily sided with fascism.  Like the social democrats, the 
communists also had an armed militia, but apart from a few skirmishes, they also failed to engage 
the Nazis in sustained battles.  It is hard to disagree with Poulantzas when he claims that the 
revolutionary fervour of the communists was little more than dilettantism.123 
 
With Hitler’s accession to power, the KPD seemed to have acquiesced at every moment, failing to 
take any direct action of any kind.  No-one in the communist movement outside Germany could 
believe what had happened.  Poulantzas reminds us that they were the communist party most closely 
aligned with Moscow,124 but there were clear indications that ‘following the line’ of direct 
confrontation with the State was consistently resisted.  Communists did fight heroically in the 
resistance against Nazism after they came to power, but it was mostly a case of too little, too late. 
 
The final part of the story is to assess what happened within the Nazi State to the working class.125  
Were the promises of strong trade unions carried out?  Were employers constrained in their 
demands?  Before their rise to power, the Nazis had campaigned hard in the factories to secure 
support from the industrial working class.  They were most successful among highly-paid workers 
and the best educated.  They were less successful among the rank and file,126 though they did best 
among the peasantry recently recruited into factory work and among the unemployed.  
Unemployment was a massive problem in 1932, with 5,500,00 out of work,127 and one might imagine 
this was fertile territory for the Nazis.  But, Poulantzas argues, the majority of the working class 
stayed loyal to the social democrats and the communists.  So what was going on, exactly? 
Poulantzas poses the question in this way : 
 
… the thing to be explained is the neutralization and passivity of the working class which national socialism 
affected. 
 The ideological aspect of national socialism is fundamental here.  Firstly, this ideology had a 
strong ‘anti-capitalist’ side, a typical sign of the petty bourgeoisie in revolt.  In the generalised ideological 
crisis of the rise of fascism, this petty-bourgeois anti-capitalist aspect … was extended to the working 
class.  But that was not all : national socialism, under the inspiration of its ‘left’ wing led by the Strasser 
brothers, took up some really socialist-sounding slogans.128 
 
Indeed, Poulantzas reminds us that in the early 1920s, the national socialists had proposed the 
nationalization of private industry, not to secure it for the working class, but to ensure that all of 
society would benefit.129  Corporatism and co-management was also widely discussed within Nazi 
party circles. 
 
When the party came to power, they were able to deal systematically with the massive problem of 
unemployment.  While there had been 5,500,000 unemployed in 1932, by the time World War Two 
was declared, the problem had disappeared entirely.130  Wages did not fall in real terms under 
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national socialism.  At the heart of the national socialist strategy was a wage hierarchy that had the 
political effect of dividing the working class.  The predominant argument was that exceptional 
productivity should be rewarded.131  In Poulantzas’s view, the Nazi régime attacked the working 
class in several ways, not merely by establishing a wage hierarchy : 
 
… it was not only or even mainly through its economic policy that national socialism could neutralize 
the working class.  It also did so by police terror, and especially by the total reorganization of the 
ideological state apparatuses … this neutralization proceeded by steps.132 
 
A period of compromise was followed by the dissolution of the old trade unions, and their 
replacement by new ones of the régime’s devising.  There was also an attempt to get rid of employer 
organizations, and to bring them also into the new structure of the State.  But in the end, employers 
remained independent.  Thus the attempt by the Nazis to follow a syndicalist strategy that would 
embrace capital and labour failed, and the private sector were able to maintain a large degree of 
autonomy, not unlike the situation in Italy. 
 
The purpose of the newly-formed unions was not merely to control workers, but to win over their 
hearts and minds – it was an ideological initiative.  Fascism, it appears, could not survive without 
forming a new ideology for the working class through a new ‘Labour Front’ which they had 
formed.133  At the same time, even though the ‘Labour Front’ was a fascist organization through and 
through, it was always mistrusted by the State, and by the private employers, who had successfully 
managed to maintain their separation from the State’s attempts to co-opt them into the new 
structures. 
 
Poulantzas then turn his attention to the Italian situation.  We can already see the nature of his 
analysis quite clearly.  He is extending his class analysis beyond that of the Comintern in two ways.  
First, his attention to detail in assessing the various classes and fractions of classes is very elaborate 
and sophisticated.  Not only is it surprising in its close attention to the various elements of the class 
structure, and to the fragmentary nature of various classes, but this approach is accompanied also by 
a detailed historical account of the period in question.  We see classes rise and fall.  Second, he is at 
pains to extend class analysis well beyond economism, beyond the limits often set by the Soviet line, 
in which, first and last, it is the economic dimension that attracts all the theoretical and political 
attention.  With Poulantzas, this limitation is overcome with the extension of economic analysis into 
the realms of political and ideological activity.  This he does quite explicitly by assigning specific 
sections of the text to each topic. As we approach his coverage of Italy and the working class, we 
will anticipate that this theoretical approach will be repeated.  
 
He begins by reminding us of the post-war situation in Italy.  As with Germany, economic crisis laid 
the foundation for any possible uprising.  In Italy, this took the form of strikes, rather than a general 
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insurrection.134  In 1919 and 1920, there appeared a series of worker-soldier alliances (soviets) and 
these new structures gained some brief authority, but they had no staying power and quickly 
dissolved.  1920 saw a further rise in strike activity, and a general strike resulted in the temporary 
establishment of workers’ councils in many factories.  The new councils made sure wages were paid, 
and production continued, this time under a new form of management.135  Again, while this may have 
been a ‘revolutionary moment’, the moment passed, and did not extend from the factories to society 
in general.  By the start of 1921, the workers’ movement had faltered, and one could see elements of 
the fascist movement on the rise.136  But progress had nonetheless been made : 
 
… the working class had won some important political and economic gains in the process : substantial 
wage increases ; an eight-hour day ; the generalization of collective bargaining ; factory committees ; 
direct universal suffrage ; and relative autonomy in the management of community affairs in red areas. 
These gains were constantly undermined during the rise of fascism, but the representatives of medium 
capital allowed them to persist to an extent unacceptable to big capital up to the time fascism came to 
power.137 
 
Nonetheless, the revolutionary moment had past, the strike rate subsided, and the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI) had failed to make close alliances with the majority of workers.  As in the 
German situation, the party was split, some, including Gramsci, seeking an alliance with the socialist 
party, others preferring anything but this alliance, paralleling the bitter struggles in Germany between 
the social democrats and the communists.  This ‘splittism’ is a pattern that has hounded the left for 
many years, such that the bitterness between various left fractions, the name-calling, the insults and 
the abuse, has often captured more energy than any enmity that might be directed towards the 
enemy, fascism in this case.  It was quite clearly the situation in Germany, and now the Italian case 
presents a similar picture. 
 
Poulantzas now turns quite self-consciously to the separate matters of politics and ideology.  It is the 
‘rebel petty bourgeoisie’138 that captures the ideological attention here in the character of 
revolutionary syndicalism.  This ideology, Poulantzas explains, amounts to a ‘self-emancipation’ of 
producers through the trade unions.  The revolution must lie in the area of production, and this will 
diminish the competition between workers, which damages wage rates.  It was argued that the State 
would be replaced by unions when the time was right.  The State would collapse under its own 
weight, and producers in the factories would take over.  This change would be associated with a 
great leap forward in the technology being used in the factories, and thus the leadership of the new 
administration would likely rest in the hands of the most technologically skilled. 
 
Poulantzas then discusses Sorel’s Reflections on Violence,139 and argues that many of these ideas came 
from this source.  Sorel believed that violence was necessary to unmask the enemy, and because the 
working class movement needs to be motivated into action.  Poulantzas reminds us that Mussolini 
was an early follower of Sorel.140  Indeed, many who had followed Sorel joined the early fascist party 
in 1919.  Thus, it was the petty bourgeoisie that greatly influenced the ideology of the working class.  
Violence was at the centre of this ideology, a violence that would set the workers aflame, that would 
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bring the necessary fire-power to the struggle.  Doing, rather than thinking, was the Mussolini 
dictum141, and the Sorelian line fitted this doctrine to a tee.  Mussolini commented in 1920 : 
 
Down with the State in every shape or form, the State of yesterday, today, tomorrow … We have 
nothing left but the religion of anarchy.142 
 
It can have escaped no-one that within but a few years, Mussolini had changed his mind completely, 
and was proclaiming to everyone who would listen that the State was everything, that nothing 
existed beyond the State, and that the individual must be subservient to the State.  This was a long 
way from anarchy.  Mussolini also took what appeared to be a very pro-worker stance on workers’ 
councils.  In discussing the Dalmine143 national strikers, he commented : 
 
The formation of workers’ councils, which for three days managed the firm ensuring the working of all 
branches and sections, represents an honest, well-intentioned attempt, and a worthy ambition, to 
succeed the so-called bourgeois class in the management of labour.’144 
 
Fascism incorporated revolutionary syndicalism into its ideology, with the caveat that production 
must improve.  Like the Taylorists of Henry Ford’s world, increasing production through new 
labour relations and new technology, was central to the new plans.145 
 
How did social democracy and the communist party operate under the rise of Mussolini?  The social 
democrats, organized under the umbrella of the Italian Socialist Party (the PSI), had  a large number of 
industrial workers among their membership, and were able to gather in some agricultural workers as 
well.146  They opposed involvement with the First World War.  After the war, the party turned left 
towards the Comintern and the Third International.  They reduced their political argument to 
economism, the reduction of sources of the revolution to the economic dimension.  This 
‘Maximalist’ trend suggested ‘the imminence of revolution’, and it forms a kind of positivism,147 a 
way in which history is reduced to ‘Iron Laws’ of economic necessity.  It was as if history had taken 
over, and the revolution was now inevitable.  This moment occurred, of course, in the shadow of 
the Russian revolution, which made everything seem possible, and following the Maximalist line, 
almost unavoidable.  There were those that thought nothing needed to be done – history would do 
it all by itself.  But this position meant, quite logically, that there was no need for political strategy.  
All the left had to do was stand aside and let in happen.  Given the position of the social democrats, 
happily ensconced in parliament, with a number of seats more or less guaranteed, this was socialism 
from the sofa, the comfortable path to a cosy revolution.148   
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This strategy, or more properly a non-strategy, led to an unwillingness to confront the State through 
strikes and overt struggles, steps, it was claimed, that would slow down the inevitable revolution.  
But there were more conservative elements in the social democratic party that did not hew to this 
‘inevitabilist’ line. They went instead in the direction of collaboration with the government, and 
hoped to be a part of it.  Rather than stand aside and wait, they jumped in, boots and all, and 
participated.  In this view, the State could still be seen as a neutral actor, thus allowing participation, 
and securing concessions for workers from the developing State apparatus.149  
 
The social democrats still believed that they had a secret weapon they could call on if needed in the 
last resort.  This was the strategy of the general strike.150  If all else failed, they argued, this weapon 
could be brought to bear to resist fascism.  But the problem was that they were not organized – they 
had become passive, and were unable, at a moment’s notice, to activate the working class movement 
into a general show of strength.  At the same time, the fascists, already a movement of some size, 
and with the support of elements of the State, and some of the owners, had transportation and 
communications.151  The attempt at a general strike took place in August, 1922.152  It failed 
spectacularly and the fascists were able to use the attempt to take over a large number of facilities 
and factories.  But well into the fascist régime, the social democrats still sought parliamentary seats 
until, in the end, parliament itself was dissolved. 
 
On the communist side, the Italian Communist party (the PCI) took a different tack.  Under the 
influence of the ‘Bordiga Line’153 the communists stayed away from orthodox politics, and fought 
vehemently against the social democratic left.  As the social democrats faced failures, the PCI 
celebrated, seeing itself as the last-remaining vanguard party for the working class : 
 
It even reached the point of congratulating itself on the success of fascism, in so far as this would 
weaken the influence of social democracy on the masses, and create favourable conditions for the 
extension of its own influence.  This policy towards the Socialist Party was strongly criticised even 
before 1922 by Lenin, who advised making agreements with (the) Maximalists.154 
 
Not unlike the social democrats, the PCI underestimated the power of the fascists, but rather like 
the social democratic left wing, they assumed the revolution was imminent.  Gramsci alone saw that 
the fascists could stage a coup d’état.155 
 
The PCI assumed that the fascists and the social democrats were in cahoots, and constituted a 
common enemy – any evidence to the contrary was clearly illusory, according to this view.  And as 
for working with the social democrats, this should be done only in the economic sphere with the 
trade unions.  There should be no political alliance.  What they wanted was a small party of deeply 
committed communists.  This would be enough to assure the success of the revolution.  The Third 
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Comintern congress opposed such a view.  They resisted the formation of small, perfectly formed 
communist parties, and instead reaffirmed the mass nature of the communist movement.  Instead, 
the PCI stuck to the small party model.  The communists did fight directly with the fascist militia 
groups, and sometimes gained successes.156  Gramsci was involved in a resistance to the Bordiga line.  
Gramsci supported the development of the workers’ councils, and felt that they might have the 
capacity to replace the existing political structure.  Here Poulantzas engages in a rare critique of 
Gramsci : 
 
… there is little doubt that at that time, Gramsci was advocating using the workers’ councils to give 
workers powers which by the fact of their establishment, would replace the bourgeois State, and to some extent 
he misunderstood the problem of the State itself.  This comes out clearly in his description of the ‘factory’ as 
the basic political centre of capitalist society, simply because it was its basic economic unit.157 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, we might all readily understand Gramsci’s ‘error’, if that is what it is.  
Certainly, at this moment, and well before his later reflections in Prison Notebooks, Gramsci seems to 
be taking an ‘economist’ line, pinning all his hopes on the factories, when it is clear that much more 
is at stake, and more is to be managed than just the factories, if a successful revolution is to take 
place.  This is a view that he was to change significantly with his later vision of the State as a series 
of defences of some complexity, and with his insistence on the need to win the hegemonic battle if 
revolution was to succeed.  However, even in this error, Poulantzas sees much to be admired.  He 
comments, for example, on the correct notion of an alliance between the working classes, the 
peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie.  He also commends Gramsci for seeing the workers’ councils as 
a preparatory mechanism from which a springboard can be established aimed towards the 
revolution. And the Gramscian analysis also had an important political dimension to it, so charges of 
economism are misplaced, in his view.158 
 
Poulantzas then turns to a section summarizing this relationship between fascism and the working 
class.  Italian resistance to the rise of fascism was stronger, though there were many similarities 
between the two case studies.  Italian workers resisted more strongly than German workers, and 
fascism took longer, and it was less successful, in trying to incorporate workers into the State in Italy 
compared to Germany.  The early fascist unions in Italy could count on a large membership, but 
many of its members came from agriculture, white collar workers and educated professionals, rather 
than the core working class.  The socialist unions had many more members among the industrial 
working class.  More workers were enrolled in the Nazi unions.159 
 
Unemployment was much less acute in Italy than in Germany.  Italian workers’ salaries remained 
stable throughout the 1920s, though they suffered substantially in the 1930s.  There was a weaker 
policy of public works in Italy compared to Germany, and thus the Italian State was less able to deal 
with the issue of unemployment.  As conditions worsened in the 1930’s, social legislation advanced 
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in several directions.160  Trade unionists were offered positions in the government initially, though by 
1927, property had been confiscated, and the Confederatione Generale del Lavoro (the CGL) had 
been disbanded.  In the end, the policy of partial absorption of the union movement into the State, 
and the destruction of those elements that could not be reached, was never fully realized.  As a social 
movement that began as anti-capitalist, opposed to large companies and hostile to bourgeois 
intentions, the relationship of fascism to workers was always ambiguous.  Union hopes to curb 
employers through the agency of the State remained unfulfilled.  Mussolini’s hope to capture large, 
capitalist interests within the fascist political architecture also remained unfulfilled.  Private 
businesses managed to flourish and extend their power over Italian society, and the workers 
struggled to survive.  The fascist revolution remained fundamentally incomplete. 
 
 
 
 Fascism and the Petty Bourgeoisie 
 
The Marxist lexicon is pretty clear about what is meant by the two fundamental classes that arise in 
the capitalist era.  On the one hand, there comes into being the owners of the new industrial society,  
the bourgeoisie, small in number, politically dominant in most cases, and focused on extracting 
profit from the emerging system.  On the other hand, there arises the mass of workers, the 
proletariat, who exist by selling their labour power to these owners, and who receive less reward 
from the system, which exploits their labour for the sake of profit.  In the Communist Manifesto, Marx 
and Engels famously set this argument out in powerful terms : 
 
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles … Freeman and slave, 
patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and 
oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, 
now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstruction of society at 
large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes ... The modern bourgeois society that has 
sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but 
established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones. 
Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified 
class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into 
two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.161 
 
What is less clear is what is meant by the third class, the petty bourgeoisie.  Who, precisely are these 
‘small capitalists’, who seem to play an important role in the rise of fascism, and whose ideology 
seems to be essential in the establishment of the new hegemony?  Not only that, but it appears that, 
from the Gramscian perspective, that they contribute the majority of the new functionaries in the 
rising fascist State in Italy. 
 
The term has been confusingly used as a substitute for the middle classes that emerged in the rising 
industrial society of the 19th. century, and these rising classes need to be analysed rather more 
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had previously been practically non-existent in Italy : insurance was established for industrial accidents, illness, old age, 
childbirth etc. (221) The citation is to P. Guichonnet, Mussolini et le fascisme, 1968, page 54. 
161 Https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf, pages 14-15. The manifesto has so 
many prefaces, so many additions, corrections and preliminaries that it is a surprise to get to the document itself.  Once 
the preliminaries have been waded through, the language of the manifesto itself is vivid and breath-taking, the clarity and 
power of the argument unmistakable. 
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carefully.162  The most important ‘rising class’ is clearly the bourgeoisie themselves, who start to gain 
power vis-a-vis the established landed order, and gather financial and political power about them.  
The rise of the State itself, as well as the emergence of the professions, gives birth to a new category 
of administrators and well-educated workers.  These people are also sometimes somewhat 
ambiguously housed in the middle class.  Marxist approaches tend to see such people as highly 
educated elements of the working class, unless they work for themselves.  If they work for 
themselves, they become members of the petty bourgeoisie, neither owners or workers.  They neither 
exploit other people, nor are they exploited themselves.163  In one sense they escape the clutches of 
capitalism entirely, though this is too facile a conclusion to draw in the end, however attractive it is at 
first glance.  But, in summary, the technical definition of the petty bourgeoisie separates them from 
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie ; they are self-employed and do not work for others, and thus their 
labour is not usurped.  The profits they accrue in their activities come entirely to them, and are not 
‘alienated’ by others. 
 
This seemingly simple definition hides more problems than it solves, however.  For one thing, the 
category covers all kinds of people, sometimes from other ‘modes of production’.  Small, self-
employed farmers are members of this class.  So also, though, are small traders, such as self-employed 
shopkeepers who own their stores.  But a self-employed doctor might also fit into this category.  It is 
their relation to the means of production – what relation they have to the economic system – that 
determines their class position.  But given the various kinds of people this throws together – farmers, 
shopkeepers, doctors – the political ambiguities are many, and it is hard to see how such a ‘class’, 
might act together politically, or whether indeed, they have economic, political and ideological 
interests in common. 
 
There are few jokes in Marxism, so one must make the most of them when they come along.  In Das 
Capital164, Marx finds delight in talking about the process of colonization for one particular reason.  
While the old countries of Europe were beset by established class structures, the new colonies, like 
Australia, had one very different condition to offer – seemingly unlimited land.  Once that land was 
made available to new settlers, these new arrivals could escape capitalism entirely by working for 
themselves.  They could become self-employed owners of their own farms – a new petty bourgeoisie : 
 
… in the colonies … the capitalist regime everywhere comes into collision with the resistance of the 
producer, who, as owner of his own conditions of labour, employs that labour to enrich himself, instead 
of the capitalist. The contradiction of these two diametrically opposed economic systems, manifests 
itself here practically in a struggle between them … So long, therefore, as the labourer can accumulate 
for himself — and this he can do so long as he remains possessor of his means of production (land) — 
capitalist accumulation and the capitalistic mode of production are impossible.165 
 
                                                 
162 See, among many others, the work of Eric Olin Wright on class structure, and, initially at least, Class, Crisis and the 
State, Verso, New York, 1985.  Wright went on to write several other major works on this topic, and spent much time 
seeking to distinguish empirically between the major capitalist classes, and how one might ‘measure’ them. Many 
volumes by a variety of authors have pondered similar questions.  
163 This may be true in a technical sense, but it is rarely true in a day-to-day sense.  For example, many small businesses 
are family businesses, and thus the ‘workers’ are family workers, often ill-paid or not paid at all.  Traditionally, this 
structure was profoundly patriarchal, and thus exploitation certainly did take place, though often hidden from view.  
Then, too, such small businesses were deeply embedded in the capitalist structure, did business with it, depended on it, 
and were structured by the capitalist State.  They were hardly separate from capitalism in any meaningful way. 
164 Volume I, chapter 33. See 
165 Capital, Volume 1, Chapter 33, pages 543-544, first published in 1867.  This edition published in 1990 by Penguin 
Books, London, Ben Fowkes, translator. 
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Marx thought it a farcical misunderstanding of traditional political economists that capitalism was 
having a hard time in Australia because people found they could do better working for themselves, 
rather than working for someone else.  Class, Marx reminds us, is not a thing, but a relationship 
between people, and self-employment offers a way out of class exploitation.  You can bring as many 
people as you like to Australia, but if they won’t work for you, and choose, rather, to work for 
themselves, you can’t export capitalism : 
 
Mr. Peel … took with him from England to Swan River, West Australia, means of subsistence and of 
production to the amount of £50,000.  Mr. Peel had the foresight to bring with him, besides, 300 
persons of the working class, men, women, and children.  Once arrived at his destination, “Mr. Peel 
was left without a servant to make his bed or fetch him water from the river.”  Unhappy Mr. Peel who 
provided for everything except the export of English modes of production to Swan River! 166 
 
It is central to Poulantzas’s argument that he makes it clear what is meant by the petty bourgeoisie in 
the context of fascism.  He starts this task by asserting that it is essential to look at political and 
ideological factors to identify this class.  Mere economic factors are not sufficient.167  The class 
constitutes two separate entities, which at first glance, have little to do with each other, but they are 
brought together because of the proximity of their political and ideological characteristics.  The 
traditional petty bourgeoisie is the category of small owners that Marx had spoken about.  This kind 
of situation could exist either in agriculture, the small farmer, or in commerce, where someone owns 
their own business, such as a shop or a small company.  In both situations, the people involved 
neither exploit labour, nor are they themselves exploited.  They have escaped capitalism, as it 
were.168   
 
But there is a second grouping who might also be put into the same class.  These might include the 
emerging category of workers we would now call service employees - working in commerce, banking 
and the like - as well as civil servants, the gathering numbers of people now working in the State 
apparatus.  Clearly this second group of people are not self-employed owners, Poulantzas admits, 
but they share similar political and ideological qualities with the traditional petty bourgeoisie. 
 
What, then,  constitutes this ‘petty bourgeois ideology’?  Poulantzas sees this system of ideas as a 
borrowing of bourgeois and working class ideas simultaneously, and predominantly the borrowings 
are from the working class.  This results in certain key ideas prevailing – an aversion to big business, 
or anti-capitalism ; a belief in the myth of the ladder, founded on faith in social mobility, and the 
climb to the top ; and a belief in the neutral State which exists ‘above classes’, and which may be able 
to aid petty bourgeois interests.169  These ideas, he argues, are shared between small owners and 
salaried workers, whose exploitation is hidden behind a salary. 
 
Not only are there ideological similarities between the two groups, but they have political 
commonalities as well.170  Neither group can organize politically around the two other classes – they 
are thrown together, as it were.  Thus they often turn to the State itself for support and assistance.  
There is therefore a special affinity for the State, and a willingness to support its aims.  They 
therefore constitute a ‘normative’ group that upholds the social order.171  And in times of crisis, they 
                                                 
166 Op. Cit., page 543. 
167 FD, 237. 
168 FD, 238 
169 FD, 241. 
170 FD, 243-244. 
171 FD, 243. 
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are likely to act together.   Poulantzas thereby concludes that these two disparate elements of the 
social landscape logically comprise a distinct social class founded in ideological and political 
similarities.172 
 
While constituting a social class, it is also true that, like other classes, that there are various fractions 
of the class to consider.  This fractioning may be enhanced in conditions of crisis.  And while this 
class may not be one of the two major classes,173 it does constitute an ‘authentic social force’,174 and it 
can play a separate political role in certain circumstances.  This is a significant point because the 
petty bourgeoisie played an important and autonomous role in the rise of fascism, a point largely 
overlooked by the ‘dolts’ in the Comintern, Poulantzas’s favourite whipping boys.175  Indeed, 
Poulantzas wants to argue that the petty bourgeoisie was one of the strongest supporters of fascism 
to the end, even as their own economic position was damaged by the new rising tide of monopoly 
capitalism. 
 
What precise role, then, does the petty bourgeoisie, play in the rise of the fascist State – this is the 
purpose of this long definitional excursus.  Fascism is, first and foremost, a vehicle for the rise of 
large capital, and especially monopoly capital, and it is especially threatening to small businesses, 
who seem to be directly undermined by large businesses entering the retail sector, for example.  For 
salaried workers, however, there is a rise in numbers, and perhaps the chance for progress.176  At 
first, the petty bourgeoisie swing to the side of the workers, but this strategy fails them.  They lose 
faith with the party system which does not seem to represent them, and they turn instead to the 
fascist movement, where their political force is felt most keenly.  In the earliest days, much of the 
membership of the fascist movement is found among the petty bourgeoisie.177  Indeed the early 
party political agendas closely parallel the complaints of this class about the existing economic 
system.  The use of the State to protect its interests allows it to be distinct from large capital 
interests.  It is important to remember that fascism started as an anti-capitalist movement wholly in 
keeping with petty bourgeois ideology.  Only later do the interests of large capital come to 
predominate.  Thus, during the first phase of fascism, the petty bourgeoisie are in the ascendancy – 
Poulantzas goes as far as to call them ‘the ruling class’, a phrase which echoes Gramsci’s earlier 
pronouncements.178  As things develop, they remain in charge of the State, but they no longer 
control society as a whole, a role taken up by large capital interests.  
 
The rise of fascism result from a crisis of hegemony, a conclusion widely agreed on by analysts from 
the left.  Elements of petty bourgeois ideology surge forward and are rediscovered in the vacuum of 
persuasive ideas, anti-capitalism being amongst them.  It is able to fill the gap : 
                                                 
172 FD, 244. 
173 Poulantzas appears to contradict himself here.  Having said, on the very same page, that the petty bourgeoisie do 
constitute a class, he then argues, at the bottom of the same page that ‘ … the petty bourgeoisie does not in the long 
term have a class position of its own’. FD, 244.  He appears to be saying that the petty bourgeoisie is a transitional class, 
destined to slip into the proletariat for the most part. 
174 Ibid. 
175 FD, 245. 
176 Poulantzas sees the two fractions of the petty bourgeoisie going their separate ways here, the small business people 
being harmed, the salaried workers being advantaged by the same trend.  He then makes a half-hearted argument about 
the pauperization of the salaried workers (See footnote 1, page 247) due to increased competition, but he doesn’t seem 
to have much confidence in the argument.  He falls back on the acceptance that the two groups do not have common 
economic interests, but that they continue to share ideological and political commonality. 
177 FD, 249. 
178 FD, 250.  
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When fascism comes to power, an apparently paradoxical phenomenon results : the petty bourgeois 
ideological sub-ensemble … ‘replaces’ the dominant bourgeois ideology, thereby cementing back together the social formation 
in question. It therefore takes on the role previously played by bourgeois ideology, both for the 
bourgeoisie itself, and for the working class.179 
 
This ‘new’ ideology still contains within it many elements of the dominant world view, which has 
been entirely eclipsed by the rise of the new régime.  The new ideology thus masks the dominant 
ideology under a new guise.  But the emerging ideology is in closer alliance with imperialism, rather 
than traditional capitalism.  Poulantzas wants to insist that the newly-formed ideology of the fascist 
State is an amalgam of contradictory ideas, rather than a logically coherent world view.180  He then 
lists a number of key elements of this ideology :   
 
1.  Emphasis on the cult of the State, in which the individual is subsumed by the State.181 
2.  The cult of the leader, the avoidance of the judiciary, and a love of direct action. 
3.  Elitism, seeking leadership roles for the petty bourgeoisie. 
4.  Racism and antisemitism. 
5.  Nationalism, the myth of the nation, ties to ‘soil’ and ‘blood’. 
6.  Militarism, and the cult of violence. 
7.  Anti-clericalism, opposition to big landed interests and the property holdings of the Church.182 
8.  The role of the family as central to economic and social organization separate from class struggle. 
9.  Emphasis on education, training the new labour force, the rise of ‘new’ men and women. 
10. Anti-intellectualism. 
11. Corporatism, bringing all elements of society together under petty bourgeois control. 
 
How did this class actually fare under fascism?  In spite of its leading role in the new society, the 
petty bourgeoisie did poorly.183  Small business people were badly harmed by the rise of big capital, 
and simultaneously, Poulantzas wants to argue, fascist wage policy also harmed salaried workers.  
Both elements of this disparate grouping were thus damaged in separate ways. 
 
In Germany, it was clear before the war that small-scale traders were already on a declining trend, 
whereas the category of employees and officials was expanding.184  As the fascist State came into 
being, it was clear that party membership came largely from white-collar workers, government 
officials and small traders.185  The election results told the same story.  In the short-term, the rise of 
fascism seemed to meet the needs of the petty bourgeoisie.  But according to Poulantzas this close 
alliance between fascism and the small owners was illusory : 
 
The real interest of the urban petty bourgeoisie were totally abandoned when national socialism came 
to power .. this was accomplished by steps … During the first step, certain measures were taken in 
favour of the traditional fraction of the petty bourgeoisie.  The activity of the big department stores was 
                                                 
179 FD, 251. 
180 FD, 253. 
181 FD, 254-256. 
182 It is hard to swallow this element of fascist ideology without some thought.  It may well have been part of petty 
bourgeois ideological armature, but it was not an enduring element of fascism.  In Italy, the church rapidly signed up for 
cooperation with the fascist State, knowing that this would help in the fight against the atheist left. 
183 FD, 256-258. 
184 FD, 259.  Again these two fractions of the petty bourgeoisie seem to be going in different directions, held together, in 
the Poulantzian argument, only by political and ideological elements. 
185 FD, 261. 
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restricted to some extent.  In 1933, two autonomous corporations were created, a Corporation of Retail 
Trade (excluding large stores) and an artisan corporation … Their purpose was the protection of small-
scale production and petty trade.  But these measures were abolished in 1934 …186 
 
Price controls harmed small producers, and the war effort further placed pressure on this sector.  
The salaried employees category grew in number, though their real wages dropped by 20%.187 
 
In Italy, conditions were of a similar nature.  Large capital had been advantaged by the war, while 
small businesses had faltered.  Civil servants comprised a larger category than in Germany, drawing 
on people from the country, though salaried positions in business were fewer because capitalist 
business was poorly developed.188  In the beginning of this new era, the petty bourgeoisie swung to 
the left, but when working class politics hit a wall, they rapidly swung their allegiance to the rising 
fascist party.  They were over-represented in the membership of the fascist party, and the higher 
reaches of the party were dominated by this group.189  Additionally, many ex-servicemen were 
members of the party, giving it an especially military look.  The petty bourgeoisie did not do well in 
the end, as might have been anticipated.  The tertiary sector increased substantially, but wages went 
down.  The ‘fascist bureaucracy’ grew faster than in Germany.190 
 
 
 
 Poulantzas, the State and the Rise of Fascism 
 
 
The broad shape of Poulantzas’s theory of the State under early fascism can now be examined in 
detail.191   
 
1.  First and foremost, this is a class account focusing on how classes and the State connect, 
foreshadowing the arguments he will put forward in his later books, and which he had already 
outlined in the earlier Political Power and Social Classes.192  Poulantzas continually structures his 
argument and indeed the shape of the book itself, around this question.  Indeed, the very structure 
of the chapters is class-defined.   
 
In Part Three, he speaks of the relationship between the dominant classes and fascism, and 
concludes, after much rumination, a review of the historical record, and barbed asides towards the 
falsely formulated Comintern line, that capitalism did very well out of the relationship with the 
emerging fascist State in both Italy and Germany.  While the Comintern had claimed that fascism 
constituted the ‘death rattle’ of capitalism, Poulantzas argued that nothing could be further from the 
truth.  Indeed, monopoly capital in particular soared forward under fascism, and thus established 
                                                 
186 FD, 263 
187 FD, 264. 
188 FD, 265. 
189 FD, 266. 
190 FD, 267. 
191 In The Crisis of the Dictatorships,191 which we will review below, he turned his attention to contemporary fascism, but for 
the moment, let us go backwards in historical time, and review his account of the State under fascism in Germany and 
Italy. I thus follow Poulantzas as he first traces the 1920-1940 period, then on to his account of contemporary events, 
contemporary, that is, for him. 
192 Political Power and Social Classes, New Left Books and Sheed and Ward, 1975, London, but published first in 1968 in 
Paris by Maspero as Pouvoir Politique et Classes Sociales. PPSC thus comprises the first of his five major books. 
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itself in an advanced form.  When the dust had settled, and all the other arguments had been put to 
one side, it was clear, in his view, that capitalism had not been cowed by the fascist State, had not 
been subordinated to it, and had retained its ‘relative autonomy’. 
 
In Part Four, he examines the working class.  While initially open to the idea of an emerging State 
that seemed to incorporate unions and worker interests in its philosophy, the working class soon 
became subject to extreme violence, initially in the violent skirmishes that took place between leftist 
and fascist militia, and later in the collapse of the party system.  In the end, the promises for union 
participation were not kept, and workers became subject to overwhelming State control.   
 
In Part Five he turns to the petty bourgeoisie.  Particularly significant in their strong support for the 
State as a neutral arbiter that might serve their cause, they became a most important element in the 
rise of fascism.  They provided some of the shock troops that first populated the fascist militia, but 
they also provided the majority of personnel for the developing State apparatus.  Coupled with this, 
in the face of an ideological vacuum, they were able to offer up a replacement dominant ideology 
that provided the cement around which a new hegemony could be formed. 
 
2.  And it not just the focus on classes and the State that distinguishes Poulantzas’s State theory.  
The originality of his approach also lies in the way in which he both periodizes these relationships, and 
focuses on class fractions.  In his periodization, he takes us through the history of the period, and 
shows us the steps in the formation of the class-State nexus for each class.  Thus we are able to see 
how these relationships evolve and how they turn out in the end.  And, at the same time, he is 
willing and able to accept the confusion that surrounds any class analysis because of the complicated 
sub-elements of any class – the various components and divisions that occur in real historical 
situations within any class.  He does not avoid this complexity even though it muddies the 
theoretical picture.  This greatly enriches the account he provides. 
 
3.  His analysis is further enlarged by his willingness to follow Gramsci in extending his State-
theoretical position into the realms of the political and ideological, and well beyond the merely 
economic.  Consider the case of the petty bourgeoisie, for example.  The two categories within this 
class – the small owners and the rising salaried category do not have economic conditions in 
common.  They are only brought together by their common ideological and political positions.  If he 
is right, and the formulation is highly polemical, then he has been able to make a breakthrough in 
class analysis, far extending its boundaries, and showing the way forward to a wider understanding 
of class relations, an understanding that was taken up by many later theorists, including Stuart Hall, 
the Birmingham School and the later-evolving Critical Studies tradition, as well as Pierre Bourdieu.193 
This was the start of the ‘Cultural Turn’, the movement towards concentration on the lived culture 
of classes, as well as their economics and politics. 
 
                                                 
193 Much more will be said about this movement in relation to State theory in later pages.  I should emphasize that there 
is no simple link between Poulantzas’s work and the work of, for example, Pierre Bourdieu.  It is rather more the case 
that when traditional class analysis had been ‘broken open’ and liberated from economism, many other possibilities 
presented themselves.  The connection between Hall and Poulantzas is close.  Poulantzas published in New Left Review, 
a journal that Hall and others founded, and Hall interviewed Poulantzas shortly before his death.  On the other hand, 
Bourdieu had little if anything to do with Poulantzas, and Bourdieu’s class analysis, though strongly ‘culturalist’, has no 
close theoretical affiliation with Poulantzas’s work.  But in the wake of Poulantzas’s work, a new theoretical space did 
open up, into which many new lines of thought entered. 
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4.  Poulantzas also takes seriously Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, closely tied to his extension of 
class analysis into the realm of politics and economics.194  Fascism, he reminds us again and again, 
along with Gramsci, arises from the failure of the ‘national project’.  No overarching common sense 
prevails – the political parties no longer represent the majority of the people, and the national 
sensibility is floundering.  Into this vacuum floods the violence and the militaristic force of fascism, 
but in order for the fascist State to survive, it must provide not just force, but also a new hegemony, 
a new consensual ideology that can embrace the wide array of interests and ideologies that it seeks to 
represent.  Petty bourgeois ideology, with its confusing and often contradictory elements, 
embodying ancient myths of ‘blood’ and ‘bone’, as well as the cult of the State, racism, anti-
Semitism, anti-clericism, anti-intellectualism, and a strong adherence to violence, was able to cohere 
into a national ideology sufficient to hold the warring factions together.  
 
5.  Poulantzas’s notion of the ‘power bloc’ is also a valuable contribution the State theory. Arguing 
that classes battle within their ranks, and that even the ruling class must be organized, he claimed 
that in order for the bourgeoisie to survive, they needed to form a ‘power bloc’, with the help of the 
State, in order to stop them tearing themselves apart because of their often bitterly-divided interests.  
The fascist State is able to do this, thus bringing monopoly capital to an advanced stage. 
 
6.  But perhaps the most important concept that Poulantzas brings to the table is his notion of 
‘relative autonomy’.  Much more will be heard about this idea as we examine the ‘normal’ State in 
the coming pages, where it plays a predominant explanatory role.  But Poulantzas is able to claim, 
quite dramatically, that fascism is not just violence.  Just as classes are not just economics, so too the 
fascist State survives not just because it can resort to brutal tactics and threats, but because it 
contrives a long and elaborate balancing act between the various social forces that it seeks to 
manage.  It is not just in the ‘normal’ State that this occurs, he is claiming, but even in the State 
taken to the extreme, as in the case of fascism, such a strategy is still followed.  He provides many 
examples showing how State policy and leadership twists and turns in order to accommodate the 
requirements of social equilibrium.  Thus the State never becomes the mere instrument of capital 
any more than it plays into the hands of the petty bourgeoisie or the workers. This game of relative 
autonomy allows the fascist leaders to maintain ultimate power in the end while seeking alliances 
with all constituents.  Even fascism must engage in this elaborate dance if it is to succeed.195  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
194 Poulantzas reminds us that it is only Gramsci who extends the account of the State into the ideological realm (FD, 
299) He comments … as little as I know Gramsci’s work, there can be no doubt that it was he who formulated the 
theory of ideological apparatuses as State apparatuses  … (but his) … theory is still tainted by a language stemming from 
the ‘historicist’ conception, and from certain related notions such as that of ‘civil society’ ; this even affects his concept 
of ‘hegemony’ … but May-June 1968 in France showed once again how correct Gramsci’s analysis was … (FD, 300) 
195 Poulantzas spends Part Six of the book discussing the countryside.  I do not review this section here. He deals the 
complexity of classes in the countryside.  He reminds us that feudalism and capitalism lived side by side in the country. 
He distinguishes between five major classes ; the great landowners ; the rich and upper middle peasantry ; the middle 
peasantry ; the poor and lower middle peasantry ; and the agricultural labourers proper. (FD, 270-277) His aim is to 
correct the simplistic notion that the countryside is simply a hotbed of fascism.  Things are more complicated than that.  
Rural labourers did very poorly from fascism, as well as the small farmers, as capitalism flooded the countryside.  
Complexity, complexity and more complexity is his constant theme. 
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 The Institutional Forms of the Fascist State 
 
Having regaled us with pages of history, Poulantzas finishes Fascism and Dictatorship by turning to 
what he calls ‘the institutional forms of the fascist State’.196  Starting with Gramsci, from whom he 
has clearly learnt much, he reminds us of what we already know – that it was Gramsci who saw that 
the State was much more than coercion, but extended its activities into the ideological realm in order 
to construct a new hegemony.197  Poulantzas then suggests that it was Gramsci who led us to the 
idea of ideological State apparatuses, an idea followed up by Althusser and others.198  Then follows a 
flurry of definitional fury.199  He reminds us that ideology permeates the mores, the customs, the 
‘way of life’ of a society (or social formation, as he terms it), and that it embodies a large variety of 
apparatuses, including the Churches, parties, unions, universities, the ‘means of communication’, the 
cultural domain, and the family.200  He provides the list merely to show that this is a repressive part 
of the State.  Ideology, he asserts is never neutral – it is always a class ideology.  Repression and 
ideology work hand in hand to secure the State.201 
 
The State, may, on occasion, also intervene directly in the economy.  And many bodies normally 
referred to as private entities must be considered as elements of the State, as suggested in the long 
list of ideological institutions above.202  And here he comes to the ‘heart of the matter’ : 
 
It is possible to refer to the State apparatus, narrowly defined, in the singular, whereas one speaks of several 
ideological State apparatuses.203 
 
Why is this point of such breath-taking importance that he calls us up short, and makes a very clear 
point about it?  It is as if he has been circling a particular idea, and has now come to understand 
what it is.  He is still ruminating, however, because there is no earth-shattering conclusion just yet.  
The State has several repressive elements – the army, the police and so on.  This is the institutional 
core of the State.  The ideological apparatus is more widely spread.  In fact, it has relative autonomy 
from the State.  Poulantzas has now veered away from discussions of fascism in particular towards a 
general analysis of the State.204  But his central conclusion at this point seems only to be that while 
the repressive State apparatus comprises the core of the State, the ideological apparatus is spread far 
and wide. 
 
But then Poulantzas turns his attention back to fascism.205  Fascism is without doubt a capitalist 
State, but it is an exceptional State.  It develops as a result of a specific political and hegemonic 
                                                 
196 FD, pages 299-359. This phrase appears on page 298. 
197 FD, 299.  
198 FD, 300. 
199 For example in footnote 5, page 303, he takes Althusser to task for failing to examine the economic role of the State. 
200 I am paraphrasing a list provided on page 301.  
201 FD, 302. 
202 FD, 305. 
203 FD, 305. 
204 And again he turns away from his own argument to suggest that Althusser is in error by arguing for the essential unity 
of ruling class ideology.  In contrast, Poulantzas wants to claim that several ideologies struggle for control in any given 
society.  Althusser is particularly criticized for excluding class struggle from the analysis. 
205 FD, 310-330.  The text is repetitive here, so I rehearse only novel arguments that we have not heard before. On page 
311, footnote 2, he provides reference to parallel arguments made in Political Power and Social Classes, op. cit.  What is new 
here is the comparison between the ‘Normal’ State and the ‘Exceptional State’. 
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crisis.  Poulantzas then takes us through a rather elaborate set of distinctions between a form of 
State and a form of régime which he plans to use in the remainder of his exposition. 
 
Relative autonomy is still part of the fascist State, particularly the way in which the economic is 
separate from the political, and the way in which the State is autonomous from the dominant 
classes.206  But the way in which the fascist State intervenes in the economic life of the nation is of 
particular importance.  Traditional scholarship wants to claim that under fascism, all is subsumed 
under the totalitarian State.  Poulantzas wants to argue in the opposite direction that relative 
autonomy is maintained.207  There are many more similarities between the fascist capitalist State and 
the ‘normal’ capitalist State than have been realised.  They vary in the degree of limitation or 
suppression allowed to the ideological State apparatuses.  And this limitation on the ideological 
apparatus results from the hegemonic crisis.208  There is more physical repression, to be sure, under 
fascism. But then also the State has to play a more active role in recovering hegemony than in 
normal conditions.  There is also a need for a new and separate ideology in all forms of the State : 
 
… the State apparatuses ‘secrete’  their own internal ideology.  But in those State forms not corresponding 
to a political and ideological crisis, this internal ideology is often perceptibly different from the dominant 
ideology : for example, the State ‘bureaucracy’, the army, the Church and the educational system all have 
an own internal ideology of their own. 209 
 
While Poulantzas is often rehearsing old arguments in this final section, the notion of a ‘secreted’ 
internal ideology is new, and he usefully explains how this difference between the ‘normal’ State and 
the ‘exceptional’ might best be understood.  In these conditions, the ideological States apparatuses 
have less autonomy than before, and the two forms of ideology, the internal ideology and the 
dominant ideology, line up more closely.  But now he takes his argument to an extreme position, 
and claims that under fascism, it may be that the ideological State apparatus dominates over the 
repressive elements.  This seems mildly surprising : 
 
In the case of the exceptional State, the reorganization of the State system can sometimes go so far as to let 
an ideological apparatus dominate the whole system.210 
 
This comment requires some thought.  It may well be that there are moments when ideology takes 
hold, and is the central component of State activity.  But overall, can he really be suggesting that 
ideology dominates the State under fascism?  In certain case, and he cites Bonapartism as a case in 
point, he claims this can happen.211 
 
Fascism is also distinctive in that it changes the ‘legal State’ to the ‘police State’.212  What Poulantzas 
is underlining is that the liberal State is the State found in competitive capitalism, and the fascist 
State is that form of the State required for monopoly capitalism. They are thus two forms of State 
for two stages of capitalist evolution. What then, precisely, are the differences?  The legal system 
within the ‘normal’ State manages the use of political power through a series of formal rules.  It 
manages the State apparatus on behalf of the power bloc.  But it also provides a mechanism 
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whereby the dominated classes secure the illusion that the law protects them as well.  The law also 
sets limits on what State power can do.213 
 
Within the ‘exceptional’ State, the same set of rules that governed State action are missing.  The legal 
system becomes arbitrary.  At the same time, the law no longer limits the action of the State, which 
might be said to have unlimited powers.  The judiciary are now directly under the thumb of the 
dominant elements in the State.  Within the ‘private’ law that manages the economy, the differences 
lie again in the stage of capitalism reached in each State, and many similarities remain.214 
 
The fascist State modifies the electoral system in a decisive way.  Its rise results from a crisis in 
political representation, in which the parties are unable to represent their constituents.  In the case of 
the exceptional State, the traditional method of representation is put to one side, and the State takes 
its place.  It is important, Poulantzas argues, to be clear about what is happening.  The exceptional 
State is not replacing the competitive system of parties in which all society’s participants have a 
chance to gain power.  This illusion is never true in ‘normal’ capitalism, where a circulation of elites 
takes place that provides little opportunity for the working masses to gain power.  Instead it must be 
understood as a reshuffling of the power bloc.  And, Poulantzas continues, this ‘shuffling’ persists 
within the structure of the ‘exceptional’ fascist State.  Even within fascism, the various elements of 
the ruling class still struggle for domination.215  But in the normal State, there are ‘possibilities for 
action’, as, for example in the gaining of universal suffrage.216  In the exceptional State, such 
possibilities are snuffed out. 
 
Poulantzas concludes this section with two minor points.217  First he points to the role that the 
extended bureaucracy plays in the exceptional State.  Key again is the notion of the bureaucracy’s 
internal ideology218 closely allied to petty bourgeois thinking.  Second, he wants to emphasize that the 
class struggle continues within the State, even under the conditions of exceptionalism.  He wants to 
claim that these struggles can be extremely violent, and can threaten the solidity of the State itself.219  
Poulantzas seems to be positing that the exceptional State in fact sets up parallel systems of control, a 
‘duplication of parallel power networks’, as he puts it,220 to represent various classes within the State 
structure itself.  Perhaps he is asserting that certain State apparatuses represent certain social classes, 
class fractions or social forces, and that the struggle between these various State bureaucracies is also 
a struggle between these interests.  It seems that by the end of this section he is making this claim : 
 
If power is organized in this way, it also allows the exceptional State to play the specific interventionist 
role required by the crisis conjuncture – to juggle the various classes and fractions through parallel, 
super-imposed channels, and thereby to reorganize class hegemony.221 
 
This is a somewhat dramatically new idea – a vision of the exceptional State as ridden with parallel 
systems of organizations, in turn driven by various elements of the class structure, and at war with one 
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another.  Curiously, the thought comes at the end of a chapter, and it not fully developed.  It is an 
instance of what one of his critics would later call an ‘outburst of taxonomic fury’.222 
 
But Poulantzas is not done yet with establishing new categories.  In the last section of the book, he 
wants to add some thoughts on the “Form of the Exceptional Regime’, filling in some of the gaps he 
feels he has still left in his already exhaustive account of the fascist State.223  Here Poulantzas often 
repeats elements of the earlier arguments, and our task here is just to decide what emerges as new 
formulations.  He begins by reminding us that the fascist State establishes the permanent mobilization 
of the masses.224  He rehearses again the stages of the rise of fascism – the first stage during which the 
fascist party dominates the army and the police, the administration and the judiciary.225  He reminds us 
of the limited autonomy of the ideological state apparatuses, an argument that has been raised before.  
The fascist party never quite fuses with the State but manages the social formation through its 
apparatus.  And he adds that we must remember that fascism came to power, in both Germany and 
Italy, in a perfectly respectable parliamentary way.226 
 
Then he returns to Italy and Germany again.  It is as if he is trying to refine his argument just once 
more, and finally nail all the bits and pieces down.  But what is there that is new in this section?  In the 
case of Germany, he provides some further historical detail, especially a detailed account of the rise of 
the SS, and the SS State.227  The section is thus valuable in the task of fleshing out the rather dry 
theoretical categories of the last 300 pages with some rich historical material.  Here history takes over 
from theory, and a most interesting story is told.  Of some especial interest is the section on the 
significance of the family in the new fascist ideology, and its close connection to petty bourgeois 
ideology.228  In his coverage of Italy, he follows a similar path.  Again, the section is rich with historical 
examples illustrating what has gone before.  In Italy, no SS existed, and thus there was less control of 
the State by the ‘political police’, as Poulantzas refers to them.  Of interest here are the reflections on 
the role of the church and the State in Italian fascism.229  The church was the ‘favoured stronghold’ of 
the landowners.230  The close affiliation between fascism and the Church is outlined, and importantly he 
sets this development against Mussolini’s initial ‘opium of the people’ line, and the hostility of the large 
landowners to unification.  The close relationship established through the Lateran pacts (1929) enabled 
the new State to ‘buy the Church out’, as Poulantzas has it.  But again, we have read these words 
before. 
 
Much still remains to be covered, our author concludes after this long exegesis.  Will fascism rise again?  
Both the left and the right were raising this issue in 1970.  Has history taught us how to deal with this 
possibility?  Imperialism is also changing, and this complicates matters.  Do we learn from history?   
Poulantzas comments : 
 
Marx, following Hegel, said that history can sometimes repeat itself : but what the first time was tragedy, 
is the second time farce.  The formulation is striking, but it is true in one sense only : there are such 
                                                 
222 Ernesto Laclau, ‘The Specificity of the Political’, in Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, (London, 1977) page 70. 
223 Pages 331-356.  There is also a conclusion that follows this section. 
224 FD, 331 
225 FD, 332 
226 FD, 333. 
227 FD, 340-342. 
228 FD, 346. 
229 FD, 355. 
230 FD, 355. 
 38 
things as black comedies.  Louis Bonaparte was only funny from a particular point of view.  And there 
are funny men in history who only kill others.231 
 
 
 
3. Poulantzas and the Living Dictatorships : The Crisis of the Dictatorships 
 
We turn now to Poulantzas’s second book on fascism and dictatorships, La Crise des Dictatures,232 
which is much different from the first.  Unlike the encyclopaedic certainty of Fascism and Dictatorship, 
the second book is brief, somewhat sketch-like, and uncertain in its tone.  It is also contemporary, 
no longer drawing us back into history, but rather telling the readers in the mid-seventies what was 
happening in their present world in Greece, Portugal and Spain.  What was happening, of course, 
was the collapse of these living dictatorships. 
 
Again, Poulantzas takes a class-driven approach, setting out chapters on the dominant classes, and 
what he now terms ‘the popular classes’.  He sets the argument out in the shadow of the ‘imperialist 
world context’ and ends with comments on the State apparatus.  What is the question he is trying to 
answer? : 
 
The Portuguese and Greek regimes were evidently not overthrown by an open and frontal movement 
of the popular masses in insurrection, nor by a foreign military intervention, as was the case with Italian 
fascism and Nazism in Germany.  What, then, are the factors that determined their overthrow, and what 
form has the intervention of the popular masses taken in this conjuncture?’233 
 
From the very first page, the reader is put on alert that old theories of revolution will not do, that 
the orthodox Soviet line from the Comintern, is wrong again, and that the anticipated rising of the 
masses against the bourgeois order has again not occurred as predicted.  Indeed, Poulantzas seems 
uncertain whether these changes involved class struggle at all.234 
 
He launches us first into the book with a review of the ‘The Imperialist World Context’.  At first 
glance, this suggests he is taking note of some of the new work emerging at this time on world 
systems, but there is no mention of the work of Wallerstein and others.235  Instead Poulantzas seems 
driven by historical events entirely.  But he is interested here, in a way not seen in Fascism and 
Dictatorship, by questions of under-development, a central idea in the emerging new literature.  
Indeed, he seems to be looking for an account of the collapse of the régimes in terms of this system, 
in which the United States dominates.  Each of these three States seems to exhibit a similar form of 
dependence in the new world order.  Could it be, he asks, that each of these countries was defined 
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by neo-colonialism, and that this feature accounts for these recent shifts?  Perhaps slow 
industrialization, and thus a slow-to-emerge capitalism, with its attendant classes, was at the heart of 
the matter.  Perhaps these countries are dependent on the core capitalist countries in some way?  He 
introduces the concept of dependent industrialization to account for this possibility.236  What he means 
by this is that certain predominantly capitalist countries, among which Portugal, Spain and Greece 
may be counted, can be characterised by low-technology industrialization, weak labour productivity, 
and with a high level of profit expatriation.  These countries provided low-cost labour to the rest of 
Europe, and these characteristics of dependent industrialization seem common to all three.237  At the 
core of this process was the influx of capital from overseas.  Poulantzas then briefly rehearses 
several development theories before dismissing them, and coming back to an argument involving 
the ‘popular masses’, his now favoured phrase for the working class and its allies.  He still closely 
aligns himself to the likelihood that the socialist revolution is on the horizon : 
 
… we must be clear as to what is involved here.  It is obvious that a country’s dependence vis-à-vis 
imperialism can only be broken by a process of national liberation, which in the new phase of 
imperialism and the present circumstances as a whole, coincides with a process of transition to 
socialism.238 
 
These dictatorships, Poulantzas concludes at the end of this section on the world system, comprise a 
dependent type of state.239  But it is also the case that the specific form that the State takes in these 
societies results also from internal factors.  If this is the case, then we must consider both internal and 
external factors together as we look for the cause of their collapse.  Even in Chile, where the role of 
the CIA is clear in the overthrow of the Allende regime, we should not overlook the importance of 
the internal situation, and how it was handled by the leftist regime.240  We must look to the internal 
forces of a country for answers, as well as the position of States in the world system. 
 
Having set us up in this way for further analysis, Poulantzas now turns to a consideration of each 
country in turn and how they sit in the world system.241  We already know that both domestic and 
international factors are at work.  The specific problem of importing capital is also in operation – that 
too is clear.  The pattern he discovers is that foreign capital appears to have been used to further 
exploit colonial labour through the agency of these three nation States.242 
 
A high level of imported capital was also associated with the further repression of the popular masses 
within these countries, preventing strikes, banning unions, repressing wage demands, and so on.  But 
as the period of dictatorship lengthened, close ties were made with the European Union, compared 
with the United States.  Thus the question might be posed – did the Common Market243 play a role in 
bringing these régimes to an end?  As the Common Market developed, it was argued that American 
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hegemony was coming to an end, and that Europe was beginning to pose a counter-hegemonic 
force.244  This was always a false argument in some ways.  American imperialism was never 
completely hegemonic, and nor would the European Union ever completely ‘take over’.  Instead, it is 
more useful to try to understand the struggles for hegemony that commonly characterise the 
economic world system.  Indeed, Poulantzas claims, the emergence of the European Union simply 
allows the further penetration of American capital into Europe.  But at the same time, there are new 
struggles developing in the capitalist world order.  Struggles are occurring both within Europe and in 
the old colonies. 
 
An easy argument presents itself, and it is one that Poulantzas is keen to dismiss immediately.  It is 
the claim that the democratic European union placed pressure on the dictatorships for them to 
follow the democratic path, while the United States supported and preferred dictatorship.245  All three 
countries sought entry into the Common Market in order to advance the causes of the several 
bourgeoisies involved.  But their exclusion did not reach the level of an ‘economic boycott’.  As large 
agricultural producers, it is more likely the case that these three nations threatened the internal 
integrity of the EU with regard to agriculture.  More precisely, Poulantzas wants to have his cake and 
eat it.  He at first dismisses the rise of the Common Market as an insubstantial reason for the 
collapse, but then begins to admit the value of this approach if seen through a slightly different lens 
that he is happy to provide.  The struggles between the dominant classes in Europe and the United 
States required a realignment in the dictatorships to deal with a changing picture.  But it didn’t simply 
mean the overthrow of the dictatorships by democracy : 
 
These countries do not face a real choice between being “American colonies’ or being ‘integrated into 
the Common Market’.  The only solution for them is a process of independence and national liberation 
vis-à-vis imperialism as a whole.246 
 
Nonetheless, public opinion and the ‘solidarity of the democratic and popular movements in the 
European countries’ did play a part in the transition phase.  And it allowed the Common Market to 
play hard to get, given the antipathy surrounding these regimes.  Military strategy was also important.  
The traditional Atlantic Alliance was also at risk.247  But it was also clear that Europe was not about 
to set itself free from the United States, but rather that Europe sought to develop some new degrees 
of freedom.  In addition, the pro-Arab attitudes of Greece and Spain, tied closely to their business 
interests in this area, contrasted sharply with those of the United States.  Thus there was never a 
simple relationship of control and subordination between the U.S. and the dictatorships.  Given the 
important role of the military in each of the three régimes, military alliances were always going to be 
of the greatest importance.  This long account amounts to a claim that internal factors matter more 
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than external factors, and that we need to look to these internal factors for our best explanation of 
the collapse.248 
 
We now turn to the role of the United States in these matters.  It is certain that the United States 
favoured dictatorship, just as it had all over the world.  Dictatorship allows much more control over 
democratic forces, and allows for smoother capital accumulation.  But Poulantzas wants to guard 
against the view that the U.S., finally losing patience with the dictatorships, decided to step in and 
change things.  The role of internal forces is neglected in such an argument, and thus it will not do.  
Several possible alternatives for Greece are rehearsed,249 alternatives posed from an American point 
of view.  Poulantzas sees American policy as ‘polyvalent’, providing various alternatives, some of 
which may be followed, and some which are not.  It is insufficient simply to argue that the United 
States gets its way all time, independent of conditions on the ground.  And the U.S. may well lose 
influence in certain circumstances, as it appears to be doing in Greece and Spain.  Too often we 
over-estimate the strength of the enemy.  Instead, capitalist interests are often at loggerheads 
domestically and internationally, and the United States itself veers between the imperialist world 
policeman role, and escaping towards isolationism.250  The several instruments of American state 
policy251 (the CIA, the Pentagon and the Military, the State Department) can be used in a variety of 
ways, in ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ roles, and often simultaneously.  Thus no single policy is followed.  This 
means there is always room for manoeuvre in the countries subjected to American domination.  
 
The global balance of power is also a factor.  One must consider the Soviet Union.  The two major 
powers have agreed on ‘spheres of influence’.  The Soviet Bloc has clearly opposed the dictatorships, 
but what happens now?   The crisis of the dictatorships means a realignment of forces, a change in 
the balance of power.  These contradictions allow the ‘popular masses’ inside these three countries 
to consider their options, and it is to these internal questions that Poulantzas now turns. 
 
So what, in all this, is the role of the dominant classes in the dictatorships?252  Here is Poulantzas 
turning from analysis of the world order and replacing it with his more familiar class analysis.  He 
has already established that industrialization is occurring in a dependent form in these three 
countries – dependent on larger hegemonic powers, such as the United States.  What has this done 
to the rise of the ruling classes internally? One result is the rise of a new class fraction : 
 
… a fraction which I have referred to elsewhere as the domestic bourgeoisie.  As this industrialization 
gets under way, there develop nuclei of an autochtonic (indigenous) bourgeoisie with a chiefly industrial 
character … grafting itself onto this process in the domain of light industry in the consumer goods field, 
more occasionally in heavy industry (consumer durables, textiles, engineering). As well as steel and 
chemicals, and finally in the construction industries (cement etc.) This is particularly the case in Greece 
…253 
 
The key point Poulantzas is pushing is that these new members of the dominant class arose with the 
development of foreign capital activity in their countries.   And he wants to distinguish this class 
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fractions from the traditional oligarchy of established comprador bourgeoisie, those what have 
always traded with large foreign capitalist undertakings.254  These people often act as the agents of 
foreign capital, are entirely supported by it, and comprise, therefore, a different category.  Such 
relationships provide an outpost for foreign capital in those countries in which they operate, and 
within those countries may also offer an avenue for further penetration into the markets of the 
colonies still controlled by these countries, as in the case of Portugal’s African colonies. 
 
In contrast, the domestic bourgeoisie gets less profit.255  But this group does not constitute a 
‘national bourgeoisie’ that could provide an alternative vision for the nation that might turn in the 
direction of anti-imperialism.  It does not constitute an alternative to comprador capitalism.  In large 
part, this is because the domestic capitalists are dependent on the international capitalist system.  
Thus, they are unable to offer much resistance to existing class relations, or take a leading role 
among the dominant classes.  They are divided among themselves, and they are also oriented 
towards external forces, and are thus further weakened in trying to establish resistance to outside 
forces.  Portugal, Spain and Greece are distinct in Europe because they were unable to carry through 
their own bourgeois revolution fully without the help of external capital.  They were stuck more 
tightly to established economic systems based in the rural economy and feudalism compared to 
other European countries.  In particular, Poulantzas wants to claim, harking back again to Gramsci, 
these countries were unable to create a hegemonic discourse that could speak for the nation as a 
whole.256 
 
So how, exactly, is it the case that the domestic bourgeoisie became so important in the 
dictatorships?  Poulantzas argues that in each country they were able to remain critical and politically 
oppose the military regimes.257  He now cites two important elements of the argument.258  Firstly, it is 
clear that these countries were run by comprador capitalism, and that this class fraction was 
dominated by the military régimes in each case.  The domestic bourgeoisie went along with such 
schemes, acting as the minor partner in the power bloc of the dominant classes.  Somewhat 
distinctly, however, the domestic interests sought State support to protect it from overseas capital, 
playing the nationalist card, as it were.  The fundamental political problem for these régimes were 
that they were unable to represent the various class fractions that constituted their various societies.  
Thus, while struggles occurred ‘behind the scenes,’259 it was often the case that the structure of the 
dictatorships, however they looked from the outside, was uncertain.  Old, traditional, landed capital 
was at war with comprador capital, and even if this battle had been eased by the rise of the 
dictatorships, the emergence of domestic capital further added fuel to the flames.260  All that seems 
possible (Poulantzas is talking about current events in Greece) is a realignment of the various 
fractions of the bourgeoisie, with, perhaps, more influence accruing to the domestic fraction. 
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Domestic capital sees in the European Common market project the possibility of escaping from the 
clutches of American hegemony through comprador capitalism.261  It wasn’t simply a case of the 
dictatorships being in the clutches of American capital, or a lack of interest in Europe by the 
régimes.  Rather, the straw had been bent too far towards America.  And while international 
capitalism is important, the key struggles still occur within these three nation states, and not beyond 
them. 
 
Secondly, Poulantzas considers the relation between the domestic bourgeoisie, the state and the 
‘popular masses.’262  At the same time that the domestic bourgeoisie were emerging, so too changes 
were occurring among popular forces.  There were closer and more conciliatory alliances developing 
between domestic capital and domestic working class groups, connections less likely to occur with 
overseas capital and its representatives – again the nationalist card was being played.  In part this 
occurred because the domestic bourgeoisie were in the line of fire – they could not send their assets 
overseas at the first sign of trouble, as the comprador capitalists could.  They needed to negotiate a 
working agenda with their domestic counterparts among the popular masses.  They were tied 
together organically.  Unlike classical fascism of the kind seen in Germany or Italy, these three 
régimes were unable to mobilize the masses, and thus unable to incorporate them into the structure 
of the State.  Thus the domestic bourgeoisie had an advantage in this field.  Monopoly capital in the 
domestic bourgeoisie, led the way, however, and not smaller businesses.  Larger businesses are able 
to make broader concessions than smaller ones, and they were also likely to be advantaged more 
fully than smaller business should the entry to the Common Market take place.263   
 
Thus what emerges is the rise of ‘neo-capitalists’ or ‘enlightened’ capitalists willing and able to work 
with the popular masses towards democracy.264  However hopeful these signs might be, none of 
them suggest any real independence for the three nations from the world capitalist system, nor, yet 
further, any possibility of the ‘transition to socialism’, now a distant goal unlikely to be achieved.265  
But the tactical alliance between the domestic bourgeoisie and the popular masses was real.  Should 
the left have made this alliance?  Poulantzas is sure they should have, given that the goal in each case 
was the defeat of fascism.266  Real gains could and were made through this alliance.  But who came 
to manage the new hegemony?  This is a question of some importance.  Whatever happens, 
Poulantzas predicts that the bourgeoisie will be in control once the transitions from dictatorship 
have taken place.  Was a transition to socialism ever likely?  In Portugal, the battle focused on 
colonial issues.  Through a series of governments and disputes, the domestic bourgeoisie started to 
strengthen their control.267  But it is an incomplete change – little by the way of nationalization of 
industry is proposed, and foreign capital is still encouraged, even though it appears that this 
investment will be better controlled in the future.  Thus there is no anti-monopoly policy being 
followed, and it still unclear what shape agrarian reform will take, an important issue in a country 
where large tracts of land still lie in a small number of hands.  In none of this is there any serious 
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sign that socialism will play a part beyond a modest form of social democracy.  What, then, has 
happened : 
 
… what we see in Greece is a ‘right-wing’ sequel to the military dictatorship, and in Portugal a ‘left-
wing’ one … the difference between the two consists at the present time chiefly in the positions of 
strength that the popular masses and their organizations have managed to obtain for their future struggles 
– history does not stop short with the process of democratization.268 
 
Poulantzas obviously leaves the door open for the transition to socialism to occur in the future, and 
he pins his hopes most clearly here on the left-wing nature of the new Portuguese régime.  But he 
has shown one thing in this chapter, perhaps most clearly to himself.  He has proved, to his own 
satisfaction at least, that democratization took place without this transition, nor through a process of 
national liberation.  The end of the dictatorships took place under the management of the domestic 
bourgeoisie.  We have thus to date underestimated the role this class fraction plays.  It would have 
been better if the working class had done it, he argues, but the end of fascism brings with it decided 
advantages.  Nonetheless, the present situation remains uncertain, and thus has within the seeds of 
hope for the future.  We are left in no doubt of what this future would consist.269 
 
Having placed the domestic bourgeoisie center stage in the revolutionary movement towards 
democracy in these three regimes, Poulantzas now turns to a consideration of the ‘Popular 
Classes’.270  First, Poulantzas wants to set out what happened under dependent industrialization in 
these three countries.  Some of these features are typical of any industrialising process, but these 
events were occurring much later in Greece, Spain and Portugal than elsewhere in Europe.  The 
major features of this movement were huge increases in the urban population and the rise of the 
industrial working class ; the exodus from the country ; the proletarianization of some of the 
peasantry ; a substantial rise in the new middle class, and in the liberal professions.271  Coupled with 
these changes were high rates of unemployment, a massive shift in agriculture, the rise of shanty 
towns and the emergence of conditions seen throughout the ‘Third World’, as it was then termed.   
The reasoning now turns back again to a world systems argument, and a focus on the movement of 
capital and labour around this system.  The process results in the super-exploitation of labour, and 
leads to a series of popular struggles, which he sets out for us :272 (i)  Struggles about the conditions 
of work, and job security. (ii) Struggles over health and social issues (iii) Peasant Struggles (iv) Issues 
surrounding the position of women (v) Student Struggles (vi) The struggles within the intellectual 
class. 
 
Nationalism plays a part in these particular countries to bring the working class together with the 
new rising petty bourgeoisie, found among the emerging white collar workers.  Each can speak to 
the issue of national independence, and this becomes something of a rallying cry for several 
elements in society when the period of the transition emerges.  The role of the domestic bourgeoisie 
must not be overlooked.  Poulantzas sees the petty bourgeoisie as followers of this group, but also 
points to the triple alliance that develops between these classes and class fractions – the domestic 
bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the popular classes - as democratization appears on the 
horizon. 
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During the later period of the dictatorships, there was an increase in the purchasing power of the 
masses, even as the profits accrued at a very high rate among the comprador capitalists.  The crisis 
developing in the 1970s among the core capitalist states started to become exported to subordinate 
states such as Greece, Portugal and Spain such that in each of these countries high rates of inflation 
resulted.273  This change then led to dramatic drops in living standards, and a curbing of the 
migration patterns that had previously been encouraged by core countries.  This further resulted in 
increased unrest in the three societies under examination.  And the causes of this unrest were 
complicated.  Clearly the unrest centred on economic issues, but given that strikes and similar forms 
of resistance were deemed illegal in most cases, these struggles immediately took on a political 
character.274  But there was never any chance that a ‘frontal attack on the state’ would take place, nor 
was there the possibility of a general strike or a widespread insurrection.  Clearly there are remnants 
of Comintern thinking being mulled over here, a musing on traditional models of popular strategic 
uprisings.  But there were perhaps two exceptions to this situation.  Poulantzas first cites the case of 
the Polytechnic uprising in Athens, in which 300,000 people demonstrated against the dictatorship, 
involving both students and workers.275  Then, too, there is the case of the African nationalist 
movements which developed in the Portuguese colonies.  In both these cases, it can be argued that 
the popular masses showed their hand and had an influence on the established régimes.  But the 
truth is that in each case, the regimes were already collapsing from within, and thus no argument can 
be sustained that a popular uprising caused régime downfall – it was already on the way.  It must be 
concluded, then, he argues, that internal contradictions caused the change.276 
 
A fundamental problem for all the dictatorships had been that, from the beginning in each case, and 
unlike in Italy and Germany, they had none of them found a way of incorporating working class 
interests into the structure of the state.  They were never hegemonic and never gained widespread 
popular support.  We are about to witness an important movement in Poulantzian thinking that is 
made very clear here.277  First, he comments : 
 
It (this line of thinking) has led people to think of these states as separate from the ‘civil society’ of the 
popular masses, monolithically maintaining themselves in an ivory tower until a final confrontation 
makes them collapse like a house of cards.278 
 
Nothing could be further from the truth.  Such a view stems from a false and misleading 
understanding of the nature of the state itself as an ‘instrument or thing’  This reading of the state, 
he argues, goes back to Hegel and to the young Marx, and it leads to the claim that the state is a 
neutral object, which can be manipulated or used by which ever party or class that comes along.279   
This, of course, is instrumentalism, a position Poulanztas has already critiqued vigorously and quite 
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publically his exchanges with Ralph Miliband.280  Instead, Poulantzas wants to assert the notion of the 
State as a Social Relation.281  Seeing the state as an instrument has dramatic consequences : 
 
… this precisely makes it impossible to grasp the internal contradictions of the state itself.  In no case, 
in fact, is the state a subject or a thing ; it is always by nature a relation, just as is ‘capital’ : to be more 
precise, the condensation of the balance of forces between the classes that is expressed in a specific 
manner within the state.282 
 
If we see the dictatorships as states in which no fissures, breaks or contradictions are possible, then 
we misunderstand the nature of these régimes.  If, on the other hand, we follow Poulantzas in seeing 
them as full of contradictions and struggles, then the transitions to democracy which follow can be 
clearly understood.  We know also that repression is never enough, and that a hegemonic and 
cultural domination is necessary, orchestrated, if possible, by the focus on a commonly-agreed 
national project.  Without these elements in place, any régime is on uncertain ground.  Thus while 
they may seem monolithic, military dictatorships are often incoherent, having no set policies on a 
wide range of issues, and muddling through in many fields.   
 
In these pages, Poulantzas raises many more questions than he answers.  He seems to be endlessly 
wrestling with the lack of a popular uprising of any significance in each of these three countries, and 
the echoes of the Comintern party line are often in evidence.  The possibility of the mass strike is 
again raised towards the end of the chapter, but immediately dismissed.  What results is an 
acceptance of several alternative explanations.  First, following on from his conclusions from the 
previous chapter, he accepts the leading role of the domestic bourgeoisie in developing a nationalist 
agenda around which members of the petty bourgeoisie and key elements of the popular masses 
could organise to defeat the dictatorships.  Second, he asserts the important notion that these 
régimes were riven with internal contradictions from the first, making them vulnerable to a state of 
permanent uncertainty.  Third, he argues that internal forces were more significant than any 
movements in the international world system.  Finally, he accepts that these changes were a step 
forward for the popular classes, even though the ‘revolution’ is entirely incomplete from the position 
of the left.   
 
Was a mass uprising from the left ever on the cards?  Possibly in Portugal, where the transition went 
in a leftist direction, and where the Communist Party made important connections with certain 
elements in the military.  But the chances were slim, and the changes that did occur towards social 
democracy must not be overlooked.  In none of these cases did a pure revolution take place.  The 
proletarian paradise was never on the cards.  But the dictatorships were at an end, and we must 
count this a blessing.  And we must hope for more in the years to come, claims our author. 
 
Poulantzas now turns to a consideration of the state apparatuses, before a concluding chapter.  The 
aim here is to examine more closely the internal contradictions that led to the changes in régime.283 
Poulantzas starts down this part of the analytic road by arguing that no simple transition is possible 
from dictatorship to social democracy because dictatorships are incapable of change.  What are the 
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differences between the bourgeois and the exceptional state?  As he sees it, the major difference lies 
in the balance of power that characterises each situation.  Transitions arise out of crisis in each case.  
Social democratic states allow some change within their structure without the need for a revolution.  
But this is a capacity that the exceptional state does not have, because it does not have a mechanism 
by which fundamental change can occur.  When the crisis comes in such a state, it is therefore much 
more significant. 
 
Exceptional states come into being originally to solve a hegemonic crisis.  This is now the familiar 
Gramscian line that Poulantzas is spinning, and he has used it several times.284  In his view, it is 
clearly a defining characteristic of the rise of exceptional states in general, whether they be Italy, 
Germany, Portugal, Spain or Greece.  In these conditions, the emerging state establishes a new 
balance of forces that protects a new hegemonic understanding.  The new balance of forces usually 
requires there to be the dissolution of established political parties, elimination of the suffrage,285 a 
change and an expansion in the state apparatus, with the repressive elements coming to the fore, and 
so on.  This creates a situation in which new elements of the power bloc come into play.  It is the 
domestic bourgeoisie in this case, and this process develops by a series of stages, not in a linear 
fashion.  He now restates his major theoretical point : 
 
The state apparatus is not a thing or a structure that is in itself neutral, so that the configuration of class 
power only intervenes in the form of state power.  The relations that characterise the state power also 
pervade the structure of its apparatus, the state being the condensation of forces.  It is precisely this 
characteristic of the state, that it is a relation, and thus riven by class contradictions, that allots a role of 
their own to the state apparatuses and the agents involved in them, and enables them to play this role.286 
 
This is a profoundly important definition, and it is one that he underscores here, having made only 
brief mention of it in the chapter on the popular masses.287  In his familiarly dense language, 
Poulantzas is trying to bring to life a sense of the state teeming with activity, conflict and energy, 
wrestling with the insoluble problems of class society, almost with a life of its own, with its own 
volition.  Of course, nobody would go so far as to suggest that the state is somehow motivated by 
self-interest, that it has a separate life apart from society.  Quite the contrary.  In the Poulantzian 
world view, the state embodies classes, represents classes and their struggles, and condenses them 
into its structure in order to cement together irreconcilable social forces.  But this is a very important 
shift from instrumentalism, and provides a much richer understanding of how class struggles, and 
perhaps the most important elements of class struggle, might occur within the ambit of the state 
structure, rather than outside in civil society.  More cautiously, it certainly is the case that important 
elements of that struggle, though clearly not all of it in its many elements, can be structured within 
the walls of the state.  This theoretical leap is one of the most important and influential moves that 
Poulantzas makes in the whole of his writing on the state. 
 
This being the case, no simple transition is possible between one form of government and another.  
It isn’t like driving a car – you don’t just change drivers.  The whole apparatus is infected by the 
particular shape of the class formations that characterised the previous régime, so any change will 
require a thorough reshaping of the state structure from top to bottom.  The rigidity of the 
exceptional state is both its strength and its weakness.  It provides the firm structures through which 
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much can be achieved, but it also suggest fragility, a structure, which, once fractured, may be subject 
to immediate transformation.  Change, Poulantzas argues, is possible among elements, clans, fiefs of 
the power bloc – the various elements and fractions of the dominant classes can be altered and 
shifted without damaging the overall structure of the state.  But when the popular masses do not 
respond and cannot be managed by violence, then a disruption of the state structure itself is 
inevitable.288  This appears clearly to be the case in Portugal, where progressive fractions of the army 
coalesced with certain elements of the popular uprising, perhaps less so in Greece, where certain 
sections of the military appear to have acted on their own.289  Poulantzas imagines that progressive 
elements of the Spanish army may lead the charge and that this might open the door to the popular 
masses.  The existing state structures, characterised as they are with the old ways of doing things, 
must now go through a purging and cleansing process, not just to the way things are done, but by 
the replacement of personnel from top to bottom.  But this process of purging continually meets 
resistance, a resistance that in the end results from this being a ‘partial’ change, since under both 
régimes, the bourgeoisie remain in power.  This ‘democratization from above’ is quite different from 
a ‘democratization from below’290 
 
Poulantzas now engages in a long exchange with ‘false analyses’ of the dictatorships.  Two positions 
are taken to task – the view that the régimes would fall because of their own contradictions, and the 
alternative view that such contradictions did not exist, and that no such occurrence was possible.291  
In contrast, Poulantzas wants to argue that both in the case of the exceptional state and in the social 
democratic292 state, the state apparatus acts as the party of the bourgeois class.293  But the state can 
also organize the popular classes, including workers and the petty bourgeoisie, thus bringing them 
into the structures that support the bourgeoisie.  Thus every state is ‘riven with contradictions’,294 
and thereby there is a source of discontent and uncertainty.  For example, in each of the three 
dictatorships, a power bloc comprised of various fractions of the bourgeoisie was constituted.  
Military power was used to a greater or lesser extent in the various régimes and at different times.  
But in each case, these military apparatuses are themselves characterised by contradictions and 
conflicts.  As the privileged element of the state under dictatorship, the military becomes the party 
of the bourgeoisie.  Thus the conflicts that exist among the various bits and pieces of the 
bourgeoisie organised in the power bloc also come to be reflected in the military.295 
 
Military dictatorships thus act as the ‘party’ of the bourgeois class, representing these interests within 
the structure of the state and beyond.  And while social democracies are flexible, and can adapt to 
change, no such change is possible in the hierarchically structured military dictatorship.296  
Poulantzas argues close ties remain between the military and the petty bourgeoisie, even though they 
play no major part in the structure of the régime, as was the case in Germany and Italy.  But this 
does not lead to the absorption of this class into the state, but rather to the beginnings of resistance 
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among certain members of the armed forces with the régimes themselves.297  Alliances can also be 
formed among members of the armed forces representing the domestic bourgeoisie, and these 
groups attached to the disaffected petty bourgeoisie.  Herein lie the seeds of an insurrection.   
 
Then Poulantzas draws two conclusions, the first very curious and not following at all from what 
has preceded it.  He concludes that the popular masses can ally with elements of the military – this 
has not been argued in the text at all – quite the contrary.298  And then he confirms the splits that 
exist and develop within the military ranks.  He avoids the simple separation of the higher ranks with 
the domestic bourgeoisie, and the lower ranks with the petty bourgeoisie.  Working class people may 
find support at any level, though the picture is unclear.  In such a state a condition of relative 
autonomy prevails in which the state keeps its distance from the various elements of the power bloc.  
Does the army rule to promote its own interests?  Poulantzas thinks not.299  The army does take on 
an important ideological role, however.  Nationalist ideology is at the forefront here.  It can have a 
somewhat progressive character, placing the national interest again American interests, for example.  
Recently, in Greece and Portugal, a progressive nationalism seems to have appeared.300  Notions of 
national sovereignty have been exploited by the domestic bourgeoisie, and these claims have often 
coincided with claims by some in the military, the petty bourgeoisie and the working class.  This 
nationalism can often be tainted by an anti-communism, which can make any simple alliance with 
the working class somewhat problematic.301  This means, therefore, that the conflicts that appear in 
the political structure of the dictatorships then logically also flow very readily into the ideological 
state apparatuses, which are themselves in a confused condition.  The church in Spain, for example, 
could be said to have split in two over the question of whether to support the oligarchy or not.  In 
Greece, the orthodox church played no major role in the junta.  The junta replaced the top 
leadership, but the lower ranks were always opposed to the new régime.302   
 
At the higher ranks of the régime, the ideological focus moves from a nationalist emphasis towards a 
technologist and economistic focus, thus aiming at industrialization and modernization as the 
antidote to the backwardness and poverty of the past.  This led to an over-dependence on outside 
capital, and the further promotion of a dependency economy.  But it was difficult to change the 
bureaucracy in the direction of the efficiencies required in the developing economy because of vested 
interests.  The educational system also went through prodigious struggles.  Already antiquated and 
deeply hierarchical, the dictatorships simply reinforced these structures.  The judiciary resisted the 
imposition of a permanent military justice and tribunal system, and remained hostile to the emerging 
dictatorships.  In the end, they came to be part of the struggle for freedom.  Contradictions and 
ambiguities plagued the press, the trade unions and the state apparatuses.303  Poulantzas argues that 
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having failed to incorporate the popular masses into the state structure, the régimes were unable to 
resist a mass uprising when it emerged.304 
 
In his last section on the state apparatuses, Poulantzas wants to distinguish between these 
dictatorships and ‘fascism proper’.305  Under fascism, the party holds the social formation together, 
including the working class.  Nothing like this party exists in the dictatorships.  They do not manage 
change well as parties do in parliamentary-democratic regimes, and they don’t have the organizing 
power of the fascist parties.  The contradictions within and between the various elements of the state 
apparatus make these régimes vulnerable.  They lacked the charismatic power of a leader, and they 
were unable to hold their societies together. 
 
In his conclusion, Poulantzas makes it clear that the emerging social democratic societies are anything 
but stable – he holds out the possibility of further changes from the left, especially in Portugal.306  He 
also asks – can these régimes fall back into dictatorship?  Uncertainty and instability appears to be the 
defining quality of the new developing political systems, though we must remember that Poulantzas 
is writing just as these changes are occurring, and when things remain unclear and unfinished.  Will 
the United States intervene to protect their interests?  The bourgeois state system is, in his view, at 
something of a crisis point with the rise of political energy among the popular masses – a certain kind 
of democracy has already been superseded.  He calls this new emerging phase of bourgeois 
democracy the ‘technocratic-authoritarian’ phase.307  In the three countries under consideration, it 
remains important to point out the dependent nature of these economies within Europe, and that 
they are thus developing dependent capitalist states, and that the ideological nature of these state will 
be more autocratic than elsewhere.  We should be on our guard, Poulantzas warns, to ensure that 
these exceptional régimes do not re-emerge again, that we do not lapse back into dictatorships.  In 
fact, we should use the crisis to move forward urgently into the transition to socialism, especially in 
Italy and France.  We need to act : 
 
If we confine ourselves to waiting, we will not get the ‘great day’, at all, but rather the tanks in the small 
hours of the morning.308 
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4.  Reimagining the State : Political Power and Social Classes 
 
Poulantzas began his interest in the state through a study of law, and his doctoral thesis examined 
the theoretical and moral questions surrounding the judicial system.  Here’s what Poulantzas said 
about this thesis : 
 
My doctoral thesis was undertaken in the philosophy of law, in which I tried to develop a conception 
of law drawing on Goldmann and Lukács. It was published in 1964; but from the moment it was 
published I began to feel the limitations of that orientation within Marxism. At this time I began to 
encounter Gramsci through Critica Marxista which was the most important journal of Marxism at that 
time.309 
 
Very soon afterwards, and strongly influenced by Gramsci,310  Poulantzas began to work on his 
extraordinarily important major work on the state, in which he reinvented our conception of how 
the state might work under capitalism.  
 
Political Power and Social Classes exploded onto the theoretical and political scene in 1968, weeks 
before the May insurrection in Paris, and changed our broad understanding of the state forever.  It 
constitutes a re-imagination of state structure and activity.  It is a massively ambitious undertaking 
for a young scholar to attempt.  In it, he not only proposes a complete revolution in state theory, but 
also, as a preliminary task, sets out to reshape class theory as a whole, taking on vast areas of political 
and theoretical certainties.  In its wake, the book upturned a huge array of agreed understandings 
that had underpinned the political life of the left for decades.  In the first 180 pages, he sets out the 
problem to be tackled, and in the last half of the book, he develops alternatives.311 
 
Where else would he start this revision but with Marx?  In the introduction, he reminds us of the 
difference between the ‘science of history’ (historical materialism)and Marxist philosophy (dialectical 
materialism), which have different objects.  ‘HM’ studies history, and ‘DM’ studies knowledge. 
Marxism provides the tools to study history, but overall it emphasizes the distinction between 
processes of thought and real processes, arguing for the primacy of the real over the ‘knowledge of 
the real’.312  Then he sets out his project in clear terms : 
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Theoretical work, then, whatever the degree of its abstraction, is always work bearing on real processes.  
Yet since this work produces knowledge, it is wholly situated in the process of thought : no concepts 
are more real than others.  Theoretical work proceeds from a raw material, which consists not only of 
the ‘real-concrete’, but of information, notions, etc. about this reality, and deals with it by means of certain 
conceptual tools: the result of this work is the knowledge of an object. 
 It can be said that, in the strong sense of the term, only real, concrete, singular objects exist.  The 
final aim of the process of thought is knowledge of these objects …313 
 
Poulantzas is setting out his philosophical methodology here,314 and the details of this section need 
not concern us here in any detail.  But it is important to note the close attention Poulantzas pays to 
the methodological struggles that were happening in Marxist intellectual circles at this time.  He 
begins by talking about the nature of social formations, by which he means society as a whole.  In any 
given society, a variety of modes of production can be said to exist – the capitalist mode of 
production (CMP) the feudal, the patriarchal – and in each society, one mode of production can be 
said to dominate.315  Together these modes of production form a structured unity.  This matrix316 of 
modes of production constitutes the object of study.  The situation is complicated by the existence of 
various economic, political, ideological and theoretical factors.  In societies dominated by the CMP, 
the economic dimension tends to be determinate. 
 
We are met immediately in the very first pages, as we have been elsewhere, by Poulantzas’s 
taxonomic fury.  In this instance, he is not content to set out theoretical requirements for studying 
actual societies – here he is keen to establish a form of science in general before he develops an 
appropriate theoretical apparatus to examine the state : 
 
The object of this book is the political, in particular the political superstructure of the state in the CMP : 
that is the production of the concepts of this region in this mode, and the production of more concrete 
concepts dealing with politics in capitalist formations.317 
 
We can expect, therefore, a series of theoretical productions, of products, much like the products of 
capitalism itself, to spew forth in the coming pages, that will help us understand what is happening in 
the politics of modern capitalist societies, and in particular, how the state functions.  The logic of this 
process flows from the abstract to the concrete, and the aim is to produce concepts that explain the 
real-concrete elements of a given society.  Such concepts allow us to know the world as it is.318 
 
He proposes to begin his work by examining the existing work in the Marxist classics, in the present 
writings on the state, the writings from the workers’ movements and other similar sources.  These 
constitute the present understandings of the state, and they comprise the raw materials on which he 
plans to work.  In this process, he has had to rewrite and complete the Marxist classics in some 
                                                 
313 PPSC, 12-13. 
314 The argument is more complicated than the one I am describing.  For example, the distinction between real concrete 
objects and the discussion about them is uncertain, and we may better think of a range of situations between the two. 
(PPSC, page 13ff.)  Much of this philosophical work comes from Althusser, under whose influence Poulantzas came at 
this time, though he was never a student of Althusser, and soon broke away from this relationship.  This break, and 
especially the break with Balibar, is discussed more fully in the Marxism Today interview cited above. 
315 PPSC, 15.  
316 He insists on the use of the term ‘matrix’. Page 15. 
317 PPSC, 16. 
318 On page 18, he sets out in diagrammatic form the way in which this method of moving from the abstract to the 
concrete might work. 
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instances.319  He sees a lack of theoretical certainty and systematic treatment in many of these 
classical works when it comes to the political realm. 
 
The epistemological break in Marx’s work is noted.  This is the familiar claim that Althusser makes 
in arguing that the young Marx took an idealist position, and later, in certain key works, began to 
establish a new science, to open up a new continent of thinking.  The ‘Young Marx’, heavily under 
the influence of Hegel and of Feuerbach, is said to have been predominantly humanist,320 and the 
reason that this becomes an important theme at the time of Poulantzas’s writing is because, in the 
wake of the end of Stalinism, there was renewed interest within Marxist circles in the work of the 
Young Marx, with his emphasis on personal freedom, the concept of alienation, and the possibility 
of a peaceful transition to socialism under the banner of socialist humanism.  Althusser takes this to 
be a retrogressive move, allowing Marxist enemies to turn the tables on Marxism itself.  Apparently, 
in the historical moment after World War Two, when Althusser was coming of age, and beginning 
to write, the class struggle was imagined to be over, upturned by the catastrophe of world war, and 
all was now, for the moment at least, peace and light – a kumbaya moment.321  What especially 
seemed to be in error to Althusser was the mindless getting together after the war of various 
apparently progressive groups – socialists, democrats, communists - all brought under the banner of 
a benign movement towards a new society.  While this all sounds very charming and lovely, it was a 
delusional strategy from the Althusserian point of view.  The ‘old’ period of Stalinism has been 
replaced with the ‘new’, much more exciting, far less dogmatic, and impressively more attractive 
version of Communism, all this undergirded by new readings of the Young Marx. 
 
What is Althusser to say to all this?  He reminds us that this deviation from Marxist science has 
occurred many times in the past, and that Lenin and others have often commented on the 
problem.322  He reminds us quite simply, that it is an ideological illusion : 
 
… the inflation of the themes of ‘Marxist humanism’ and their encroachment on Marxist theory should 
be interpreted as a possible historical symptom of a double inability and a double danger.  An inability 
to think the specificity of Marxist theory, and, correlatively, a revisionist danger of confusing it with 
pre-Marxist ideological interpretations.  An inability to resolve the real (basically political and economic) 
problems posed … , and a danger of masking these problems with the false ‘solution’ of some merely 
ideological formulae.323 
 
Althusser then makes a very bold claim, on which most of his intellectual reputation was to depend 
in the coming years : 
 
                                                 
319 He is nothing if not confident.  See his comments on page 19. 
320 Louis Althusser, For Marx, Introduction. 1963.  In the comments to English readers, Althusser explains that the 
essays that are to follow have their limitations : ‘They are philosophical essays, the first stages of a long-term investigation, 
preliminary results which obviously demand correction; this investigation concerns the specific nature of the principles 
of the science and philosophy founded by Marx’.  From ‘To My English Readers’, page nine.  This comment raises a 
problem besetting much of this period’s writing from the left – that everything was ‘preliminary’, and subject to revision.  
Nothing was ever fully explained.  All was a preliminary to something else, but a final understanding never resulted.  It 
was as if the writing was enough.  Althusser, of course, wants to insist otherwise, this his writings are an ‘intervention in 
a particular conjuncture’, and in his case the direction of the French Communist Party.  
321 Defined by the Urban Dictionary as ‘blandly pious and naively optimistic.’ Recovered on October 21, 2016 at 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=kumbaya. 
322 Pages 10-11. 
323 Pages 11-12.  Althusser’s writing, like that of Poulantzas, is full of urgency and vitality.  These are problems of the 
moment, and the writing is seen as being able to inject new life into the political world surrounding the authors. 
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… we may claim that Marx established a new science: the science of the history of ‘social formations’. 
To be more precise, I should say that Marx ‘opened up’ for scientific knowledge a new ‘continent’, that 
of history – just as Thales opened up the ‘continent’ of mathematics for scientific knowledge, and Galileo 
opened up the ‘continent’ of physical nature for scientific knowledge.324 
 
What we must do, then, quite clearly, is to rush back to the secure territory of Marxist science, and 
away from the easy solutions of the charming, but misguided, early Marx.  What then, is the nature 
of this ‘mature science’?  The break between the two starts to be seen, according to Poulantzas, in 
The German Ideology325, but reaches its full realization in Das Capital.  Poulantzas, quite clearly 
influenced by Althusser and writing in his wake, plans not to focus on the young Marx, but rather to 
concentrate on this new continent, to work in the established territory of historical materialism. 
 
From Capital,  Poulantzas decides he can find a ‘scientific treatment of the CMP’,
326 and the matrix 
that specifies it, along with a scientific treatment of the economic system.  The economy dominates, 
but the elements of the social formation have some autonomy one from another.  For Poulantzas, a 
gap exists, even in the great master-work, in which, to his eye, the political world is implied rather 
than spoken about, and he plans to remedy the situation.  Nor is ideology given a full analysis here.  
Then, in addition, there are other works by Marx, mostly focusing on ‘ideological struggles’, in which 
Marx is responding to critics.  There are also a series of texts that focus on the real-concrete.  
Theory here is not explicitly stated.  Instead these studies ‘are a ‘concrete analysis of a concrete 
situation’ ’.327  A key question here is whether concepts used in a specific study have usefulness in 
the analysis of capitalism in general.  And do writings about one mode of production have value in 
analyzing other modes of production?  How general are these concepts – at what level should they 
be used?328 
 
Poulantzas then sets out his expositional strategy.  Following Marx, he proposes to start with the 
concept of the political in general, then proceed to a regional political theory before finally arriving 
at the concrete-real.  His products, as we have already found out, are to be new concepts by which 
to analyze the concrete-real.  He thus starts in the realm of dialectical materialism, and will gradually 
introduced the theory of historical materialism.329  There are precautions to be taken.  He does not 
expect to be entirely systematic, and he wants to avoid some obvious mistakes : 
 
… I should like to note my reserve towards a currently over-popular tendency to put the cart before 
the horse in confusing the order of research and investigation with the logical order of the process of 
thought, and in systematizing the general theory in the void, before proceeding to a sufficient amount 
of concrete research : a tendency against which Marx warned us.330 
 
His focus will be on the political within capitalism, and he does not plan to use these evolving 
concepts in wider areas, such as in the study of other modes of production.  The fundamental 
concepts from historical materialism which come into play are those deriving from the theory of 
                                                 
324 Althusser, page 14.  In the introduction to For Marx, Althusser sets out a very clear chronology in Marx’s work, 
setting the date for the ‘break’ in 1845.  Here is his chronology in brief.  Pre-1844 – the Young Marx ; the Break 1845 ; 
1845-1957, the transitional period ; after 1857, (1857-1883) the Mature Period. 
325 PPSC, 20. 
326 PPSC, 20. 
327 PPSC, 22. 
328 Poulantzas raises these questions on pages 22-23. 
329 PPSC, 23-26. 
330 PPSC, 24.  Indeed Marx warned against such a strategy, but it is unclear whether Poulantzas will avoid the problem. 
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surplus value – the labourer ; the means of production ; the non-labourer, who appropriates the 
product.331  These elements are brought into a relationship by capitalism, in which the labourer is 
separated from the products he makes.  In this relationship, Poulantzas argues, quoting Marx, lies 
the entire secret of the social formation.332  Marx goes on to comment : 
 
… the economic structure of society is the real basis on which the juridical and political superstructure 
is raised, and to which definite social forms of thought correspond ; that the mode of production 
determines the character of the social, political and intellectual life generally, all this is very true for our 
times …333 
 
This is a profoundly important extract from Marx’s writing, because it establishes the centrality of 
the base-superstructure model, in which it is thought that the economic life of a society determines 
the other elements of the world – the political and juridical system, as well as the dominating ideas 
of the day.  This is an assertion that leads to endless debates about the determinacy of this 
relationship.  If this relationship is determinate, then the nature of the state and the ideology of a 
given time can simply be read directly from the nature of the economic system.  The state is then the 
mere instrument of the ruling class, and the ideology is ruling class ideology.  But we already know 
this is precisely the misreading of Marx on which Poulantzas will concentrate in the pages to come.  
In any case, this is not the element in the quotation on which he wishes to concentrate.  Instead, he 
uses it to show us that the capitalist mode of production is merely one moment in history, and that 
these relationships do not hold for all historical periods. 
 
But then immediately he draws attention to other elements of Marx’s writing that provide an avenue 
to a more sophisticated understanding of the major elements of capitalism.334  The economic and the 
political, he finds, both from the Grundrisse335 and from other sections of Capital, have a certain 
degree of relative autonomy between them – they are not joined together at the hip.  Thus 
immediately we are disabused of the view that Marx developed some simple and unchanging view of 
the matter.  If this new understanding is examined closely, it then becomes possible to study the 
political as a separate entity, a ‘specific object of science’.336  Under capitalism, a specific form of 
economic relationship is set up in which the labourer is separated from his product, a situation that 
occurs most obviously with the rise of heavy industry.337  The economic system gains its character 
from this development, but it also creates a separation between the economic and political worlds, in 
which the economic realm, none the less, takes the dominant and determining role.  This new 
understanding opens the door for what is to come. 
 
Having cleared his throat, Poulantzas is now ready to get down to work on the raw materials of the 
task at hand – the existing writings concerning politics.338  Class struggle is clearly going to be at the 
centre of this work.  Without class struggle, no politics.  Without politics, no state.  In a review of 
the best of the raw materials to hand – writings from Marx, Engels and Lenin - he draws out key 
                                                 
331 PPSC, 26. 
332 PPSC, 27.  Poulantzas is quoting a passage from Capital, volume 3, page 791. 
333 Marx, Capital, Volume 1, page 82, quoted in PPSC, 28. 
334 PPSC, 29ff. 
335 Marx, Karl, translated by Martin Nicolaus. 1973. Grundrisse : Foundations of the critique of political economy. New York: 
Vintage Books. 
336 PPSC, 29. 
337 PPSC, 32-33. 
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elements of the Marxist readings on politics.339  Marxism can be read as a historicism, history 
through class struggle driving society forward.  Politics through class struggle is the motive power 
through history, and linear progress is made in this fashion.  All the elements are thrown together, 
and nothing exists in the world of ideas except the distinction between bourgeois science and 
proletarian science.340  This clumsy synthesis of all the elements of society makes the separate study 
of the political impossible.341   
 
Historicism and functionalism are closely aligned.  Poulanztas seems to be assigning this whole 
tradition, from Weber through Parsons (though Weber is rarely treated as a functionalist) as 
historicist, and thus rather beside the point.342  Althusser has shown that the theory of historical 
materialism can allow us to escape from a simple historicism that offers class struggle as the singular 
motor of history.343  Althusser’s characterisation reminds us of the complexity and the nuances of 
the social formation, and thus the impossibility of attaching the causes of history to a single source.  
Indeed, following Lenin, we can discern that every social conjuncture (a society at a given time) has 
within it various elements on which political practice and class struggle impinge – the economic, 
ideological, theoretical and political.344  Political structures are to be found in the institutionalised power 
of the state.345  Class struggle is always aimed at the state.  If the final aim of class struggle is the 
gaining of power, and if the state is where power resides, the goal of class struggle is therefore 
always to take control of the state. 
 
The state may be said to be the factor of cohesion in any given society.346  During class struggle, the 
goal is to develop a new equilibrium in the state structure.  The state is where contradictions are 
condensed.  If we see the state in this way, a major problem presently existing in Marxist theory can 
be resolved.347  In the early Marx, we find the argument that the purpose of class struggle is to gain 
control of civil society, and not the state.  In the mature Marx, the goal of class struggle is the state, 
and the problem is overcome.  Under capitalism, the state has some degree of autonomy.  Only by 
developing a degree of autonomy can the state hope to achieve its goal as the factor of social 
cohesion.348  Engels had apparently presaged this argument by speaking of the way in which the state 
                                                 
339 In fact, he starts with Hegel and Gramsci, who he does not list in the text.  And like Althusser, he is using the classical 
model of production to frame his argument.  All production starts with raw materials – in this case existing concepts.  
These concepts are then worked upon to produce new concepts, new knowledge.  The structure of the argument 
perfectly parallels the theory of surplus value set out by Marx many years before.   
340 An argument developed by Bukharin and others, and developed, and later rejected, by Althusser. 
341 Functionalism and Talcott Parsons are cited as providing the only viable alternative to the Marxist account of history. 
342 PPSC, page 40ff.  But having said he will spend some time on this issue, he immediately veers back to Althusser and 
Lenin. 
343 PPSC, 41. 
344 Ibid.  Poulantzas is also engaged, in footnotes and in the text, with an endless attempt to create new definitions and 
new clarity about existing definitions, the familiar taxonomic fury we have seen elsewhere.  For example, on page 42, 
footnote 8, he wants to distinguish between the law (the juridical structure) and the state, (the political structure) and not 
to confuse the two as the ‘juridico-political structure of the state’, a commonly used term in the classics.  A most 
important distinction, one might argue, and precisely in line with his broad task of putting the record straight with regard 
to the classic texts of Marxism.  But often these definitional skirmishes lead to dead ends, to the creation of new 
concepts that neither he nor anyone else ever uses again. 
345 PPSC, 42.  His phrase and his italics. 
346 PPSC, 44. 
347 PPSC,  45-46. 
348 Poulantzas further, and appropriately, complicates the picture on page 47 by reminding us that even when one mode 
of production has gained dominance, several other modes of production still exist in the same social formation. 
 57 
connects with the array of conflicts in society as a whole.  One part of the Engels quote that 
Poulantzas cites is well worth repeating here : 
 
… it becomes necessary to have a power seemingly standing above society that would alleviate 
… conflict, and keep it within the bounds of ‘order’ ; and this power, arisen out of society but 
placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state.349 
 
This notion of the state as comprising the ‘table of contents of man’s practical conflicts’350 is 
also to be found in Lenin, so the idea is clearly there among the classical writers.  This being 
the case, it is perhaps within the structure of the state that we can look for an understanding 
of society as a whole.  The state, then, both reflects society and its troubles, as well as 
offering a method of achieving order : 
 
The state prevents classes and ‘society’ from consuming themselves : the use of the term 
‘society’ indicates that it prevents the social formation from bursting apart.  It is true that the 
Marxist classics did not theoretically elaborate this conception of the state, but we do find 
numerous indications of it in their works.351  
 
Poulantzas has thus cleverly achieved two goals in this section.  He has drawn from the classic 
writings sufficient evidence of the notion of the state as the institution of social order, but also 
provided himself with an opportunity to complete the work only superficially begun, hinted at, and 
dimly conceived, by the great masters who wrote before him. 
 
This notion of order that the state manages can take many forms, and in the next section 
Poulantzas spells out the forms it can take.  What, then, are the precise functions of the state?  A 
related question is to ask where the state originated.  According to the classics, the state’s traditional 
role is to control the economic life of society.352  But the labour process is only one aspect of the 
economic system that the state must control.  It must also seek to manage the juridical system that 
provides rules for the work place and capitalist markets.  And it must also provide an ideological 
system that fits the overall structure of the economic system as well.  Thus the state must function 
at the economic, ideological and political levels simultaneously if the economic system is to be 
sustained.  And the state’s various activities can only be properly understood if we can see the 
connectedness between these elements of the system.353  The result is political class domination 
with the overall aim of establishing and maintaining unity and order.  Thus the state’s political 
function is paramount inasmuch as the primary role of the state is to ensure the political 
domination of a certain class.  But the state’s functions cannot be reduced to the simple act of 
intervention since it provides an ensemble of functions well beyond simple intervention.  It does 
not, therefore, simply produce order.  And the role that it plays varies in different societies. 
                                                 
349 Cited in PPSC, page 48.  The original source is cited as Origins of the Family, Chapter 9, MESW, 1970, page 576. A 
delightful quote from Marx is also worth recording here, though it adds little to the general argument : ‘The State is the 
official résumé of society’. (Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, page 156. Appendix : Marx’s letter to P.V. Annenkov, 1846.) 
350 Lenin, ‘What the “Friends of the People” are and how they fight the Social Democrats’, Collected Works, Volume 3, 
page 527, and cited in PPSC, page 49. 
351 PPSC, 50. 
352 PPSC, 52. A further outburst of definitional analysis occurs in footnote 28 on this page, in which Poulantzas discusses 
‘some problems of definition set by political anthropology …’ (his italics) 
353 PPSC, 53. 
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Poulantzas now turn to the issue of politics and social classes.354  Capital, he argues, is a text focused 
on the economic dimension, but it does not provide an adequate account of the notion of class.355  
We know already what is to come – the extension of the concept of social classes beyond the 
merely economic, and into the realms of the political and the ideological, and then further on into 
the very structure of the state itself.  Again, we will see Poulantzas hint that these matters were 
there in part in the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin, but that the explanations are partial and in 
need of  completion.356  In his discussion of Marx, he examines Marx’s theory of the rise of the 
proletariat, and the emergence of a broadly political dimension beyond the singular exchange of 
worker and owner, or a single workplace and a single employer, and onto a wider stage.  He is 
discussing the gradual rise of two social classes.  Individuals struggling one with another do not 
constitute a struggle between social classes.  Only the rise of groups – workers and bourgeoisie – 
provide the foundation for a struggle between classes, between categories of people, rather than 
between individuals.  So what was once a ‘merely’ economic struggle in the workplace becomes a 
political struggle in society at large.357   
 
In the Poulantzian view, this argument has frequently been distorted, and these distortions must be 
swept to one side.  The first argument to be dismissed is the Hegel-inspired conclusion that ‘men 
make their own history.’  It is as if this movement of class formation, from ‘class-in-itself’ to ‘class-
for-itself’ is logical, coherent and inevitable.  There are also functionalist interpretations to be 
discarded.358  The problem here is that structures and functions are seen as two parts of the 
definition of social class – class situation and class function – which neatly attaches to Marx’s class-
in-itself and class-for-itself.  Such a view is misguided because Marx imagined that workers and 
bourgeoisie ‘bear’ the ensemble of structures of a class society, and because Marx never conceived 
classes as the origins of structures.  Thus the connections made between class situation and class 
function are misplaced. 
 
A further error to be corrected is to found in economism.  In this view, classes merely have an 
economic status.  But the economic can never be separated from the political and ideological 
dimensions.  Marx, Poulantzas argues,359 never made such an argument, though it is claimed that he 
did.  Instead Marx always spoke of the ‘ensemble of the structures of a mode of production’.360  Classes 
can always be identified at the economic, political and economic level.  This leads us to reconsider 
the notion of the social relations of production.  The idea of relations of production refers to how 
people are organized in the productive process – worker and capitalist, for example.  But it is 
                                                 
354 Chapter two, pages 57-99.  This still comes under the heading of general questions to be raised, which involves a 
rehearsing of existing texts.  This continues to page 117.  He raises three sets of questions – questions about the political, 
questions about politics and social classes, and questions about power.  
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economic theory on pages 58-59. 
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different.  See ‘Bourdieu’s Class’ in An Introduction to the Work of Pierre Bourdieu : the Practice of Theory,  (edited with Richard 
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necessary to distinguish the social relations of production if we want to go further and examine the 
other levels of the class structure – the political, the ideological, the cultural.  It seems a trivial 
distinction, but as Poulantzas builds towards a new theory of social classes, it is very significant.  
Classes are always engaged in social practices, and these practices cannot be reduced to 
structures.361  
 
So what can we conclude so far about the nature of classes?  Clearly classes cannot simply be 
distinguished just at the economic level alone – economic, political and ideological levels come into 
play from the first, both in the social practices of classes, and in the struggles that take place 
between them.  Indeed the dominance of the economic in class struggle may be displaced into the 
political and ideological realms.  The economic may be determinant ‘in the last instance’, but classes 
cannot reduced merely to the sphere of economic activity.   
 
Do Marx and Engels admit that classes have a ‘plurality of criteria’?  Certainly Marxist critics have 
suggested that this is so.  Clearly Capital proposes two classes – wage-earning labourers and 
capitalists.  But any society comprises several modes of production, and if this is the case, other 
classes besides the two capitalist classes must be said to exist.  But the political and ideological 
dimensions of even these two central classes are not fully elaborated upon in the classical texts, 
though clearly these elements are close at hand, as in the case of property law and of labour law.362 
 
Thus it is mistaken to argue that in the capitalist mode of production, that economic relations are 
sufficient to define class relations.  There are also secondary effects to consider which derive from 
the concrete situation in any given society.  And where does politics figure in these theoretical 
calculations?  Marx appears to separate economic struggles from political struggles, and suggest that 
classes exist only at the level of political struggle – the familiar class-in-itself/class-for-itself 
distinction.  The early work of Marx is clearly representative of such a view.  But it seems equally 
clear that class relations are embedded in economic relations in Capital and later writings.  And this 
insistence by Marx on defining classes solely on the political plane needs to be explained.  What 
seems to be happening is that we are witnessing the gradual formation of a theoretical concept 
which comes to light when we study Marx’s texts historically.  He is also attempting to separate the 
various levels of class practices out so as to be able to distinguish them theoretically.363  But what 
remains important is to remind ourselves that these structures comprise elements of a united 
structure which come together in the actual practices of social classes in any given society. 
 
Classes are said to exist, by some of Marx’s critics,364 merely at the political level when they become 
conscious together as a class.  Classes in this view don’t exist at the economic level ; they come into 
being at the political and ideological levels merely in the act of class struggle.  This approach 
suggests that the economic system is thereby ‘shaken up from above’.365  This is a misguided view, 
according to Poulantzas, and he proposes instead the importance of class struggle at each level of 
the social system, including the economic.  It might be said, somewhat differently, that the political 
class struggle is the over-determining level of the class struggle at certain times, especially because the 
state is involved, and because the state acts as the force of social cohesion. 
                                                 
361 See footnote 16 on page 68. 
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363 PPSC, 75. 
364 Poulantzas cites Lukàcs, Korsch and ‘the Theoretical Leftism of the Third International” as supporting this line of 
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How are classes present in any given society?366  Classes which seem theoretically to be present in 
any particular mode of production appear dissolved and diffused367 in any given concrete situation.  
When one mode of production dominates, classes from other modes of production may be less 
clearly demarcated, especially if we consider that classes might be said to exist only when political 
class struggles representing their interests take place.  But we should perhaps more accurately argue 
that classes exist only when their economic interests come to be represented at the political level.  
How exactly, then, are we able to distinguish when a class exists or not?  Poulantzas introduces the 
phrase pertinent effects to suggest how this might be done.368  By this term he means that an economic 
class produces effects in the political, ideological and social structures and practices that would not 
exist if the economic class did not exist.  Economic classes can clearly exist without a political form 
of representation that speaks for their economic interests.  For example, in the case of French 
peasants, it is clear the rise of the Bonapartist state would not have occurred without them, and 
thus they are represented by the very structure of the state itself.  In this way, they can be said to 
comprise a social force.  In any event, even when the state does not represent such a category, and 
this category does not have party representation, issue like the suffrage mean that no such group 
can be overlooked – there are always ‘pertinent effects’ at the political level.  However, this 
situation must lead us to the view that without state or party representation, such a category cannot 
be said to exist as a separate social class.369  Thus if an economic category never functions as a 
social force, it cannot be said to form a separate element in the class structure.  Thus a class must 
have pertinent effects, but that does not mean it must have its own political party to constitute a 
class.  
 
In any given society, certain modes of production can be said to be decomposing, their classes 
shifting into new class formations.  As these changes occur, the way a class is represented at the 
political level is also shifting, as new class alliances and new class fractions are formed.370  It then 
become important to say more about classes, strata and categories.371  Social categories are ‘social 
ensembles with pertinent effects’, such as the bureaucracy and the intellectuals.  Autonomous fractions 
of classes are those fractions which might lead to social forces, become autonomous and create 
‘pertinent effects’.  And social strata are the sub-elements (what Poulantzas calls the ‘secondary effects 
of the combination of modes of production in a social formation’) of classes, such as the ‘labour 
aristocracy’.372  Obscurity and uncertainty in the use of these terms has prevailed among Marxist 
writers, apparently, and these confusions must be clarified and put to one side.  If we step back 
somewhat from the obscurity of Poulantzas’s own argument, some of his intention comes more 
fully into focus.  The bourgeoisie clearly have class fractions – the commercial, industrial and 
financial fractions can empirically be distinguished – groups joined together by common interests of 
ownership, but separated because of their several and various forms of activity.  However, when the 
distinctions are purely political, things become more complicated.  For example, the bureaucracy is 
determined not by economic factors, as in the case of the bourgeoisie, but by the political 
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dimension.  Fractions might be able to constitute social forces, unlike strata, who are already 
embedded in a particular class. And even if this does not occur, various subgroups in society might 
still influence the political structure.   
 
After this long discursus, Poulantzas is now ready to draw two conclusions : the separation between 
structures (the economic dimension) and (political and ideological) class practices ; and the argument 
that :   
Social relations consist of class practices, in which social classes are placed in oppositions : social classes 
can be conceived only as class practices, these practices existing in oppositions which, in their unity, 
constitute the field of class struggle.373 
 
Just as Poulantzas has just commented that one way to read Marx is to view his collected works 
historically, and thus to witness the gradual emergence of ‘mature’ concepts, so too as Poulantzas 
reads the classical texts, he responds to difficulties and omissions by trying to tidy up and clarify 
theoretical muddles, creating a flood of categories, definitions and specifications which appear to 
constitute a history of his own theoretical development.  Many ideas are cast to one side, signposts 
to a theoretical dead end.  Others appear to have more lasting power, and continue into the final 
understandings of the state.  But often the relentless insistence on theoretical clarity ironically adds 
to the confusion, rather than simplifies the task. 
 
Social classes are thus social relations, and these comprise class practices.  Classes only exist in 
opposition.  They imply domination and subordination – the struggle between wages and profits – 
for example.  This analysis of classes as social relationships engaged in struggle leads to the 
development of new concepts.  Structures do not dissolve into practices, however.  
 
In Lenin we find a distinction between political and economic class struggles.  Economic struggle 
for Lenin occurs around the workplace and in the trade unions, whereas political struggle is centred 
on the state.374  Poulantzas wants then to make a bold claim : 
 
This distinction implies a relation between the economic and the political struggles.  The essential 
character of this relationship consists in the fact that the political struggle is the over-determining level of 
the class struggle, in that it concentrates the levels of the class struggle.375 
 
It then follows that rather than thinking of class struggle as an evolutionary phenomenon, it must 
rather be the case that the political struggle must always have priority.  This is potentially a massive 
shift in Marxist thinking, which according to orthodoxy, always gives priority to the economic. 
Clearly Poulantzas is giving preference to Lenin’s thinking here, who proposes that unless a 
revolutionary class pays attention to politics, they will not survive, and one is tempted to think that 
there may be a situation in the revolutionary moment which deserves this focus, but that it may not 
be quite so pertinent during other historical times.376 And political struggle must then reach into the 
other areas of activity, the economic and the ideological, for example, even if the purpose of this 
struggle must always be, in the end, state power. 
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376 Ibid.  
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Placing the primary emphasis on the political brings the state to the fore in a way rarely seen beyond 
Lenin, and clearly not fully realized in his writings.  This leads Poulantzas now to consider ‘the 
conjuncture’ – the present moment – the actual conditions of a given society.  He now turns to 
Lenin’s discussion of the Russian situation during the revolution.  This conjuncture comprises a 
variety of social classes and categories, including the Tsarist régime, the monarchical bourgeoisie, the 
proletariat and the peasants.377  This is where the political class struggle occurs.  We must examine 
the relationship between structures and practices here, and this connection is complex.  Political 
struggle takes place within the limits set by the structures, and indeed can be said to take place on 
the structures.378 
 
The structure of the state is especially important in this situation because it concentrates the levels of 
the structure.  According to Lenin, the state must be smashed.379  If this is so, it is clear we must 
move beyond economistic analysis.  Only classes or class fractions which have pertinent effects can 
be said to be social forces.  According to Lenin, they must go further, and declare their action, and 
participate in the struggle.  And this struggle must take on the form of organised class power, 380 
which is often, though not always, associated with a political party. 
 
Poulantzas now turns to the concept of power itself.381  Again Marx, Engels, Lenin and Gramsci are 
found wanting, never having produced between them a theoretical concept of power.  Clearly this is 
the topic on the agenda here.  First and foremost, power resides in the realm of class practices, and 
class relations are relations of power.  Thus state power can only correspond to the power of a class 
whose interests the state represents.  Here Poulantzas plans to deal with various existing, and mostly 
contemporary, theories of the ruling class.  In such theories, Poulantzas discovers an unwillingness 
to attach power to the relations of production, to social classes, and instead to develop an 
autonomous theory of power distribution that has little to do with classes at all.  The problem of the 
ruling class, therefore, according to this view, is that power is distributed globally in an uneven 
fashion, especially in autocratic societies.  The emergence of power from classes is then proposed as 
a special case of power.  Such an argument poses a dilemma for Marxist theory.  If we say relations 
of production are all there is to be said about classes, we should be ignoring the political and 
ideological dimensions of power.  And if we replied that that indeed this is a special case, this would 
reduce the economic and the juridical system to power relations.  Neither response is satisfactory.  
The problem here lies in the confusion between structures and practices.  Class relations are always 
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381 This is Chapter Three under ‘General Questions’. 
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political relations, whether at the economic, political or ideological levels of the structure.  But such 
a view might lead to the conclusion that state power is the only power that exists.  Instead, it must 
be insisted that power relations exist at every level.  
 
What, therefore, is ‘economic power’?382  Marx used the term economic power to refer to the 
economic domination of the ruling class.  On the other hand, political and ideological power. As 
well as struggles over power can also exhibit forms of domination quite separate from economic 
considerations.  Classes don’t begin with power, however, and they are not founded in this realm.  
 
Elite theory argues that the groups that control politics are different from those that control 
economic power.383  In this analysis there is no way scientifically384 to connect the economic and 
political dimensions, a problem that appears both in Michel’s notion of the political class, and in 
Weber’s status groups.  This results from the earlier problem that Poulantzas has already canvassed 
in relation to the issue of class-in-itself and class-for-itself.  How, then, shall power be defined? : 
 
By power, we shall designate the capacity of a social class to realize its specific objective interests.385 
 
Poulantzas has now set out his theoretical stall in unambiguous fashion, reducing all power to class 
power, and offering himself up as a target to all those who see power in a much wider context, with 
many other sources of origin.  As we shall see later, this was a ready avenue for Foucault to travel 
down in search of a wider and more subtle theory of power.386  But for the moment, let us stay with 
Poulantzas as he develops this apparently highly reductionist argument further.   The Poulantzian 
proposal separates itself from several other previous theoretical strategies.  It is distinct from 
Lasswell’s theory of decision-making,387 and from Weber, who argues that power is : 
 
… the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of 
people.388 
 
This, in the Poulantzian view, reduces power to a matter of legitimacy.  In Parsons he sees another 
problem.  For Parson, power is ‘the capacity to carry on certain functions to the profit of the social 
system considered in its entirety’,389 and this definition is clearly bound up with functionalist 
notions of integration and social systems.  But Poulantzas wants to rush on.  In his view, his new 
conception  is ‘capable of accounting for the whole range of Marxist analysis of this problem’.390  This 
is an extraordinary claim, in which he wants to assert he has solved the problem of power for all 
Marxist writing.  The reader is put on notice that this is an attempt at nothing less than a paradigm 
shift in Marxist political theory. 
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First, Poulantzas argues, we must start with the assertion that this definition relates to all societies 
engaged in class struggle, which, one assumes, is all societies apart from socialist societies.  And 
these societies, are by definition, societies engaged in class struggle.  There is thus set up a 
condition of domination and subordination.  When classes do not exist,391 a structure of authority 
might be said to be in play.  Power between individuals cannot be considered ; instead Poulantzas 
wants to use the term might.392  This definition implies an element of force, but when this force is 
replaced with an element of consent, the term ‘power’ (pouvoir) has been used.  Thus he seems to 
admit one might look at power in other ways, but these kinds of arguments are beyond the Marxist 
ambit, and thus hardly worth considering in any detail.393  He soon moves back to an elaboration of 
his own theory, and proposes that : 
 
This concept of power refers to the capacity of a class to realize specific objective interest.  This element 
of the concept of power has particular reference to Marx’s and Lenin’s analyses of class organization.394  
 
Classes can exist even when that class might not have fully developed political and ideological 
structures, the ‘pertinent effects’ discussed above.  Such classes might still develop as a social force, 
but they don’t fully emerge until the capacity to create the conditions of class power arise.  Until, as 
Lenin has underlined, this class exerts its class power, its capacity for coercion, then it cannot be 
said to be effective.  But this potential power always develops under a set of conditions.  Thus 
having a political organization may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for taking power. 
This depends on the capacity of other classes to reach their aspirations. 
 
What then, do class interests and objective interests mean?  Class interest reside in the realm of 
class struggle.  But they are not identical to class struggle.  For functionalism, interests reside in the 
world of agents.  Functionalists are then forced to introduce the concept of ‘latent interests’ which 
refers to the agents’ structural role, and the idea of ‘manifest interests’ which occur in the field of 
actual practices.  So then latent interests give rise to ‘quasi-groups’, and manifest interest to ‘interest 
groups’.  This is a rather similar position to one we have seen before : 
 
Similar to the economist-historicist division of social ‘class’ into two conceptually delimited parts of is 
the functionalist division between (a) class-in-itself: class situation, latent interests, quasi-groups, and 
(b) groups-for-themselves: status, groups, political élites, manifest interests, interest groups.395 
 
But this approach does not strike Poulantzas as ‘scientific’.  Interests are always, by definitional fiat, 
the interests of a class.  We must instead think of political class interests as the horizon of its action, 
the limits of political imagination, what the class might anticipate to strive for.  And these horizons 
and interests are modified in the light of other class interests.  Thus the capacity of a class to realise 
these interests is limited by the activities of its enemies.   
Class interests are objective interests, not merely dreamlike aspirations.  They result from the 
mutual independence of individuals around the labour relation.396  This means that interests must 
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always be distinguished from ‘all psychological connotations,’397 clearly an attempt to keep the 
Marxist argument well aware from bourgeois theories of individualism.  But, nonetheless, ideology 
in any given society can give rise to delusions. 
 
Poulantzas has now canvassed three elements of his theory of power – first, following his definition 
of power as the capacity of a class to realise its specific interests, he has canvassed its connection to 
the field of class struggle ; second, he has outlined the relation of this concept of power to the 
capacity of a class to realise its objective interests ; and, third, he has reviewed the embedded 
definition of class interests.  Now he wishes to pursue a fourth dimension – ‘the specificity of the 
class interests to be realized’.398  Power is located at all levels of the class structure.  Thus we might 
speak accurately of economic power, political power and ideological power.  Power relations are 
complex, and, in the end determined by economic power.  Yet the three elements may often be 
separated.  Those with economic power may not have the capacity to take political power.  He cites 
the case of the bourgeoisie in England in 1688, who, while holding economic power, could not take 
the reins of political power, which still remained in the hands of the landed gentry.  
 
Poulantzas now turns his attention to state power and the state apparatus.399  What, then does state 
power mean?  We should not take the view that the state has some sort of autonomous power.  It is 
only social classes that hold power through the agency of the state.  This power is orchestrated 
through what Poulantzas designates as ‘power centres’,400 such as the economic, political, military 
and cultural elements of the state. 
 
Poulantzas also importantly defines structure here.  Since the term is widely used in his writing, it is 
essential to draw out its meaning for us here.  Thus far, he has been satisfied at pointing at the 
defects of the term, used to refer to roles and behaviours in structural-functionalism, for example, 
implying a wider and separate notion of structure for his own argument, without spelling out what 
this might be.  Now a definition emerges : 
 
… the concept of structure covers the organizing matrix of institutions.  Through the functioning of the 
ideological, the structure always remains hidden in and by the institutional system which it organizes.401 
 
These institutions thus do not develop autonomous power of their own, but gain it because of their 
relative autonomy from social classes.  They are not separate ‘organs of power’402 ; rather it makes 
better sense to think of them as power centres.  The precise degree to which one centre of power 
may hold a commanding position rests entirely on the balance of social forces within the state. 
 
Lenin distinguished between ‘state power’ and ‘state apparatus’.  By ‘state apparatus’ he meant the 
various elements in the institutions of the state, as well as the personnel working in the state.403  The 
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key issue is to be clear that the state is never seen in this conception as a mere instrument of the 
ruling class.404 
 
After 120 pages, Poulantzas now seems willing to move from a consideration of questions and a 
preliminary reading of the theoretical raw materials relating to the state, and to concentrate instead 
on the project of establishing a new state theory from the rubble left by his demolition of the old 
theories.  Part Two, ‘The Capitalist State’ then embarks on this scheme.405  What, then, are the 
particular qualities of this kind of state compared to others?  One of its primary qualities resides in 
the condition that it represents itself as a ‘popular-class state’, a state of the people.  Its legitimacy 
does not rest on the divine law of monarchs, but rather on the notion of free individuals, universal 
suffrage, and an expression of the ‘general will’.406  The liberty of individuals rests on the law, and 
not on tradition.  The state and the nation are as one, the state representing the public interest. 
 
However, we are not clear of problems with existing theory yet, and Poulantzas returns to a series of 
issues that have muddled Marxist thinking to date concerning the nature of the capitalist state.  
There has been a separation, for example, between the notion of ‘civil society’ and ‘the state’, a 
separation that readers will remember was emphasized, reinforced, one might say, even reified, by 
Gramsci.  The very idea of the individual can be said to have emerged with capitalism as a result of 
the rise of the new form of economy.  Thus the agents of production evolve as separate, 
autonomous citizens free to act as they wish.  This notion of civil society, derived from Hegel, and 
developed by Gramsci and others, rests on the idea of the alienated individual – the relation of an 
individual to the state.407 
 
Two results stem from this line of argument.  First, we cannot understand the relation between class 
struggle and the state going down this path.  Individuals thus constructed cannot be made to form 
social classes, and thus the whole Marxist problematic is put at risk.  Second, such an approach hides 
a series of problems behind the separation of state and civil society.  In particular, we cannot 
understand the relative autonomy of the ideological and the political from the economy through this 
line of questioning. 
 
Instead, let us consider the problem of the capitalist state and the economy.  Capitalism dissolves old 
ways of being, old social structures embedded in feudalism.  Poulantzas wants to dismiss Marx’s 
insistence on the rise of the individual as a ‘merely descriptive’ strategy that describes the liberation 
of the citizenry from the ties of feudalism.  But Marx does not mean, Poulantzas wants also to insist, 
that people are now free, later to be inserted into social classes as capitalism develops.  It means only 
that old ties dissolve, and perhaps the new ties are not yet obvious.  What is really to be understood 
is that capitalism constitutes a stage in which the producer becomes separated from ‘his’ means of 
production in the rise of large-scale industry.  The labour process becomes collectivized, and it leads 
to the concentration of capital.  So we must get beyond the question of the individual-subject and 
the separation of civil society and the state.  We must instead establish the relative autonomy of the state 
from the economic system.408  How then, does the state relate to class struggle?  This is the question 
that now takes centre stage.  While the idea of civil society might allow for the relative autonomy of 
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the state, it cannot do justice to the relations of production.  The state, described by Poulantzas here 
as the juridico-political structure, is related to the economy by law.  The new agents of capitalism are 
fixed in their places by the emergence of capitalist law.  This happens precisely in the rise of contract 
law and the establishment of a legal structure surrounding the capital-labour relation – the buying 
and selling of labour power.  A dominant ideology develops at the same time that masks this 
development.  Poulantzas is using a common trope in his writing style here.  He uses the phrase ‘It is 
hardly necessary to emphasize’409 to suggest that all us clever people have already seen through the 
mask of capitalism to the real truth of the matter.  He is only reminding us here of what we already 
know.  And what is it that we already know?  That the rising ideology of capitalism is taking the 
place of religion under the old régime, hiding the truth from the emerging class of labourers.  What 
is actually going on as capitalism emerges, of course, is the establishment of a nation-wide, and then 
a global, system of domination and exploitation.  While this system is established at first in private 
locations, where ‘private’ individuals are created, this private system is, in fact, part of a much larger 
system of production, overseen by the emerging state. 
 
The rise of the capitalist state and the emerging ideological structures has the effect of preventing 
the emerging labouring classes from understanding the class nature of the new society.  Indeed, 
individuals sense this shift in class relations as an alienating and isolating experience.  There is 
competition between workers for jobs.  This isolation further conceals the connection that workers 
actually have in the sense that they have common interests.  This individualism separates worker 
from worker, private capitalist from private capitalist, and one branch of industry from another.410   
 
We must not forget that other groups remain in existence within capitalism.  There is, for example, 
the case of the small-holding peasants, who are also isolated from the new developments, a holdover 
from feudalism.  Into this gap steps the state.  The state appears as the agent of unity, as a 
representative of the common interest.  It systemically conceals its class nature.  The state, in fact, 
has a dual function – to establish a normative juridical structure,411 and to represent the unity of the 
social formation.  This form of unity must cover a realm of problems and sources of isolation – 
between one capitalist and another ; between one group of workers and another ; between the 
classes, and between public and private interests. 
 
Poulantzas is then at pains to point out some errors of interpretation deriving from Marx’s work.412  
Poulantzas argues that Marx was trying to understand a new phenomenon by using theoretical ideas 
from the past.  Here Poulantzas acknowledges the contributions of the ‘Italian School’, who have 
pointed out the errors besetting the instrumentalist theory of the state, but this approach also leaves 
many problems to be solved.  It leaves, for example, the problem of the relation between class 
struggle and the state unsettled.  We should remember from the Marxist classics that the new state 
acts, in the last instance, to establish and maintain the role of the dominant classes under the guise 
of protecting the public interest.413 
 
Poulantzas now takes up the concept of hegemony.  Derived in its most recent sense from the work 
of Gramsci, it remains none the less a vague and incomplete concept.  Again this is a familiar 
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strategy Poulantzas is using, setting out concepts from the ‘great masters’, finding them wanting, and 
rectifying them.  He starts by saying what is meant by hegemony.  It is the way in which Gramsci 
describes the ‘political practices of the dominant classes’.414  In these practices, the state plays a role 
in class leadership.  Gramsci thought he had discovered the concept in Lenin’s work, but to 
Poulantzas’s eyes, this is a new idea that speaks to the issue of how the dominant classes engage in 
political practice.  And again, as before with his commentary on Marx and Lenin, he sees a youthful 
‘error’ in Gramsci’s work, an error corrected by maturity.  He sees historicism in the youthful use of 
the concept, and he finds also a more mature elaboration later on.  Yet still in these mature works 
we find elements of historicism still lingering.  In a first reading, hegemony seems to suggests that 
class domination is not simply coercion, but rather rests on consent, an active consent ‘given’ by the 
dominated class.  Thus the ideological world view of the dominating class provides the unitary 
ideology of a given society.  Gramsci uses the idea of hegemony to distinguish capitalism from 
feudalism.  In feudalism, economic and political relations are grafted together, mixed very tightly, 
with little chance of freedom or autonomy.  In the ‘modern’ state, an atomization of individuals has 
taken place due to the rise of the new economy, and thus it is the role of the state to recover a 
necessary unity. 
 
Thus, having told us that the concept of hegemony is amenable to a process of ‘purification,415 
Poulantzas then shows us how he will use hegemony going forward : 
 
The concept of hegemony, which we shall apply only to the political practices of the dominant classes of a capitalist 
formation, and not to its state, is used in two senses : 
 1. It indicates how … the political interests of these classes are constituted, as representatives 
of the ‘general interest’ of the body politics … (and) 
 2. … in another sense, which is not actually pointed out by Gramsci.  The capitalist state and 
the specific characteristics of the class struggle in a capitalist formation make it possible for a ‘power bloc’, 
composed of several politically dominant classes or fractions to function. Among these dominant classes 
and fractions one of them holds a particular dominant role, which can be characterized as a hegemonic role.416 
 
A ‘double function’ is thus assigned to the concept of hegemony, which now acts both to show how 
the dominant classes express their narrow interests as the common interest, as well as to show how a 
ruling category emerges from the cluster of dominant groups available to lead. 
 
We consider now what kinds of capitalist state can be said to exist.417  Already Marx, Engels and 
Lenin have distinguished forms of the state typical in various modes of production, and, within 
these modes of production, various ‘forms of state’ or ‘forms of government’.  What is especially 
important here is to distinguish the capitalist state is the autonomy that the state enjoys from the 
economic realm.  How does the state develop this autonomy, and how does the state relate 
specifically to the dominant classes and their political practices?418  In every society, several modes of 
production co-exist, and thus the state must attempt to represent unity in the face of a complex 
social structure.  Yet in capitalism, one mode of production dominates.  But even in such societies, 
as in the case of Bismarck’s Germany, the feudal state may still predominate politically over a 
capitalist economy. 
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In the work of Weber, we find the problem of historicism raises its head again.419  Weber develops a 
‘typology of juridico-political superstructures’420 by using mysticism and rationality as defining 
qualities.  Thus emerges the rational-legal, the traditional and the charismatics types of state.  These 
formulations result from the values of the investigator, and from the motivations of the men who 
create them.  In the last analysis, the typology only deals with actors, and not with structures, and 
thus is of limited value in delineating all the various forms of state, though it might be argued that 
the rational-legal form of state does align with the capitalist state structure. 
 
We still face the fundamental problem – what kinds of capitalist state exist?  This new form of state 
is, from the first, distinguished by the autonomy of the economic and political structures.  Thus the 
different types of state must refer to the degree of autonomy established in any particular state 
formation.421  There are no simple steps or progressions that mark the development of the capitalist 
state.  We might usefully talk of the beginning of the state and the period of reproduction of the 
same state structure.  Some of these stages might include a movement from simple market 
capitalism to state monopoly capitalism through private capitalist production, social capitalist 
production and monopoly capitalism.422  In these various forms of the state, the degree of autonomy 
between the political and the economic varies considerably.  For example : 
 
… it is clear that private capitalism involves a non-interventionist state and monopoly capitalism 
involves an interventionist state.423 
 
These examples, in Poulantzas’s view, comprise ‘variables of a specific invariant’.424  One is forced to 
comment that they come close to the use of Weber’s ideal types, in spite of the historicist and 
subjectivist criticism heaped upon him.  None the less the key point is clear.  All capitalist states 
exhibit a relatively autonomous state, and the degree of this autonomy varies.  Various forms of 
capitalism exist at the same time, it is also clear.  Thus various stages of capitalism might be said to 
exist – private, social, monopoly, state monopoly.  Depending on the dominant form of capitalism 
at any given time, the relationship between the state and the economy will vary.  It is a mistake to 
argue, as many have, that the rise of the liberal state is the rise of the noninterventionist state, 
however.  This is not what Marx proposes in Capital.  In fact, no clear account of the state is 
provided, nor a way in which the state intervenes into the economic realm.425 
 
We must also distinguish between forms of state and forms of régimes.  For example, the liberal 
state can exist as a constitutional monarchy, as in Britain, or a parliamentary republic, as in France.  
Régimes are thus variables within a particular form of the state.  Thus, there can be said to be stages 
in the development of the capitalist state.  But these stages do not come in some simple 
chronological order, but rather in a variety of patterns depending on the particular conditions of a 
given society.  In actual circumstances, several ‘stages’ of development may be ‘skipped’, which is 
surprising if we are expecting a simple historical path to be followed.  And a particular type of state 
can exist in various forms.  There may also be various dislocations between structure (the juridico-
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political superstructure) and the field of class practices.  Thus a liberal state can co-exist with a stage 
of monopoly capital, for example.426 
 
Poulantzas now spends a chapter on the absolutist state and the transitional state.427  This writing 
primarily concerns the movement that takes place between feudalism and capitalism.  In this 
moment, the state and the economy do not appear to be aligned.  This results from a condition in 
which the rise of the bourgeoisie as an economic class happens before the rise of a parallel political 
system.  The struggle at this stage is between the landed nobility and the rising bourgeoisie.  
Capitalism fully emerges in the period of large-scale industrial production.  Capitalism starts with the 
emergence of the free labourer, but this free labourer may still be working on the land, in close 
contact with the product of his labour.  It is only in large-scale production that real appropriation 
occurs.428  The emergence of capitalism in Europe depends on the rise of a new kind of economy 
coupled with a new state.  In the transition from capitalism to socialism, the process is quite 
different.  Socialism establishes itself on new economic terrain, through the social ownership of the 
means of production.  In capitalism the ground of private property has already been prepared.  In 
the transitional state, there is therefore a condition of relative autonomy between the mostly feudal 
nature of the state, and the bourgeois nature of the emerging economy.  And the function of the 
absolutist state is to produce the conditions under which this new mode of production can come 
into being, while ending the era of feudal relations.429 
 
The absolutist state starts to emerge during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in Europe.  The 
change results from a crisis in the feudalist economy, the collapse of feudal agriculture, and the rise 
of manufacturing, the early development of international trade, and a decline in population.  As the 
new economy expands, the absolutist state, typified by monarchical rule, strengthens its hold until 
well into the seventeenth century.  The state is characterised by absolute power, usually in the hands 
of a single individual, with little to limit this power.  Power derives from divine law, and is thus 
superficially unquestionable.  Such a power, however, depends on the support of the landed 
interests, the so-called ‘Great Estates’.  The sovereignty of the state is thus a mixture of divine 
sanction and territoriality.  The church often plays a central role in such arrangements.  The political 
power of the state, through its divine connections, appears to be separate from economic interests.  
Popular assemblies start to emerge and the monarch reigns over such gatherings.  As well, a written 
juridical system comes into being during this period.  The state is said to embody the public realm, 
the justification for this arrangement arising from divine privilege.  This is the beginning of the rise 
of the social contract. 
 
How do the army and the bureaucracy function in such a society?  In the absolutist state, the army 
remains under the divine power of the monarch.  The feudal army, raised from large landowners, is 
now replaced by a mercenary army, free from feudal ties.430  In the case of the bureaucracy, the 
influence of the rising capitalist economy is more obvious.  The members of the state are no longer 
appointed through social connections as members of a political caste.  Instead the functionaries take 
on the duties required of a state emerging to serve the public interest, at least at a nominal level.  
Indeed, the breakdown of feudal relations of production can only occur with the aid of a state 
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directing its action to a new productive mode, that is, a state with a capitalist character.431  The state is 
acting against the nobility, even as the bourgeoisie are not yet ready to take political power. 
 
Does the autonomy of the state emerge from a balance of class forces, as Engels has proposed?   
This does not seem to be an adequate account.  The relation between the state and social classes 
appears rather to be very complex, and not to be reduced to a simple balancing act.  What emerges 
from these struggles in the second half of the nineteenth century, is the rise of the liberal state. 
 
Poulantzas now turns to the nature of the ‘Bourgeois Revolution’.432  If the absolutist state sets the 
scene for the political rise of the bourgeoisie, how do the historical facts line up?  Is there a typical 
form of bourgeois revolution?  In Poulantzas’s view, no such typical model exists. 
 
Poulantzas has made two interesting points in the past few pages.  At the end of the last chapter,433 
he uses the phrase ‘From the point of view of the state’, a suggestion that the state has completely 
autonomous interests, a motivation and a consciousness.  This sense of the conscious state peppers 
his work, but it is clearly not a part of his central argument, which would assert, it is clear, that the 
state has no life, no vitality, no motivation apart from those of the class struggle and the attempts 
towards social unity.  However, the idea remains in the texts.  In this new chapter, he also chooses 
to go ‘off-grid’, and to tell us that he will not cite Marx and Engels in this section because he has 
cited them very often at prior occasions.434   
 
He begins his examination of the bourgeois revolutions with a discussion of the British case.  The 
two dates of 1640 and 1688 for him ‘mark the bourgeois revolution’.435  The feudal nobility start, 
during this period, their long march towards becoming a capitalist class.  But this is only the 
beginning of the revolution – the commercial bourgeoisie are barely formed, and the industrial 
bourgeoisie are beyond the horizon of the future.  But capitalism rapidly came to dominate the 
countryside.  The patriarchal mode of production, through small-scale production, was swiftly 
brought to an end.  The revolution thus started with a fraction of the feudal class who could see 
opportunities in capitalism.  Thus there slowly emerged a capitalist agriculture, a mixture of the old 
and the new, which comprised : 
 
(i) Large-scale owners of ground-rent, an infinitesimal minority which monopolized the ownership of 
land (ii) tenant farmers; and (iii) agricultural workers, who constituted the immense majority.436 
 
The British peasantry thus rapidly disappeared from the economy, and were never to play any 
further autonomous role in the political life of the country.  Commercial capitalism started under the 
management of the landed gentry, until in the 1830’s, with the rise of the Reform Bills, when they 
gradually began to assert their political authority.  The Whig Party, representing the large landowners 
with a decidedly reformist and progressive bent, was the mechanism by which this transformation 
gradually took place.  A legal system emerged in the 17th. Century that altered the law surrounding 
the ownership of land, thus enabling ground-rent relationships to emerge.  But it still remained the 
case that feudal elements still held onto political power well into the late 19th. Century.   At the 
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highest levels of the state, there still remained a preference for appointing members of the peerage.  
The state was not required to intervene to bring about the economic revolution – the ground had 
already been prepared.  Thus the British revolution succeeded because of the early dominance of the 
capitalist mode of production in agriculture allowing  the transition to bourgeois dominance.  The 
economic appears to have dominated ‘in the last instance’, and those that dominated the economic 
sphere came, at the last, to be the leading members of the hegemonic bloc.  The state secured its 
autonomy, being for a long period in the hands of feudal interests, only later falling into the hands of 
the bourgeoisie.437 
 
The French case follows a different path.  France has often been presented as the typical bourgeois 
revolution.  It is argued that the absolutist state put the bourgeoisie in charge.  Thus there was an 
immediate gain of political power, the feudal system having exhausted itself, with Jacobinism, a petty 
bourgeois ideology, dominating French society during this transition.  But, according to our author, 
such a history is mythical.438 
 
First, Poulantzas claims that the bourgeois takeover was less decisive in France that it was in Britain 
or in Germany, a surprising claim, given that France is always held to have undergone the most 
clear-cut revolution of the three case studies under examination.  His evidence for this claim lies in 
the failure of the French state to ‘cut the knot’ with the French peasantry, who were not readily 
shifted from their agricultural practices of the past.  Indeed, he claims, the French Revolution 
secured the small peasantry in place.  The revolution also resulted in the security of the petty 
bourgeoisie, who developed along with the emerging commercial and industrial bourgeoisie.  
Following Hobsbawm, we can conclude that 19th. Century economic development : 
 
…contains one gigantic paradox: France.  On paper, no country should have advanced more rapidly.  It 
possessed institutions ideally suited to capitalist development … Yet in fact French economic 
development at the base was distinctly slower than that of other countries … This was because … the 
capitalist part of the French economy was a superstructure erected on the immovable base of the 
peasantry and petty bourgeoisie …439 
 
The French bourgeoisie did indeed gain power, but they paid a price, according to Poulantzas.  They 
depended on some categories of workers, the small peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie, with whom 
they were forced to share power.  In contrast to Britain, they were required to eliminate the nobility 
to make this arrangement secure.  Thus the bourgeoisie could not form an alliance with the nobility, 
nor form a state with their blessing and support.  What resulted was the emergence of the Second 
and Third Empires, which were characterised by a state dependent on the support of the peasantry 
and the petty bourgeoisie, which, in turn, resulted in a bourgeois revolution continually in crisis.  By 
the time the bourgeoisie finally turned its back on the nobility, the industrial working class had 
emerged as a powerful political force. 
 
Thus the bourgeoisie were never able to form a properly capitalist state.  It was certainly lacking the 
feudal quality of the British state, but the state was still in the hands of the peasantry and the petty 
bourgeoisie, a bourgeois state in theory only.  And the state failed to last.  In this case, the state 
dominated in many instances, rather than allowing the economic sphere to develop.  Thus, the new 
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economy took far more time to evolve than in Britain.  Additionally, the state was constantly in crisis 
because of the complex class structural support of the state, and as a result of rising working class 
interests.440  The French bourgeoisie are often contrasted with the British, the British tainted with 
the flavour of the feudal class resonating in their ears, the French a ‘purer’ form of revolution.  But 
French Jacobinism has within it revolutionary ideas, ideas that Poulantzas terms ‘the maggot hidden 
inside the fruit’.441  There are strong arguments against wealth and for social equality, and a claim on 
behalf of the proletariat, hardly the stuff of bourgeois dreams.  But in Poulantzas’s view, this 
argument is overblown and overdrawn – we shall never find the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ in 
this line of reasoning, he claims.  Instead, the ideology expresses the hopes and the dreams of small 
peasants and the petty bourgeoisie, the ideology of smallholders : 
 
Jacobinism projected as its social ideal a society made up of small-scale independent producers (both 
peasants and artisans), a society in which each man owns his own field, his own shop or stall and is able 
to support his family without recourse to wage-labour and without being exploited by ‘the very rich’.442 
 
So this vision stands in direct contradiction to the fundamental notions of bourgeois ideology, and 
these ideas came from the classes that were supporting the French state during much of the  19th. 
Century.  The French working class came to take up elements of Jacobinism, especially in the 
utopian socialism of Proudhon.443  Jacobinism thus remains an ambiguous ideology, and this 
ambiguity results from the particular class nature of the bourgeois revolution in France. 
 
Poulantzas now turns to the German case, which he has mentioned several times before as an 
example of a ‘revolution from above’.  It is sometimes implied that a bourgeois revolution took 
place in 1848 with the issuing of a constitution.  Nothing could be further from the truth, 
Poulantzas claims.444  The landed nobility still remained in power, and, as with Britain, the feudal 
system was to retain power for a long time to come.  Indeed, of the three case studies to hand, it 
appears that this class still dominated the political realm well into the 20th century and until the rise 
of the Weimar Republic after the First World War.  In this environment, Bismarck brought about a 
bourgeois revolution ‘from above’, and the state, under the management of feudal landlords, started 
to transform itself in the direction of bourgeois interests.  The emergence of the bourgeois economy 
took place side by side with a feudal state.  At the same time, the German working class were finding 
their political feet.  The French revolution was vividly alive in the imagination of the newly emerging 
German bourgeois class, and they were reluctant to dismiss their connection with the German 
nobility.  Thus strong feudal structures lasted up until and beyond the First World War, with feudal 
hegemony being sustained in the political arena throughout the 19th. Century.  Notwithstanding, the 
feudal state had within it juridical elements useful to the rise of new forms of property and capitalist 
ownership. 
 
What happened in German agriculture?  Small-scale producers were taken over by large landowners, 
and this resulted in the replacement of small landowners by a mass of landless agricultural labourers.  
This shift ended small-scale ownership, but it sustained feudalism.  In any event, the small-scale 
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landowners were never a major political force as they were in France, and the resentments these 
take-overs caused were clearly, in the Poulanztian view, seeds of the rise of Nazism in another 
generation. And we also can see the sources of Nazism elsewhere.  The bourgeoisie and the petty 
bourgeoisie rose slowly and together, both resisting the interests of the working class, both 
struggling against the permanent hold that feudal interests appeared to have over the state.  This 
particular mixture of interests gives rise, after the First World War, to the emergence of the Nazi 
state from this source, as the aspirations of both the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie were 
dashed in the aftermath of the conflict. 
 
Thus no paradigm case can be found that suggests a model bourgeois revolution.  This section of 
writing is perhaps the most illuminating found in Poulantzas’s texts to date.  The vivid use of 
historical evidence, coupled with a supple use of his newly evolving theoretical armature makes a 
clear case for the significance of class history and class struggle in explaining the rise of the 
bourgeois state.  There are clear differences elegantly drawn in these three case histories, and the 
reader can follow the argument very straightforwardly.  There is less of the endless debate with the 
ghosts of the theoretical past.  He seems to be setting himself free here.  This is newly mature 
writing and new theorising, and it is very persuasive.  Poulantzas concludes that in none of these 
cases was the bourgeoisie able to make its own political case, that is, to produce a state that directly 
worked for its own interests, at least at the beginning of the new mode of production.  Instead, in 
Germany and Britain, feudal interests sustained power, even as the state moved in the direction of 
bourgeois interests.  In France, the small peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie held sway over the 
state.  All these developments were profoundly significant for rising working class interests.  In 
Britain, trade-unionism emerged, class struggle at the economic level at the expense of seizing the 
state.  In France, the problem was Jacobinism, essentially a petty bourgeois dream, and it sat poorly 
with the hopes of the working class.  In Germany, the problem lay in the failed attempt to make the 
state do what the working class wanted it to do, to act as a sort of neutral mediator in the game of 
the class struggle. 
 
Poulantzas now turns his attention to the ‘Fundamental Characteristics of the Capitalist State’, part 
three of his five-part argument.445  In Capital, only a brief outline of these characteristics is provided.  
But we can now see that the capitalist state acts as an agent of social cohesion at the economic, 
political and ideological level with relation to the class struggle.  The state sets the limits on the field 
of class struggle, the state managing the complex dynamic that exists between the dominated and the 
dominant.  The state is represented as the embodiment of the interests of a mass of private 
individuals, and not as a class state.  It therefore has a profoundly ambiguous and complex role.  In 
the case of the dominated classes, the state must maintain a condition where the members of those 
classes are prevented from understanding and acting upon their common interests.  The state thus 
maintains the political disorganization of the dominated classes, while simultaneously organising the 
elements of the power bloc.  It establishes itself as the embodiment of a bourgeois vision, but a 
vision in which all citizens can participate.446 
 
Poulantzas then expands his account of the dominated classes and the state.  He starts with the 
assertion of the autonomy of the economic from the political in capitalism, a variation on his well-
established theory of relative autonomy.  The state cannot act narrowly in the interests of the 
bourgeoisie, but in the end this is the outcome of its action.  But the state is flexible and fluid in its 
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role.  As he is later to say, the state is a relationship, rather than a structure.  The state may act, in the 
short-term, against ruling interests.  Thus : 
 
… the state is not a class instrument, but rather the state of a society divided into classes.447 
 
This succinct quotation describes much of what is to come in the following pages.  Constantly playing 
this role of mediator on behalf of the dominant order, the state manages a class-divided society.  Much 
of the argument is here repetitive – yes, the state acts to disorganize the dominated classes and organise 
the dominant – this much is already known.  But it is perhaps Poulantzas’s contribution to separate 
this argument from those who would simply call capitalism and the capitalist state a sealed box – 
dominant economic interests mean dominant political interests.  Instead he wants to argue that the 
bourgeois state is not merely a lie, but rather a mechanism in which genuine assets can be assigned to 
the dominated, all the while ensuring that capitalism and the dominant classes survive intact.  This 
means that the state forms a compromise,448 and that this compromise is unstable by its very nature.  
So clearly this does not mean there is a harmonious balance between the classes.  Obviously, the 
dominant classes ‘win in the last instance’, but in order to maintain social stability, certain concrete 
concessions must be made to subordinate interests.  The state is thus two-sided.  It has autonomy 
from the economic sphere to undertake social policy, and this also means it has the capacity to cut 
into the economic power of the dominant classes without ever threatening their political power.  In 
this theoretical arena the problem of the emergence of the ‘Welfare State’ appears.449  These arguments 
are sketched out in Capital but not fully formed. 
 
We now turn to the issue of ideology, and Poulantzas begins by tackling the problem of historicism. 
The state and classes are clearly connected at the ideological, as well as the political and economic, 
levels.  This is merely to state the obvious.  The notion of hegemony embodies this relationship.  
Here Gramsci offers a major contribution in that he sees through the problem of historicism and 
understands the role of ideology within capitalism in a particularly subtle way.  In Marx, we find the 
notion of ideology as ‘a projection in an imaginary world of the subject’s mystified essence’.450  
Ideology is false consciousness, and this conception of ideology has remained at the centre of 
historicist accounts of ideology.  In this view, ideology is associated with alienation.  Under 
communism, alienation and false consciousness are said to have disappeared because social subjects 
have regained their essence, ideologies have disappeared and science has replaced them.  And, 
interestingly, in contemporary accounts from the left, including those provided by Marcuse, ideology 
has been absorbed into the real, and the end of ideology has arrived.451 
 
But it is with Lukács where historicism takes hold especially.452  Gramsci is often read through the 
lens of Lukács’s reading, so an analysis of his work becomes very important.  In the Lukács view the 
class-subject of history is organised into a political class with a determined world view.  This world 
view has within in it both ideology and science.  This world view forms the consciousness of ‘men’ 
who then make their own history : 
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Thus the role assigned to ideology through the medium of the class-subject is that of the principle of 
totalizing a social formation, which is precisely the young Marx’s position when he held that it is ideas 
that rule the world and the weapons of criticism that can change it.453 
 
Such a view is common in contemporary political science.  Lukács and Weber are clearly closely 
connected, and Weber is followed quite strictly by Parsons, so the links between Lukács and modern 
functionalism are not hard to delineate.  The development of normative social action through the 
production of a normative set of ideas is not a million miles from the Lukács argument.  In Weber, 
this argument leads to his ideal types of state, and focuses especially on the question of legitimacy, 
and the actions of agents to bring these forms of state into being. 
 
Lukács appears to be adding Marx to Weber.  In this historicist account of totality, there is simply no 
place for a single cause, yet ideology appears to play a predominant role – history driven by ideas.  
Some writers have taken Gramsci to mean much the same thing – history driven by the class 
conscious ideology of a hegemonic class.  Such a view seems to be dominant in the pages of the 
New Left Review.454  But Gramsci also achieves two theoretical breakthroughs – the idea of ideology 
as a cement in a given formation, and the break he makes with ideology as a conceptual system.455 
 
Lukács is unable to explain how dominant ideology is generally associated with the dominant class.  
If this dominant ideology expresses the totality of the social formation, how can it, at one and the 
same time, express the ideology of a single class.  This leads to further questions – how does the 
ideological universe gain coherence ; how does the dominant ideology permeate the subordinate 
classes ; how is it that this ideology is the ideology of the dominant class?  The Lukácsian argument  
leads to a series of errors that require correction : 
 
In general it leads to what can be termed an over-politicization of ideologies, the latter being considered as 
if they were political number-plates worn by social classes on their backs.456 
 
Thus no autonomy can be awarded to the ideological realm, because things are never this way in 
actually existing societies.  In addition, this relation between dominant class and dominant ideology 
is always masked.457  Thus a whole series of confusions and uncertainties emerge in any given society 
that are not covered by the Lukács argument.  As well, the argument does not adequately explain the 
ideology of the working class.  The question here is – who is right, Lenin or Gramsci?  Lenin wants 
to insist that the working class cannot rise to power until they have gained the state ; state power 
comes first.  Gramsci wants to argue instead that the hegemony of new ideas must come first before 
a working class revolution can occur.  Gramsci is closer to the Lukáscian problematic that the 
ideological view and the political are strongly tied together.   Gramsci and Lukács are in error here in 
assuming that ideological domination is all that matters, and that the dominant ideology is somehow 
monolithic and impermeable to a variety of influences.458  Furthermore, if ideologies are number-
plates that people carry on their backs, then it would impossible to admit the influence of other 
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classes,459 as, for example, in the case of the ‘contamination of working class ideology by the dominant and 
petty bourgeois ideologies’.460  The various ideologies thus appear to be hermetically sealed one against 
another, and thus no permeability is allowed, no mixing of ideas.  How, then, can ruling class 
ideology permeate and come to dominate the working class?  But the ‘correct’ Marxist view ought to 
be that revolutionary working class ideas must arise from Marxist science, in the separation of 
ideology from science, and from the rejection of ideology.461 
 
What, then, is the Marxist conception of ideology?  Ideology comprises a set of relatively coherent 
ideas.  ‘Men’ engage in political, economic and ideological life.  Ideological life refers to religious, 
moral, aesthetic and philosophical activities.462  Ideology refers to a set of understandings that arise 
through the lived experience of individuals, and it becomes indistinguishable from that lived 
experience.  Ideologies must thus be said to have a dual nature, a reflection of a real experience, and 
a sense of an imaginary world simultaneously.  Thus ideology is not just consciousness of the world.  
Given that ideology is partly imaginary it is, by definition, false.  The purpose of ideology is to insert 
human agents into the world in the locations required of them with the beliefs they require in that 
location.  Ideology is thus determined by social structure, and it remains opaque to the agents who 
experience it.  Ideology has the precise function of obscuring the world from those who experience 
it, as opposed to science.  Ideology, in the Gramscian sense of ‘cement’, has the function of 
obscuring the world, by shaping human consciousness into a relatively coherent world-view.  Thus 
ideology has the function of cohesion.  It does not allow for contradiction. 
 
Ideology is thus the culture of a given social formation.463  But this proposed unity is constructed on 
an imaginary plane.  Ideology is determined by class relations that distribute agents to positions in 
the class structure.  This is perhaps the most vivid incarnation of the class-structural position 
Poulantzas takes to date.  Here the argument is simple and quintessentially structuralist.  Class 
societies assign agents to positions, and these positions have ideologies attached to them :464  
 
The dominant ideology, by assuring the practical insertion of agents in the social structure, aims at the 
maintenance (the cohesion) of this structure, and this means above all class domination and 
exploitation.465 
 
This is how an ideology of a dominant class dominates society.  But dominant ideology includes 
elements from the ideology of other classes, just as each society has within it a range of ideas from 
many sources.  We begin to form an idea of ideology full of complexity and contradiction, with 
subsets of classes, along with various class fractions, holding on to certain and separate views, all the 
while over-determined by a dominant class ideology.  And this ideological structure appears across a 
host of institutions – political, religious, economic, for example.  For Poulantzas, there is a wide 
ensemble of ideologies associated with these institutions.  So having first asserted a simplistic notion 
of dominant class ideology, he now reminds us of the complexity and subtlety of this structure.  And 
one ‘region’ of this ideological complexity commonly reigns over other regions.  The region that can 
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be said to dominate is that region which best hides the function of the ideology in a given society.  
In feudal society, this role falls to the church ; in bourgeois society, it falls to the juridico-political 
system.  In monopoly capitalism, it is economic ideology that predominates.466  While religion can be 
said to tie people together, the juridico-political ideology of capitalism acts to separate and isolate 
them.  It creates individual, autonomous subjects.  These changes allow for the rise of the labour 
contract, private property, competition between workers, and the rise of market and exchange 
relations.  Thus a certain way of seeing the world emerges, a world view that excludes ideas of class 
exploitation.  Instead, notion of equality, justice and the law are superimposed on a society riven 
with economic inequality and injustice.  The state and ideology are closely connected because the 
state is the site where the newly-formed ideology originates and resides, and particularly in the 
bureaucracy.  The state represents itself as the agent of national unity, not as the agent of class 
domination.  Parliament is the agent of the public will, the political parties representing the public 
interest.   
 
Bourgeois ideologies thus represent themselves as science.  In the present world, Poulantzas claims, 
it is incorrect to follow Gramsci in arguing that hegemony must be secured for the dominant world 
view to prevail.  Instead, it is necessary only to appeal to science, and in this case, public opinion 
polls, to show that the common view is being followed, that we all consent to a similar world view.  
The new world view is thus manifested in public knowledge, a body of practical rules, based on logic 
and reason.  Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, all the bourgeois values, are encapsulated 
here.  This representation of the world thus excludes any notion of class struggle as utopian, and 
produces a new sense of the world as a mass society, which brings into being the end of ideology, 
the end of class struggle, the end of conflict.  Totalitarian ideologies of communism and fascism are 
then contrasted with bourgeois liberal ideologies.  Totalitarianism assimilates the individual into the 
state ; liberal ideological separate individuals out.467 
 
Thus bourgeois ideology both isolates and coheres.  It sets up agents as free, separate, equal 
individuals, establishing the formal isolation of citizens.  They gain their social existence through the 
state, which embodies the general will, and can use its authority when needed.  Rousseau said : 
 
Man must be as independent as possible from other men and as dependent as possible on the state.468 
 
Thus, in Poulantzas’s view, the individuality of the citizen goes hand in hand with the totalitarianism 
of the state.  Juridico-political ideology holds that the political realm encompasses the whole of 
human life, and it accepts no limits to its involvement in all aspects of human activity, including 
political life.  This situation contrasts sharply with earlier eras.  On the other hand, this is not a 
defining characteristic of capitalist ideology.  We should use the concept of hegemony to describe 
the domination of subordinate classes under class leadership, a class fraction that manages to present 
itself as representing the common interest.  Poulantzas is not at all clear here.  First he argues that 
this form of ideology is new, and permeates all aspects of society.  Then he contradicts himself by 
arguing that ideologies have always done this, whether it be slave society or feudal formations.  We 
are used to his entering complexity into the argument.  Contradictions and subtlety we can fully 
                                                 
466 Using a familiar trope that asserts we all know what is going on, Poulantzas uses the term ‘ we need only mention’ 
three times on page 212 to discuss the rise of capitalist ideology, to announce three separate arguments. 
467 Poulantzas (pages 219-221) starts his alphabetizing strategy here again in setting out the characteristics of ideology, 
but it only amounts to parts a and b.  The attempt to formalize, to structure, the create theory as a mathematical formula, 
is continuous. 
468 Rousseau is cited in page 219, though the original citation is missing. 
 79 
admit.  But this appears no more than a confusion, a working out of ideas on the page without a 
useful conclusion.  Confusing or not, he now turns to the issue of legitimacy :469  
 
By legitimacy of political structures and institutions we can designate their relation to the dominant ideology in a 
formation.  In particular legitimacy covers the specifically political impact of the dominant ideology.470 
 
Modern political science suggests that legitimacy refers to the way the political system is accepted by 
individuals, and now, after Weber, this view becomes part of the functionalist problematic.  The 
ideological becomes the key instance in a given social formation.  Legitimacy of political structures 
thus refers to their embeddedness in the functioning of society, their acceptance by agents, and their 
valuing in society as a whole.  Poulantzas here refers to Almond and Verba’s classic political-
scientific tome, The Civic Culture, a cornerstone of orthodox teaching in American universities in the 
1960s’, just as this legitimacy was collapsing in the United States.471  When political structures do not 
coincide with normative structures, they are declared dysfunctional, badly integrated into society.  
The problems with such an approach are obvious - Poulantzas points out three.  First, the ‘over-
estimation of the ideological’, and the inability to deal with conflict.  The Marxist problematic is 
perfectly suited to dealing with conflict, but for functionalism there is nowhere to go.  Second, what 
results from such an argument is a typology of political structures based on legitimacy, which comes 
close to Weber’s understandings.  Third, we can give no account of the co-existence of several 
forms of legitimacy in the same social formation.472 
 
Marxist theory can readily cope with such problems, he argues.  Poulantzas seems to, for the 
moment, have neglected the failure of functionalist theory to deal with change, expressing as it does 
a vision of early 1960’s American capitalism as a hermetically sealed, and thoroughly victorious, 
thousand year capitalist Reich in which all problems have been solved, everything has been agreed 
to, and the political and the ideological go forward hand in hand.  This thesis was to be dramatically 
tested, if not completely discarded, by the crisis of the Vietnam war, the issue of civil rights, and the 
emergence of the counterculture, founded on a denial of state legitimacy.  His assessment on this 
issue may come later, but it seems an obvious elision for the moment.  Instead Marxism is professed 
to have the capacity to deal with this and many other complexities.  In the Marxist view, political 
domination is not only accepted by the dominated classes, but also by the dominant group as well.  
This sounds profoundly functionalist itself, but this understanding is based on visions of class 
struggle and resistance.  The dominated classes may not have class consciousness, but they often live 
in conditions of ideological revolt against orthodoxy.  They may demand other forms of political 
democracy not presently available.  This suggests a way of participating in the orthodoxy of the 
system while at the same time resisting it.  It may present itself in the rise of new icons, new images, 
new cults.  As well, in any given state, there exists a dominant ideology, but also forms of legitimacy 
that derive from other sources, such as monarchical legitimacy.  A complex set of ideological 
relations is thus formed under the hegemony of the ruling class. 
 
How does the capitalist state use violence in maintaining the functioning of the state?473  Clearly, the 
state is no mere instrument of the ruling class, yet clearly, in the last instance, the state has immense 
repressive force at its disposal.  The term ‘force’ refers to the institutions of physical repression, such 
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as the army, the police and the prison system.  Under capitalism, the state functions through 
‘consent reinforced by coercion’.474  But this is often true of power relations, so this does not define 
the specific qualities of capitalism.  In Gramsci’s understanding, force is exerted in political society, 
hegemony in civil society.  But this depends on a historicist understanding, and suggests an 
‘automatic’ movement in society based on economic laws. 
 
The state certainly holds ‘the monopoly of organized physical repression’,475 a definition that is Weber’s, and 
certainly organized coercive power rests with the state.  The use of this power accords with the 
notion that the state acts in the public interest, and that it acts in this coercive way only when the 
public interest is threatened.  The repressive state is subject to the authority of public opinion, 
tribunals, juries and the entire juridico-political structure.  And the use of this power can only occur 
through the instrumentality of the state, and cannot be seen as a direct weapon of class domination.  
Thus the state can be seen still to be acting in the public interest, even while these instruments of 
repression are used on behalf of the dominant power bloc. 
 
How does the capitalist state and the dominant power bloc connect?  In capitalist societies, it must 
be remembered that the dominant class fractions also need to be organized under the management 
of the state – this line of reasoning follows Gramsci.  Several modes of production may co-exist 
under capitalism, and thus several dominant classes and class fractions my still remain.  To develop 
unity among dominant interests, it is useful to employ Gramsci’s notion of the power bloc.  Thus 
the state is seen to be the only possible mechanism by which a power bloc can evolve.  This is a 
point repeatedly developed by Marx.476  According to Marx, universal suffrage is the mechanism that 
creates the space within which the power bloc can be established.  In the transition from feudalism 
to capitalism, the large landowners become capitalist ground-renters.  They constitute, in effect, a 
fraction of the dominant bourgeois class.  Clearly feudal relations have dissolved, and the land has 
become merely another location in which profit can be generated.  Thus, the old feudal landlords 
become a new fraction of the developing bourgeoisie.  This shift in class position complicates the 
elements of the class structure that will come to constitute the power bloc.  And, at the same time, 
the newly-forming bourgeoisie themselves are divided.  Several ways of developing capital are 
evolving, and thus various fractions of capitalists emerge  - the commercial, financial and industrial 
fractions are the most obvious.  The power bloc develops over time to take control of the political 
practices of society.  The state may then enter a series of régimes, and certainly Marx pointed out 
two periods : in the first period, the contradictions between certain fractions of the ruling class are 
evident.  Marx talks of the ‘exclusive domination’ by one class or class fraction during this time.477  
And during this time, feudal interests, monarchical interests or the financial aristocracy may be in 
charge, as was the case in mid-19th. Century France.  The parliamentary state that followed was a 
bourgeois republic that brought together key elements of the ruling classes, along with all the 
subordinate classes of society.478  But in this analysis Marx does not make use of the concept of 
power bloc, preferring instead the term ‘fusion’, a term borrowed from the physical sciences. 
But the power bloc cannot be simply seen as a form of fusion.  The notion of a power bloc does not 
refer to a harmonious synthesis, but rather a complex contradiction in unity, much less stable, far 
from resolved.  This is the thesis of hegemony.  There is no harmonious coming together of various 
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interests and a sharing of power.  Instead one class or class fractions comes to dominate.  Thus the 
power bloc comprises a complex unity under the hegemony of a particular class or class fraction.  In 
addition, we must remember that the class struggle is continually present.  Poulantzas is keeping in 
mind the fluid and dynamic nature of the state as it expresses not just the struggles between 
dominant elements, but also between these classes and a range of subordinate classes and class 
fractions.  This will lead him to suggest, at a later date, that the state itself is a social relation, rather 
than a social structure. 
 
The formation of a power bloc is not accidental.  It results from the institutionalized power of the 
developed capitalist state, and the establishment of the power bloc, and its continuance is a major 
function of the bourgeois state.  The public interest is thus represented, even as the new society 
establishes itself on the basis of domination and exploitation.  Poulantzas is at pains to distinguish 
the concept of power bloc from that of ‘alliance’.  By ‘alliance’ is meant both a unity and a 
contradiction.479  But they differ in two ways – first, the power bloc only relates to the dominant 
classes and class fractions, and not to relations between the power bloc and other classes ; second, 
different kinds of unity are connected with the two terms.  For example, a political alliance between 
the petty bourgeoisie and the power bloc may also be combined with an intense economic struggle.  
In the case of the power bloc, unity is extended across political, economic and ideological 
dimensions.  Thus the power bloc comprises a class or class fraction that holds hegemony ; a series 
of classes and class fractions that are associated with this leading element ; and a particular set of 
contradictions and relations of force.480 
 
Marx fell back on the use of the ‘supporting classes’ to refer to groups, such as small landholders, 
who might support a power bloc.  By this phrase he meant that this support was not based on a 
particular ‘political sacrifice’, but rather comes from what Poulantzas calls ideological illusions.  Often 
this supporting class registers support of the power bloc because of fear of the working class.  Thus 
it is often the small peasantry or the petty bourgeoisie who fill this category.  In these instance, the 
state will often act as an intermediary to bring this alliance into being.  The state can be seen as 
above the class struggle, and serving the public interest, and thereby, by inference, a barrier to the 
further interests of the working class.  This alliance results from the inability of this class to develop 
their own political organization and a distinct political ideology.481   
 
This section comprises another element in the ongoing debate with Marx, who is there as a constant 
theoretical touchstone in the background, as Poulantzas develops his arguments.  This debate 
continues, with the use of extensive quotes from Marx, as Poulantzas starts to form his theory of 
periodization.  In Marx, he finds writing about two important periods in the formation of the 
bourgeois state – the first referring to the ‘form of the state’ and the ‘power bloc’, the second covered by 
the concept of the ‘forms of régime’.482 In the second period, Marx is referring to the struggles between 
political parties.  Political suffrage : 
 
… precipitates the formation of numerous classes in the political scene, precisely because, in the 
concrete circumstances studied by Marx, it constitutes one of the factors contributing to the 
organization of certain classes into parties.483 
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But political parties are not in themselves social forces, and, as Marx has already suggested, a space 
emerges in which these political parties seek to express social forces without necessarily having the 
organization skills to achieve this aim.  Thus there is a dislocation between a classes’ political interests 
and their capacity to organize them through political parties. 
 
Gramsci had earlier made the point in Italy that there could exist a difference between the class or 
fraction in charge of the state (in this case the petty bourgeoisie) and the hegemonic class, the 
bourgeoisie.  This latter class, Poulantzas notes, following Marx, is simply the one from which the 
personnel of the state are recruited, and that holds the ‘heights’ of the state.484  In various situations, 
these classes may be one and the same, in other situations, they may be different.  Class relations 
cannot be reduced to party relations. 
 
In Part Four, Poulantzas comes to consider ‘The Unity of Power and the Relative Autonomy of the 
Capitalist State.’485  In my view, this section constitutes the heart of his original theoretical argument. 
Again, Poulantzas is on the conceptual warpath, tidying up the theoretical ramblings of the writers 
of the past, patching and adding to what already exists, and developing new constructions for future 
analysis.  His endless attempts at precision and clarity frequently fail.  The careful reader is baffled by 
pages of obtuse, unclear and repetitive text which sometimes does not yield to the most careful of 
readings.  Yet beyond this considerable confusion, there is an originality in his thinking that is 
breath-taking. 
 
He begins this section with further attempts at clarity.  Indeed, he takes on the scolding tone of the 
19th. Century schoolteacher when he says : 
 
… no-one should be allowed to use these notions (of unity proper and relative autonomy) unless their 
precise meaning is specified.  In order to pin down these ideas, I shall start by making some preliminary 
working definitions …486 
 
By ‘unity proper’ he means the particular way in which a capitalist state presents a specific internal 
cohesion.487  It prevents the sharing of state power between the classes and class fractions.  This 
seems to Poulantzas to be unique to the capitalist state. And by relative autonomy, he means : 
 
… the state’s relation to the field of the class struggle, in particular its relative autonomy vis-à-vis the 
classes and fractions of the power bloc, and by extension vis-á-vis its allies and supporters.488 
 
In this new conception, Poulantzas wants to distinguish his argument very clearly from ‘simplistic 
and vulgarized’ conceptions of the state that see the state merely as the tool or instrument of the 
dominant class.489  There is a close connection between these two conceptions, of course because it 
is the function of the capitalist state, at one and the same time, to maintain a profile of unity while 
maintaining its relative autonomy from capitalist interests.  The instrumentalist theory has often 
predominated in the past in which the state is seen to have no autonomy : 
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The state, unified by this (ruling) class’s single will for domination is merely its inert tool.490 
 
Of most importance is the relationship between class struggle and the state.  Within the state’s 
structures lies the whole ensemble of class practices. 
 
Marx and Engels had much to say on the characteristics of the capitalist state.  But their writing is 
not always clear, the scientific concepts not always well elucidated, and the ambiguities 
commonplace.491  But there is also a concerted theoretical attempt to understand the nature of the 
newly-evolving state.  We can see the steps in the formation of this new structure, and the major 
elements of it as well.  In this context, Bonapartism and the rise of the French state is a seminal 
example.  Poulantzas quotes Engels in this regard : 
 
Bonapartism is after all the real religion of the bourgeoisie.  It is becoming ever clearer to me that the 
bourgeoisie has not the stuff in it for ruling directly itself, and that therefore … a Bonapartist semi-
dictatorship is the normal form; it upholds the big material interests of the bourgeoisie (even against 
the will of the bourgeoisie) but allows the bourgeoisie no part in the power of government.492 
 
France is conceived as having an advanced political state, while Britain is accepted as being in an 
advanced economic condition.  What is immediately apparent in this account of Bonapartism is the 
relative autonomy of the state from economic interests.  The relative autonomy seems to stem from 
a historical moment discussed by Marx in The Civil War in France, in which the ‘bourgeoisie have 
already lost, the working class had not yet gained, the ability to govern the nation’.493  But we must 
remember that Bonapartism is a state already under control of the bourgeoisie, and an account of 
the state as a state in equilibrium is clearly insufficient.  But Marx does not really admit to a state of 
equilibrium.  Gramsci comes close to agreeing with Marx that while the bourgeoisie had already lost 
the opportunity to govern the nation, the working class could not yet grasp it.   But neither 
Gramsci’s notion of Caesarism and catastrophic equilibrium, a form of equilibrium that end in crisis, 
nor a theory of general equilibrium can explain Bonapartism.  Instead we must look to the inherent 
qualities of the capitalist state and the shaping of relative autonomy within it. 
 
There are many misconceptions regarding the nature of the state and state power.  They include (i) 
an under-estimating of the political, in which the political is reduced to the economic or the 
economic is merged into the political (ii) A lack of an idea of the unity of state power (iii) a lack of a 
theory of relative autonomy, and (iv) a lack of a concept of class struggle.494  These remarks merely 
rehash the author’s already clear intentions for his newly-emerging theory of the state.495  Given 
these elisions in the literature, it is impossible for these authors to provide a ‘scientific concept’ of 
the class struggle.  The state is poorly defined, and its functions unclear.  Its internal unity is not 
understood, and there is a vague sense of a balance of forces that is not fully explicated.  
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The neo-liberal school attaches itself to the concepts of equilibrium and pluralism.  In this vision, 
the state is merely an institution in which a balance of power is played out.  The automatic and 
natural equilibrium of the market is replaced by an equilibrium of ‘mixed powers in the 
technological-industrial society’.496  Neither the concept of the unity of power, nor the theory of 
relative autonomy can have any place in such a theory.  Nor does the neo-corporate alternative offer 
much promise.497  While such theorizing admits to worrying antagonisms, no discussion of class 
struggle is possible.  Instead the argument is proposed of the state as an enlightened agent acting to 
harmonize these conflicting interests.  The state is seen as authorising and enabling these interests ; 
cooperation and arbitration are the themes of this process.  Does such an approach admit to 
theories of unity and relative autonomy?  The image of unity is the unity of the institutionalised 
powers, and the understanding that economic powers are absorbed into the state.  Both lines of 
argument fail to delimit the political and the economic. 
 
Marxist political theory is not untouched by such trends in theory elsewhere.  And these kinds of 
theories have a long history, which it is useful to recall.  The institutionalist-corporatist theories had 
their influence on the German social democratic movement during the Weimar Republic.  The state 
was seen as the agent of harmonization, representing a ‘constellation of interests.’498  The working 
class became incorporated into the Nazi state without any form of power-sharing.  There is a strong 
current of theorising the ‘revolution from above’, following Bismarckism, a line of reasoning that 
suggests the state taking an enlightened direction.  But this argument does not see the state as a 
neutral arbitrator.  Indeed there are elements of a state exhibiting a condition of relative autonomy, 
as when the Bismarck state moved Prussia from a state of feudalism to a state ready for capitalism.  
If today499 we are in a state of monopoly capitalism, the next step might be the transition to 
socialism.  But this would mean that the state, in its planning and nationalization strategies, would be 
in advance of economic interests.  This would exactly parallel the case of Prussian feudalism.  For 
this to happen, there needs to be sufficient force on the side of the working class to balance that of 
the bourgeoisie.  But these arguments are doubtless wrong, both about Bismarck and about the 
contemporary situation.   
 
While these tendencies have sometimes crept into the Marxist lexicon, the traditional Marxist view 
of the state has been to see it merely as an instrument or tool of capital.500  Poulantzas is following 
Althusser here in suggesting that the Marxist theoretical toolbox has been contaminated by 
ideological tendencies seeping into the pure realm of Marxist scientific thought.  Indeed, there 
appears to him to be a lack of a scientific theory at all when it comes to the monopoly capitalist 
stage of development. 
 
We now turn to a consideration of the capitalist state and class struggle.501  Capitalism places the 
state in a relatively autonomous position in relation to the economic system.502  The state acts as an 
agent of unity even as it separates individuals into private citizens, with rights, responsibilities and 
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recourse to justice under the newly-forming juridico-political system. And not just the dominated 
classes are separated.  As the new state emerges, the dominant classes are also separated, 
disorganized and confused.  The state’s has a role here, too, and it is to establish a power bloc under 
the hegemony of the ruling fractions.  This process occurs to shield the real class interests of the 
participants from their view.   
 
The petty bourgeoisie and the small peasants still remain as vestiges of a previous mode of 
production from an earlier era.  Class struggle and the state are connected in two ways, both through 
economic and political relations.  The state presents itself as the public unity of society, the people-
nation.  It represents the political power of class unity, and, therefore, in a sense, has its own class 
unity.503 It can represent itself as a national-popular state, not representing any class interest in 
particular, but rather the nation as a whole.  It therefore has a significant ideological purpose which 
concerns the legitimacy of the state.  This does not mean the state is reduced to having an 
ideological function, but it does have a powerful ideological purpose is establishing the authority and 
power of the new state structure. 
 
The notion of national sovereignty is already present in our understandings of the absolutist state, 
where it suggests a unitary structure, in which the state has gained autonomy from the economic 
realm.  Even here, citizens are formally free and equal, and they constitute the foundation of state 
legitimacy.  The state and popular sovereignty are seen as identical terms, but only if the people are 
represented.  The state’s unity is also founded in the juridico-political system.  
 
Under the second Bonaparte, according to Marx, the state is able to create independence for itself.504  
But is unclear whether he saw the state as a class instrument, or as a ‘relation of forces’.   The 
question remains as to how the state organizes its unity, a unity of class power.  Marx appears to 
understand that a dislocation has occurred between the political and economic class struggle.  But 
perhaps more importantly, what has also occurred is that the state has developed autonomy from 
the political interests of the ruling class.  The state thus represents the unity of class power.  But 
why, exactly, is relative autonomy required?  Marx and Engels propose that in the case of 
Bonapartism, that the bourgeoisie were incapable of undertaking the task of managing the state.  
They could not create political parties that could rise to the level of hegemonic organization.505  It is 
as if political life just got in the way of business – there was no time for organizing public life when 
the necessity for selfishness and self-interest was predominant.  Thus the bourgeoisie ‘sinks into 
fractional struggles’,506 and cannot emerge from the problems of the past.  In this vacuum, the 
capitalist state ‘takes charge’, and in this move, establishes its relative autonomy.  The state then 
moves to manage the various fractions of the dominated classes, but also manage the struggles 
between the various competing elements of the ruling class.507  Thus the dominant classes must 
accept a series of compromises to ensure the stability of the system, thereby allowing resources to 
flow to subordinate interests, ensuring their loyalty to the state, while also maintaining the capitalist 
nature of the social formation.  Thus we are reminded that the relatively autonomous state organizes 
the ruling class elements, at the same time disorganizing the dominated classes such that they do not 
organise into a revolutionary political party.  The state must also act to incorporate, or be 
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understood to incorporate, more accurately, the interests of the petty bourgeoisie and the small 
peasants, which Lenin referred to as ‘the ocean of small-scale producers’.508  This means that : 
 
State power is not a machine or an instrument, a simple object coveted by the various classes; nor is it 
divided into parts which, if not in the hands of some, must automatically be in the hands of others; 
rather it is an ensemble of structures.509 
 
The state sets the limits on the class struggle.  But this does not establish an equilibrium of forces. 
 
What of the totalitarian state?  Often modern political theory has used the case of the totalitarian 
state as typical of capitalist states, and this is clearly a misguided approach.  Often the approach has 
compared it to liberal capitalist states.  Dictatorships are seen to depend on the theory of mass 
society.  In dictatorships, the individual is subsumed into the state.  In liberal capitalism, the 
individual is celebrated and supported.  In dictatorship, the class struggle disappears into a 
homogenized society.  This means : 
 
… total acquisition by state power of all the spheres of individual activity. Absorption of the private 
domain into the womb of the state Behemoth; a complete non-participation of the individual in the 
political, the individual becoming a mere cog in this monstrous new Leviathan.510 
 
The modern capitalist state gains its legitimacy from representing the unity of the nation-state, 
created through the foundation of individual citizens.  It is here that it separates itself from various 
forms of despotism.  Yet even despots worked within certain limits of power.  The totalitarian state 
separates the political from the economic, thus separating the individual from the class struggle, and 
enabling the state to move beyond the class struggle.  But while the totalitarian state seems to 
subsume class struggle and the individual into its structure, it is still a class state.  But it is important 
not to label every capitalist state as somehow, or in part, totalitarian.  This leads to an imprecision 
which makes analysis impossible.  The term is vague and uncertain, and it refers simply to  ‘a 
particularly ‘strong’ character of state power’.511  Use of the terms, Poulantzas argues, prevents us 
from developing a scientific terminology that would be more useful.  And the differences between 
liberal states and totalitarian states, are, in any event, overblown.512 
 
Poulantzas now turns his attention the capitalist state and the dominant classes.  Here he remains in 
Marx’s theoretical pocket – the entire book now seems to on the character of a debate with Marx, 
rather than a reformulation in any completely original sense.  He begins by repeating his own earlier 
remarks on the power bloc – that it derives from the co-existence of various ruling elements, some 
from previous modes of production, others from the rising bourgeoisie, and especially from the 
commercial, industrial and financial fractions.  The power bloc is not a fusion, but rather a 
contradictory unity of various classes and class fractions to form a hegemonic force.  It does not 
comprise a sharing out of the state ; instead the state holds together in its unity. As ever, the state 
establishes its autonomy from the power bloc even as it acts to secure the permanence of this 
structure.513 
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Struggles within the dominant classes ensure that the power bloc is permanently unstable.  It is this 
instability that leads to the relative autonomy of the state.  Elite theory would argue that due to the 
instability of contemporary elites that power in capitalism is shared.  But this argument stems from a 
basic misunderstanding of ruling fractions – they have never been stable and homogenous.  Indeed 
it is the working class who have had a coherent political life, strong political parties to represent 
them, and a sense of solidarity.  But the political parties of the bourgeois class are never able to bring 
coherence, and the role of the state is to provide the necessary coherence to this class.514  It is also 
mistaken to argue that in the past the state represented the bourgeois class as a whole, and that the 
contemporary capitalist state represents only the interests of monopoly capital.  In both cases, a 
variety of fractions of the bourgeoisie are represented by the state. 
 
Relative autonomy may take on several forms : 
 
The state, may, for example, present itself as the political guarantor of the interests of various classes 
and fractions of the power bloc against the interests of the hegemonic class or fraction, and it may 
sometimes play off those classes and fractions against the latter.  But it does this in its function of 
political organizer of the hegemonic class or fraction and forces it to admit the sacrifices necessary for 
its hegemony.  To say, therefore, as in the Communist Manifesto, that the state is the managing committee 
for the common affairs of the bourgeoisie in its ensemble is both correct and insufficient: it is 
insufficient if it makes us lose sight of the state’s complex role vis-à-vis the power bloc, and its particular 
relation to the hegemonic class or fraction.515 
 
Again, as many times before, we witness Poulantzas in debate with Marx.  Is Marx simply serving up 
the instrumentalist theory of the state?  It is hard to deny the clarity of the exposition, but if he is, 
then Poulantzas is quick to show the shortcomings of the formulation.   
 
Poulantzas then turns his attention to the theory of the separation of powers, by which he refers to 
the distinction commonly made between the legislative, parliamentary and executive branches of the 
capitalist state.  Usually one of these powers is the dominant power in a given society.  It comprises 
the ‘nodal point’516 at which power is concentrated.   Sometimes these elements of the political 
system reflect the power of certain class fractions, as in the case of the Louis Bonaparte coup 
discussed by Marx, in which the financial fraction controlled the executive, and the industrial 
fraction controlled the legislature.517  But in any of these cases, it is important to remember that the 
unity of the state is assured by the maintenance of the hegemonic bloc. 
 
What forms of state are possible?  This question, along with the forms of régime, is taken up in 
chapter five.518  There are several technical issues to consider, including the role of the executive, and 
what it includes, commonly the state apparatuses, including the bureaucracy, administration, police, 
and the army.519  This must be separated from the work of the constitutional assemblies.  The 
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relationship between these two branches and the dominance of one over the other suggests different 
forms of political and economic relationships.  Forms of state relate to certain moments in the 
transformation of the state.  Many of these changes and forms of state result from the particular 
qualities of the class struggle.  And the distinction between the legislative and executive dimensions 
of the state does not determine the forms of the state – again, the class struggle is central here in its 
familiar guise in which the state manages the power bloc and disorganizes the dominated classes.  
Different forms of legitimacy result from various social formations that may appear.  In those 
societies in which parliament predominates, legitimacy make take the form of legality - rule-making, 
in which the general will of the people is seen to be represented.  In these cases, the legitimacy of the 
executive is handled in a particular way.  Parliamentary publicity decreases, and a mask of secrecy 
hides the role of the bureaucracy, and, at the same time, the charismatic leader is brought forward as 
the leader of the nation. 
 
A long tradition of working class politics has expressed distrust in the executive form of 
government.  Parliamentary legitimacy is thus seen as the only legitimate form of bourgeois 
government, and thereby it sees a state dominated by an executive as a ‘deformation of the national-
popular-class-state’.520  But in fact such a view is clearly false.  A parliamentary democracy is no 
closer to a popular-class nation state than one dominated by the executive.  It does not represent the 
popular will of the people any better than a state governed by a sovereign or an Emperor, as is made 
clear by the example of Louis Bonaparte. 
 
Executive legitimacy is often masked by a series of devices borrowed from the parliamentary régime.  
But both are the same type of state.  Neither is directly determined by the nature of the class 
struggle.  Parliament may be seen as a ‘place of danger’ to the dominant class because it is a place 
where the popular will may prevail – it may be taken over by the popular classes.  Thus the 
executive/legislative distinction provides security for the power bloc, since if parliament is taken by 
storm, then the center of power can be moved to the executive.  But the dominant class has many 
ruses available to it to resist popular domination, and this movement from the parliamentary to the 
executive wing rarely takes place.  There may have been anxieties about this event occurring at one 
time, but the role of the social democrats put paid to this anxiety for the most part.  None the less, 
the displacement of the dominant node of authority from parliament to the executive branch is a 
significant way of distinguishing various forms of state.  It may signify a change in the fraction of the 
hegemonic bloc gaining control.  In such a case, hegemony may come to be organized within the 
structure of the executive.  Forms of state depend on the role of parties in the power bloc.  They are 
linked very closely to the nature of class struggle in the power bloc.  The rise of the executive can 
lead to the diminution of political parties, and the rise of pressure groups.  The rise of the executive 
branch often results in the substantial failure of monopoly capital to secure hegemony over the 
nation-state.  
 
Where are the centres of power in the various state forms?521  The centres of political power522 include 
the legislative assemblies, the administration, the army, the police, the judiciary and various other 
locations.  In modern societies, there are many such centres of power, all of which are concentrated 
in the executive.  The state still remains relatively autonomous, but monopoly capitalism controls 
society through the executive.  But dislocations can still occur.  Even when the hegemonic fraction 
                                                 
520 PPSC, page 312. This is the phrase Poulantzas uses. 
521 This question is posed on page 315. 
522 Ibid.  The italics and the phrase appear in the original. 
 89 
concentrates itself in the executive, parliament may still claim to have authority as the governing 
authority through the popular will.  Often such a crisis develops that a new national agenda emerges 
that allows legitimacy to flow back both into the legislature, and into the executive branch. 
 
Forms of state and forms of régime should be considered at the same time.  It is important here to 
consider factors such as the predominance or equilibrium between the two branches, and the status 
of the party system in a particular historical moment.  Two kinds of periodization are associated with 
forms of state and forms of régime.  Consider a state with a predominance of the legislative branch, 
and a multi-party system.  In this case, state power could be threatened by the potential for sharing 
power through the coalition.  But usually what is actually at work is a particular form of hegemonic 
power bloc under the management of the ruling class fraction.  And by analysing both forms of state 
and forms of régime we can assess the state of relative autonomy in a given formation.  As a case in 
point, the predominance of the executive often implies an increase in the autonomy of the state, but 
only when parties decline, such as in the case of French Bonapartism.  It occurs when there is a 
crisis of representation among the parties.523  And relative autonomy may be more important in a 
parliamentary system, where a multi-party polity exists, rather than a two-party system, where 
internal discipline is strong.  In the case of a two-party system, monopolies may exert a certain 
capacity to rule, and thus the relative autonomy of the state is less important, since the whole power 
bloc is tied together in a single party : 
 
The hegemonic fraction becomes the ruling fraction by occupying the ‘heights’ of this or these parties 
by means of its ‘agents’; … this is clearly the case in the USA where the parties’ weakened organization 
has sometimes allowed a relative autonomy of the state, which came into play in Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal 
… and in the particular case of the 1945 Labour Government in Britain.524 
 
Poulantzas ends this discussion of the relative autonomy of the state with a reference to Ralph 
Miliband, and this is suggestive, because he is soon going to engage with Miliband in the pages of 
New Left Review on the nature of the state in the familiar Poulantzas/Miliband exchange.525  He 
then turns his attention to the issue of bureaucracies for the rest of the book,526 and the reader 
senses that the author has largely made his case, and that the substance of the argument, resting as it 
does on the exposition of his theory of relative autonomy, has been presented, and that he has now 
gone down a theoretical cul-de-sac.  My own analysis will be pointed, and I will examine this 
question of the theoretical cul-de-sac in what follows.  
 
We start by following Poulantzas into what seems to be a detailed review of bureaucracy and the 
state, using Weber as the primary touchstone.  First, we examine elite theory.527   Here two issues are 
of importance – the question of the politically dominant class and the question of the bureaucracy.  
The question of the bureaucracy leads to two sub-questions – whether the state has an autonomous 
power, and whether the state can be seen as a ‘mere tool’ of the capitalist class.  Functionalist theory 
takes the road of cutting off any possibility of class struggle.  In this vision, political elites become 
leaders in the needed places in the social order.  The state is said to have its own autonomous power, 
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and is engaged in parcelling out political power.  Another school of thought centres on the idea of a 
political class.  In this view, there may be several ways to rule.  The opportunity may arise through 
economic domination, or it may result from political control. Unity stems from the wealth of the 
elites, whether political or economic.   
 
In contrast, Marxism provides fuller answers.  But Marxism is critiqued as proposing that the 
dominant class is determined by the economic.  By now, the reader can fully discern that the notion 
of class refers to an ensemble of social relations, including the political, economic and ideological.  
Poulantzas then repeats his arguments about the relative autonomy of the state, the power bloc and 
the unity of state power.  In fact, bureaucracy seems to Poulantzas to have two clear meanings in the 
Marxist texts, the first referring to a social category of the state apparatus, the second to a ‘specific 
system of organization and internal functioning of the state apparatus’.528  But in any case, the term 
‘bureaucracy’ should refer to the state apparatus, and not to the wider question of state power.  On 
its own, the bureaucracy cannot constitute a separate class since it has no economic base.  But it 
might be construed as a class fraction, since a class fraction can arise from a purely political base.  
But given that it is embedded in the relations between classes structured into the state, the notion of 
class fraction is misplaced.  The activities of the state are limited by the field of class power. 
 
The state may, however, have class affiliations in the form of its membership.  Marx and Engels 
spoke of ‘the heights’ of the bureaucracy, which in France were owned by the bourgeoisie, with the 
lower strata populated by the petty bourgeoisie, and in Germany were directed by the landed 
aristocracy during the nineteenth century.  And indeed Marx and Engels often referred to the 
particular class fractions from which the ‘heights of the bureaucracy’ were recruited.529  But this does 
not mean that bureaucratic functioning is determined by the class origins of its members.  It is an 
agent of state power, and thus the class background of the members is secondary to the place of the 
bureaucracy in the unfolding of state power.  Nor is the bureaucracy merely a tool of the hegemonic 
fraction.  This argument therefore pushes to one side the significance of the fact that members of 
the economic and political elites belong to the same clubs, the same social circles and the same class, 
and thus move in harmony to run the economy and the state.  Because of the structural location of 
the state as the unity of power, as the formal representation of the public interest, and the organizer 
of the power bloc, it remains impervious to these personal interests.  It possesses, in the end, relative 
autonomy.  Thus we need not concede that the state is a separate power, nor that it is an instrument 
of the ruling class.  
 
Class affiliation among the bureaucracy may affect the state’s functioning to some degree, though 
always within the limits set by the class struggle.  The political power gained comes from within the 
state itself, and not from the relations of production.530  These powers set the limits on the class in 
charge.  This is particularly clear in periods of transition, when the bureaucracy has a particular 
power.  In this case, the bureaucracy has a particular access to power, as the social formation is 
roiled by class conflict.  The bureaucracy both aids and hinders the hegemonic bloc.  Thus, within 
limits, the class nature of bureaucratic membership may play a role.  In particular, the petty 
bourgeois nature of the subordinate layers of the state have played a significant part.  They come 
into the bureaucracy because their economic role is reduced under capitalism, and because this 
allows the dominant class to reconstruct the petty bourgeois class as a supporting class.  There are 
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also ideological reasons, because this particular class has a propensity towards power fetishism, and 
the state provides a mechanism by which such interests can be realised.  And given that the petty 
bourgeoisie can no longer represent themselves through a political party that directly represents their 
interests, the state provides an avenue of representation. 
 
What can be said about bureaucracy, bureaucratism and the capitalist state?531  Does the bureaucracy 
take on different forms in different kinds of state, for example?  Bureaucratism refers to the 
tendency towards bureaucratic structures, and to the particular system of organization of the state 
apparatus.  Weber has contributed much to this discussion, but the account remains inadequate.532  
Weber argues that bureaucratism is identified by rationality, a system of normative models governing 
‘various sectors of the capitalist system’.533  For him bureaucracy itself is the creator of modern 
political power.  Hence, for Poulantzas, Weber is in the business of masking the political power of 
social classes and class struggle in general.  It is, in a very direct way, a form of ideological shading of 
the truth.  But Weber does acknowledge the importance of the state to the capitalist mode of 
production, and that the state carries within in it important contradictions.  Functionalism has 
followed Weber in his analysis.  For this school, the bureaucracy is only of interest when a 
dysfunction arises.  This becomes a pathology of the capitalist system.  Thus there are functional 
bureaucracies (good for the system) and dysfunctional bureaucracies (bad for the system), in which 
case adjustments must be made for the system to be corrected.  Weber saw the state as the most 
rational way to run the system, but he also saw a contradiction between bureaucracy and democracy.  
Thus he cannot be fully accepted into the leadership of the functionalist camp.  Rationality for 
Weber has two senses.534  In the first instance it merely references the very practical matter of 
budgetary accounting of the capitalist firm and state.  But then rationality is also used in a somewhat 
vague way, which suggests the weight of a new system bearing down on capitalism.  And while 
Marx, Engels and Lenin sometimes refer to the bureaucracy as a parasite on the body of the 
capitalist formation, they more commonly speak of contradictions.535  The contradictions for them 
lie in the relation between the bureaucracy and social classes, including the relation between the 
bourgeoisie and the relatively autonomous state, as well as the relation between the bureaucracy and 
the subordinate classes, including classes from other modes of production. 
 
There are homologies between the way that capitalist firms work and the way the bureaucracies 
work,  This results from the dominance of a certain ideological model in a given society.  The state 
has specific ways in which it may intervene in the economic universe.  It may serve as a source of 
employment for a displaced class, as in the case of small peasants driven off the land.  But it also 
acts as a tax collector, and it also acts directly to assist business in the period of monopoly 
capitalism.  As capitalism develops, the state also evolves, develops higher levels of functionality and 
increases the number of personnel.  And it may take on various political qualities.  In France, the 
bureaucracy has always had the characteristic of a social force, but in Britain this has never occurred. 
 
There is a particular quality of the state under capitalism, and this quality lies with its relative 
autonomy, quite distinct from the state under feudalism.  Feudalism depends on administration by 
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notables.  Class affiliation does matter here.  As well, the intellectual class comes from this 
background as well.   
 
Ideology works on bureaucratism in several ways – as a general masking of knowledge through 
bureaucratic secrecy, through particular forms of capitalist ideology, through the establishment of 
the juridico-political system as the legitimate face of capitalism, or through the bureaucratic 
monopoly of knowledge. 
 
Bureaucracy can be said to be a specific social category because it creates a specific unity, and 
because of its relative autonomy from social classes.536  And bureaucratism has been analysed so 
frequently that Poulantzas simply rehearses its main features here :  
 
Bureaucratism represents a hierarchical organization of the state apparatus, by means of a delegation of power, 
having particular effects on the functioning of that apparatus.537 
 
It is also associated with the ‘axiomatization’ of the juridical system into rules and laws, the process 
of centralization, and with the impersonality of state functioning.538  Payment of personnel is by 
fixed salaries; access is by competition or nomination ; there is a clear separation between public and 
private life ; a masking of the apparatus is common ; and a masking of senior civil servants in 
particular is notable.  Finally, the senior members of the bureaucracy are highly educated, and the 
lower orders are not. 
 
In the end, and at this point, Poulantzas appears to suggest here that the bureaucracy is not a 
specific social category.  It may have its own interests in that it provides an avenue for careers, but 
these interests are not enough to constitute a separate social category because there are a wide array 
of interests involved throughout the strata. 
 
Finally, in ‘Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle’539, Poulantzas confronts his last topic.  Class struggle 
is at the heart of his concerns, the epicentre of his theoretical and political passions, and he turns to 
it now as comes to the close of the book.  From Marx and Engels, he sees that the relative 
autonomy of the state is entirely a function of the relation of the state to the class struggle.  The 
bureaucracy has no power of its own, state power is class power, and the state is a power centre.  
For them, an equilibrium is involved.  But Engels clearly feels the bureaucracy can have an 
independent and separate power, even thinking of it as a class on occasion.540  But it is also obvious 
that relative autonomy is present even when equilibrium is missing, so this is an inadequate account.  
The bureaucracy, instead, must be seen as a structure with an ensemble of levels all engaged in the 
class struggle.  It is involved with the problems of isolation previously discussed, both for the 
working class, and the dominant classes, and with the isolation of the peasantry and the petty 
bourgeoisie.  Poulantzas appears here to vacillate on his use of the concept of the bureaucracy as a 
social category.  Here he concludes : 
 
In short, the relative autonomy of the bureaucratic category from the dominant classes is related to that 
of the capitalist type of state … we can say that the bureaucracy itself as a social category, assumes this 
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autonomy, in that it accurately reflects the political power of the dominant classes and represents their 
interests in the particular economic, political and ideological conditions of the class struggle in these 
formations.541 
 
In a turn towards instrumentalism, he appears to assign the bureaucracy to a social category, though 
what exactly is meant by a social category is unclear, so the importance of this shift is lost to the 
reader.  But now, in a last attempt to resolve the many questions he has raised, he systematizes the 
rest of the text.542   
 
First, how does the state connect with the bourgeoisie?  The question is an entirely political one, and 
functional theory’s notions of dysfunction miss the point entirely.  The small scale producers are 
often overlooked in this analysis, however.  This relation of the bourgeoisie to the state has two 
aspects – the struggle between dominant class ideology and petty bourgeoisie ideology within the 
state apparatus, and the contradictions between the capitalist state, and the structure imposed on it 
because of the involvement of the petty bourgeoisie.543 
 
A second set of questions concerns whether the bureaucracy is undemocratic.  Does it lead to 
totalitarianism?  The legitimacy of this kind of state is clearly bourgeois legitimacy.  This could bear 
the charismatic character of a ‘leader’, but that is only one kind of legitimacy.  Thirdly, what happens 
when the state is dominated by the executive.  The answer might lie in the question of whether the 
bureaucracy constitutes a social force.  But since it is neither a class or a class fraction, it can in no 
way constitute the state on its own.  Further, although the bureaucracy forms a social category it 
cannot be a social force, but it can become one.  This, of course, depends on the concrete situation  
and on the situation of the class struggle.  In some cases, perhaps, the bureaucracy may act as a 
social force. 
 
 
 
 Relative Autonomy, Miliband and Class Struggle  
 
Immediately after publishing this book, and in the shadow of the May-June uprisings in France,  
Poulantzas reviewed Ralph Miliband’s book The State in Capitalist Society in New Left Review.544  He 
begins by praising the value of the book, hinting at epistemological differences, then focusing on the 
gap in Marxist theory on issues relating to the state.545  We see here a theme that resonates 
throughout Political Power and Social Classes, that of the debate with Marx, teasing out the implications 
of Marx’s theoretical corpus that only requires a little help to provide the fullest account needed of 
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the state and social classes.  Poulantzas reminds us that Marx proposed that the economic was both 
dominant and determinant in the last instance within capitalism, but that in the feudal mode of 
production ideology and religion were dominant, even if the economy was still determinant.  Thus, 
this lead to a neglect of the state at the expense of Marx’s extensive economic treatments.  
Poulantzas then rehearses similar lacunae in the work of Lenin and the theoreticians of the Second 
and Third Internationals.  In the latter case, the malady was simply an overwhelming outbreak of 
economism, and thus the neglect of the state was inevitable.  This form of economism simply 
reduces the other levels of reality to epiphenomena, and thus diminishes them to matters of no 
consequence.546  In the light of this situation, Miliband’s work on the state is therefore seen to be of 
particular value.  As an attack on bourgeois theories of the state, Poulantzas applauds the work. 
 
But now Poulantzas gets down to his critical work, and his first assault is on Miliband’s 
epistemology and his focus on concrete cases.  He requires of Miliband that he sets out the 
methodological strategies that he plans to employ before engaging on this kind of work, and he sees 
nothing that will fit the bill.  Indeed, Poulantzas goes so far as to say that Miliband never really says 
what the state is, and leaves its shape and its form implicit.  But more important is the issue of 
method and epistemology.  Poulantzas explains the matter by raising the issue of the relation 
between theory and the concrete.  A marvellous piece of writing from the later 1976 article sums up 
the Poulantzas position on this dilemma : 
 
… facts can only be rigorously - that is, demonstrably - comprehended if they are explicitly analysed 
with the aid of a theoretical apparatus constantly employed throughout the length of the text.  This 
presupposes, as Durkheim already pointed out in his time, that one resolutely eschews the demagogy 
of the ‘palpitating fact’, of ‘common sense’ and the ‘illusions of the evident’.  Failing this, one can pile 
up as many concrete analyses as one likes, they will prove nothing whatsoever.547 
 
By not placing himself fair and square within the realm of Marxist epistemology, Miliband has laid 
himself open to the claim that he has been caught in the snares of the enemy, that he is playing on 
their theoretical territory.   Poulantzas, in his own work, of course, has done nothing for 355 pages 
but set out his theoretical territory and the Marxist problematic on the state, with little recourse to 
‘facts’ or evidence at all, so the Miliband project, coming as it does from an empirical direction, is 
profoundly at odds with the Poulantzian project tout court.  Miliband may not have a carefully 
argued epistemology or an elaborated theory of the state, but Poulantzas has nothing else.  He rarely 
roams into the empirical world at all – unlike Marx somewhat surprisingly – and when he does it is 
to go back 100 years to Bismarck and Napoleon – hardly a timely attempt to indicate what the 
contemporary capitalist state might be up to.  The divide between them could hardly be more 
obvious. 
 
Poulantzas expands his critique by arguing that it is the Miliband position that classes are not 
objective structures but are instead reduced to interpersonal relations.548  For Poulantzas, who is 
clearly in a structuralist moment, individuals are placed in class positions by the mode of production, 
not by the motivations that might or might not exist within the minds of individuals.  This seems 
like a fundamental distinction between the two authors, at one and the same time epistemological, 
methodological and empirical, that then colours the rest of the argument.  In what remains in the 
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547 Poulantzas, 1976, op. cit., page 65. 
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article, Poulantzas follows a familiar tack of numbering key points, this time to advantage, and he 
lists five major areas of contention : 
 
1.  Managerialism.549  Poulantzas approves of Miliband taking on the ‘false issue’ of managerialism, the 
argument that in late capitalism, managers have taken over control of enterprises, and have little 
interest in profit.  Miliband, in contrast to the managerialist line, wants to emphasize that the new 
category of managers is part of the ruling elite.  But, Poulantzas claims, this is a false way to conceive 
of social class.  Marx reminds us that class results from an agent’s objective place in the relations of 
production, and does not reside in the motivational structure of the individual.  Thus managers, in 
the Poulantzian view, do not constitute a unique fraction of the capitalist class, which is where the 
focus should be. 
 
2. Bureaucracy.550 Miliband next confronts the relationship between the state and the ruling class.  
Miliband is at pains to argue against the prevailing orthodoxy that the state is class-neutral.  Again, 
he takes an opposite position, arguing that often the capitalist class has provided membership for 
state offices, and that personal ties between the ruling class and senior members of the state are 
widespread.  But again it must be pointed out that the relationship between the state and the ruling 
class is an ‘objective one’, and not a matter of personal motivation or class allegiance.  Thus the fact 
that members of the ruling class populate the heights of the bureaucracy is an effect of the class 
structure and its relation to the state, and not its cause.  And we must now discuss the problem of the 
bureaucracy.  Readers will remember that Poulantzas spends many pages at the tail-end of Political 
Power and Social Classes writing about the bureaucracy, so he has much to say on this topic.  In the 
Poulantzian worldview, the state bureaucracy constitutes a social category, and not a class fraction or a 
social class.551  The state is thus a servant of the ruling class, not because of the class origins of the 
members, but because of its role in establishing the unity of the social formation.  And while a long 
Marxist tradition has celebrated the instrumentalist theory of the state as a tool in the hands of the 
capitalist class, Poulantzas now wants to emphasize that relative autonomy between the ruling class 
and the state is a more thoughtful description of this relationship.  And if this is so, one cannot 
account for the condition of relative autonomy that prevails if the state has been ‘cornered’552 by 
agents of the ruling class.  This approach can only lead to instrumentalism. 
 
3. The Branches of the Bureaucracy.553  Poulantzas spends the last fifty pages of Political Power and Social 
Classes considering the role of the bureaucracy, and it is to this problem he returns here.  Which 
branch of the bureaucracy dominates in a particular case?  The Miliband argument seems to be that 
the answer lies in the closeness of the managers of a given sector to members of the ruling class, or 
the sector most closely tied to an important element of the economy.  Again, the two writers are at 
odds, and again Poulantzas wants to emphasize the objective nature of the state as a system of unity 
with its own logic.  Various forms of state do exist, but these forms must be related back to the 
nature of the class struggle in any given society. 
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4. The Present Form of the Capitalist State.554  What, then, does Miliband make of the present capitalist 
situation?  Poulantzas argues that the present (1969) condition of the state is novel, though he does 
not believe that the state is moving in the direction of a military dictatorship, a view that he seems to 
imply might be in Miliband’s mind.  It seems that what Miliband might be proposing is that the state 
and the ruling class are becoming ever closer, and the state is thus becoming ever more 
instrumentalist because the agents of the state and the agents of the ruling class are now more or less 
interchangeable.  Poulantzas sees such a view as a close parallel to the orthodox communist view 
that under state monopoly capitalism, the state and the ruling class become as one.  But as he has 
argued elsewhere, such a view leads to a blunt and crude version of instrumentalism, and neglects 
the notion of relative autonomy entirely.  It is thus profoundly misguided. 
 
5. The Ideological Apparatuses.555  Finally, Poulantzas turns to ideology, and in this case, he poses an 
interesting question – perhaps neither Miliband nor he have dealt with this issue adequately.  Apart 
from Gramsci, it is clear in the Marxist lexicon that the emphasis has been on the repressive nature 
of the state, and with Miliband and Poulantzas, while ideology is examined, nowhere is there a 
systematic treatment of the institutional nature of ideology, the way that ideas are embedded in the 
structures of the state.  When ideology has been considered it has usually been located in external 
agencies, such as the church.  But this is clearly a misplaced argument.  Indeed, Poulantzas argues, it 
would be better to understand that while some structures of the state are repressive, many state 
apparatuses are largely ideological in nature – state education is the obvious example - but these 
structures might also include the church, the trade unions, the media and so on.  For while some of 
these agencies formally live outside the state, they often act as if they were state agencies, and 
indeed, in the case of the media, for example, they comprise a mixture of public and private entities.  
And these agencies are particularly important because such agencies are especially autonomous.  
Poulantzas gives four reasons why we should consider these agencies elements of the ideological 
state apparatus – (i) Such agencies act to unify the social formation, which is the role of the capitalist 
state (ii) the repressive state apparatus guarantees or denies their existence (iii) while these 
apparatuses exhibit a high degree of autonomy, they are still influenced strongly (and limited by) 
changes in the structure of the state, and (iv) if gaining state power in the socialist revolution 
requires ‘smashing the state’, it also require taking over the ideological apparatus – the church, the 
schools, the media – in order to secure full control of the social formation.  But this is to go too far 
for Miliband, Poulantzas argues, for his political conclusions are muted, and revolution is not where 
the Miliband argument takes us. 
 
Miliband replied to this review in the next issue of NLR.556  His reply is shorter than the initial 
Poulantzas review, rather gentlemanly, but no less critical than the Poulantzas position.  Again, he 
uses a numbering system, which I now follow.  
 
1. The Problem of Method.  Miliband admits that he hasn’t given the problem of method the attention 
that it probably deserves, but he argues that empirical adjudication is the only possible way forward 
in many cases, a view that Poulantzas, by failing to use ‘evidence’, theorised or otherwise, often 
seems to deny.  And while he does admit to the use of the term ‘elite’ in his work, he reaffirms that 
the notion of ruling class remains, and that the use of the term ‘elite’ is really little different from 
                                                 
554 Ibid., page 75. 
555 Ibid., page 76. 
556 NLR 1/59, January-February, 1970, pages 53-60. 
 97 
Poulantzas’s use of ‘class fraction’.  The Miliband book ‘may be insufficiently theoretical’,557 but in 
comparison one might say that the Poulantzas position is insufficiently empirical, and contrasts 
significantly with Marx’s rich empirical tradition embodied in his major works. 
 
2. The Objective Nature of the State.  Managerialism, in the Miliband view, is underestimated by 
Poulantzas, and constitutes a significant empirical problem.  And Miliband reaffirms the role he 
assigns to the objective conditions of the state.  But he also argues that Poulantzas pays altogether 
too little attention to the issue.  In fact, in Political Power and Social Classes, Poulantzas does deal with 
this matter empirically, as did Marx.  And it may be that we catch Poulantzas in a structuralist 
moment here, in which he is willing to dismiss this issue as entirely irrelevant – that he ‘bends the 
stick too far’ in the French phrase.   But it cannot be entirely ignored, Miliband claims.  Given that 
Poulantzas seems unwilling to deal with the empirical in any substantive way, it is hardly a surprise, 
one might imagine Miliband thinking, that he neglects the twin ‘concrete-empirical’ problems of 
managerialism and state agents.  And then Miliband makes his famous accusation : 
 
… his own analysis seems to me to lead straight towards a kind of structural determinism, or rather a 
structural super-determinism, which makes impossible a truly realistic consideration of the dialectical 
relationship between the State and ‘the system’.558 
 
Here is Poulantzas pushed out on a limb, challenged on the issue of theoreticism, a failure to address 
questions of history and of evidence, and now, also failing to attend to issues of agency, and accused 
instead of ‘structural super-determinism’, implying that the agents who actually fill the positions in 
the state are merely ciphers who carry out the logic of the state bereft of human agency.  And 
Poulantzas is accused of more : 
 
The political danger of structural super-determinism would seem to me to be obvious. For if the state 
élite is as totally imprisoned in objective structures as is suggested, it follows that there is really no 
difference between a state ruled, say, by bourgeois constitutionalists, whether conservative or social-
democrat, and one ruled by, say, Fascists.559 
 
This is a powerful rejection, and one which ignores entirely the subtlety of the Poulantzian argument 
in Political Power and Social Classes, as well as ideas proposed about relative autonomy and fascism in 
Fascism and Dictatorship, the place where this issue is most fully discussed.  Of course, Fascism and 
Dictatorship had not yet been published, and it is unlikely at this time that Miliband had fully come to 
grips with Political Power and Social Classes itself.  But it is clear that, within the limited terms of this 
debate, Miliband scores a powerful point here. 
 
3.  The Ideological Institutions.  Miliband gently argues that his treatment of ideology is actually 
extensive, contra the Poulantzas claim, but that Poulantzas is misguided if he thinks the church, the 
media, education and the like are all part of the ideological state apparatus.  For Miliband, the state 
itself already plays a very significant role in socialising citizens.  The other institutions may be part of 
the socializing process, but Poulantzas is mistaken to place them within the state.  They are subject 
to state pressure, but they are best considered part of the political arena.  Indeed, Miliband claims 
that such institutions are most effective in their activities of indoctrination when they keep at arm’s 
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length from the state in a bourgeois-democratic society, whereas in dictatorships, the connection 
would be formal and close. 
 
The exchange ends on a political note.  Poulantzas has claimed that Miliband stayed away from 
political conclusions.  Miliband accedes to this view.  To move towards a democratic-socialist future 
is clearly important, he replies, but the ways in which this might occur seemed to the author beyond 
the scope of his book. 
 
This is where the exchange lay until much later.  In the early 1970’s, Poulantzas published Fascism 
and Dictatorship (1970) and Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (1973), and it was not until 1976, after the 
completion of these later works, that Poulantzas finally gave a reply.560  He begins by commenting 
that the initial debate has led to widespread discussion, and that he cannot hope to reply to all the 
questions raised.  He is, however, to answer Laclau’s comments, along with the Miliband position.  
He starts by reiterating that Miliband’s theoretical language is so imprecise that it lacks any 
‘theoretical problematic’.  Thus the arguments, as Laclau has suggested, are probably sited on 
separate theoretical terrains.  And Poulantzas goes on to say that he has little to add to his previous 
criticisms of Miliband, but instead wants to develop his own arguments.  Again, as before, he does 
this under a series of headings : 
 
1. Abstractionism.561  Poulantzas takes exception to Miliband’s characterization of his work as hyper-
abstracted, by which he takes Miliband to be saying that he won’t confront the world of facts.  His 
answer to this charge is sophisticated, though facile.  He cleverly uses Durkheim to defend the view 
that the world of ‘common sense’ of ‘pure facts’ cannot be approached innocently, but rather always 
through a theoretical lens.  But then he also argues that Political Power and Social Classes is full of 
empirical referents.  The former claim might have some weight if he were in debate with some 
ardent positivist with no knowledge of epistemology, Marxist or otherwise.  But this is not so in the 
case of Miliband.  And, in any case, having established a methodological epistemology, one is then 
free, as Marx amply shows in his own work, to bring historical and ethnographic evidence to bear on 
the case at hand.  The brilliance of Marx’s work, in part, lies in the magnificent way that historical 
evidence and case studies are joined with elaborate theoretical argument to provide language of 
remarkable power and influence.  Since Poulantzas debates with Marx, not just in the early pages of 
Political Power and Social Classes, but throughout the book, it is surprising that none of this empirical-
historical influence rubs off on him, or far less, perhaps, that one might have imagined to enable him 
to enlarge the power of his own argument.  In fact, the most persuasive part of the book is his 
discussion of the French and German case studies, where the empirical comes into close contact 
with the theoretical, and the language is lively and persuasive.  But for the vast majority of the book, 
the use of empirical evidence is sketchy, gestural at best, and absent for most of the time.  One 
cannot hide behind the epistemological shadows to avoid historical evidence, nor can one dismiss 
the ‘concrete-real’ as being all too obvious if one is to confront political realities, but Poulantzas 
does this throughout his book.  And, curiously, his main point of historical connection is with the 
19th. Century, and not with the contemporary capitalist state at all.562  Thus his defence is in these 
two ways thoroughly unconvincing. 
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561 Pages 66-66. 
562 This is exactly the point that Miliband makes in his 1973 review of the English version of Political Power and Social 
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He does, however, admit to a certain theoreticism.  He attributes this to an overly Althusserian 
approach to which he found himself subject at the time of writing the book.  This overly formal 
attention to philosophy, to the creation of new concepts as a form of production (Generalities 1, 
Generalities 3, Generalities 3) means that much of the book is taken up with trying to be very clear 
about the use of terms, setting the historical record straight about how Marx, Engels, Lenin and 
Gramsci used theoretical constructs, and seeking to establish a ‘scientific’, clear and precise form of 
analysis.  But as he attempts this work, he produces a text of such density, complexity and confusion 
that he can be said to fail in large part at this task, however original his achievements, and however 
brilliant his insights.  Thus he failed to deal with the ‘concrete-real’ in any serious fashion, and 
admits, at least to some extent, the error of his ways, and believes he has now rectified his faults. 
 
2. A Necessary Distinction.  Poulantzas admits to failing to separate the theoretical work, the plan for 
the establishment of new concepts, and the ‘order of research’, which is the realm in which facts are 
addressed.  In the theoretical realm, apparently, we are in a hermetically sealed space in which 
concepts and ideas are worked over by Marxist science and new concepts are developed.  Then, in 
the realm of research, ‘facts’ come up against theories, and give rise to concepts.563  This appears 
contradictory, and  Poulantzas gives no satisfactory explanation or defence of this form of 
exposition within this section. 
 
3. Formalism.  But none the less, as the defence develops, he does admit to a lack of empirical 
evidence, of ‘concrete analysis’, a problem ameliorated in Fascism and Dictatorship and in Classes in 
Contemporary Capitalism.  Thus, while Political Power and Social Classes remains slightly diminished by its 
shortcomings, overall the Poulantzian oeuvre now seems to be on the path to recovery.  But in these 
changes, Poulantzas wants to remain of the view that facts are always suffused with theory, a view 
that is now widely accepted among advanced theoretical circles, not the least because of Bourdieu’s 
theoretical and philosophical interventions.  But he finds little of analytical value in Miliband’s work : 
 
What we find, mainly, are narrative descriptions, along the lines of ‘that is the way it is’, recalling 
powerfully to mind the kind of ‘abstractionist empiricism’ that Wright Mills spoke of.  One cannot 
emphasize too heavily the fact that in neglecting theory one ends up failing to notice the concrete.564  
 
His own work, he explains, suffers to a considerable degree from the historical conditions of its 
production, a situation in which few concrete examples were to hand, where the Marxist tradition 
was largely positivist and economistic, and from which a break needed to be made. 
 
4.  Difficult Language.  Poulantzas admits to the use of overly challenging language.  He justifies such a 
strategy, however, by arguing that he needed to break with existing schemes of thought.  But then he 
takes issue with Miliband’s claim concerning the profound obtuseness of the Poulantzian analytic 
strategy.  Here is the quote he uses from Miliband : 
 
“A class”, Poulantzas says, “can be considered as a distinct and autonomous class, as a social force, 
inside a social formation, only when its connection with the relations of production, its economic 
existence, is reflected on the other levels by a specific presence” . . .  One must ask what is a “specific 
presence”? The answer is that “this presence exists when the relation to the relations of production, the 
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place in the process of production, is reflected on the other levels by pertinent effects”. What then are 
“pertinent effects”? The answer is that “we shall designate by ‘pertinent effects’ the fact that the 
reflection of the place in the process of production on the other levels constitutes a new element which 
cannot be inserted in the typical frame-work which these levels would present without these elements”. 
This might be interpreted to mean that a class assumes major significance when it makes a major impact 
upon affairs - which can hardly be said to get us very far. But Poulantzas does not mean even that. For 
he also tells us, “the dominance of the economic struggle” (i.e. “economism” as a form of working-
class struggle - RM) does not mean “an absence of ‘pertinent effects’ at the level of the political struggle”- 
it only means “a certain form of political struggle, which Lenin criticizes by considering it as ineffectual 
”. So, at one moment a class can only be considered as distinctive and autonomous if it exercises 
“pertinent effects”, i.e. a decisive impact; next moment, the “pertinent effects” may be ineffectual. 
Poulantzas never ceases to insist on the need for “rigorous” and “scientific” analysis. But what kind of 
“rigorous” and “scientific” analysis is this? Indeed, what kind of analysis at all?’565  
 
The quotation is extensive, but the difficulties involved in the exposition will resonate strongly with 
all those academic heroes and heroines who have made the same long and tortuous journey through 
the Poulantzian terrain as Miliband has.  Poulantzas replies at length and with little advantage, and 
seems to this reader merely to add to the confusion. 
 
5.  On the Question of Structuralism.  Poulantzas now addresses the ‘second’566 issue that lies between 
the two authors.  He begins by claiming that nowhere does his adversary define what he means by 
structuralism, and that thus, as with Marx, Lenin and the rest, he will have to remedy the situation.567 
He takes from the literature the view that one form of structuralism excludes the actions of agents. 
He refuses to respond to this claim, arguing that anything he could say here would be fruitless.  But 
then he turns to a second kind of structuralism that he takes more seriously – that of the exclusion 
of the class struggle from his analysis.  This he utterly refutes.  Thus the position he is willing to go 
to the barricades for is not the question concerning individuals and the state, whether they be 
automatons or no, but to suggest instead that the only form of voluntarism worthy of the name is 
class struggle.  This is entirely consistent with his theoretical work to date, and he then continues on 
to examine three case studies to make his point. 
 
The headings remain confusing, and the argument is still complicated, but one senses Poulantzas is 
on firmer ground here. In ‘case study one’, he looks at the ‘relative autonomy of the state’.  In this 
case, he wants to assert that he has made two advances, the first to assert the relative autonomy of 
the political from the economic, and the second lying in his specification of the classes and class 
struggle within late capitalism, and especially in his formulation of the power bloc.  All this leads him 
to understand the capability of the state to establish the necessary unity of late capitalism.  How 
autonomous is ‘relatively autonomous’ asks Miliband?  An absurd question, responds Poulantzas, 
and a question that can only be answered by specific historical circumstances, and this task he feels 
he has fully completed in his later texts. 
 
In case study two, Poulantzas deals with ‘state power and class power’.  Miliband seems shocked, 
apparently, because Poulantzas has not assigned a separate power to the state, but instead has 
insisted that the state reflects class power.  In functionalist orthodoxy, it is always the state and other 
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institutional powers that hold power.  What disappears in these accounts is the role of classes and 
class struggle.  Thus the Poulantzian emphasis on class struggle designates his break with this kind 
of structuralism.  And here he engages in an auto-critique :568 he paid too little attention to this 
matter in Political Power and Social Classes, a position he tried to rectify in Classes in Contemporary 
Capitalism.  He comes now to a succinct definition of the state as a social relation : 
 
 … the State should be seen (as should capital, according to Marx) as a relation, or more precisely as 
the condensate of a relation of power between struggling classes.569  
 
Thus the state is neither a thing or an instrument to be used by the ruling class as it wishes, nor is it 
a subject with a will of its own.  In these opposing arguments, either the state is ‘invaded’ by the 
ruling class, or the state invades the social classes.  Instead it is more useful to see the state as ‘shot 
through’570 with class contradictions.  The bureaucracy is thus best seen as a social category which 
does not stand above classes and class struggle, but rather is embedded in them. 
 
In case study three, Poulantzas turns to fascism and parliamentary democracy.571  Miliband has 
claimed that Poulantzas cannot distinguish between fascism and parliamentary democracy, a claim 
which Poulantzas challenges directly.  Instead, he argues that PPSC does exactly that, and indeed 
that he takes pains to make this very distinction.  But what it also does is to insist on the relative 
autonomy of the state in both cases.  Does anything remain of the charge of ‘structuralism’?  
Poulantzas thinks not, but he does accept further criticisms, and uses Laclau’s commentary as a 
pathway forward.572  Laclau starts by criticising Althusserian conceptions of ‘instances’, which he 
claims Poulantzas and others put to use, and which leads inevitably to taxonomism and formalism.  
As well, he argues that the economy appears to have the same meaning in all modes of production, 
and that the concept of relative autonomy appears to apply only to capitalism.  Laclau may be right 
in some of his commentary, Poulantzas agrees, but it is important to remember that there were 
several people at work on the same problems within the Althusserian camp, and that there were 
wide variations on the views expressed.  The charge of economism, for example, seems to apply 
mostly to Balibar, who also under-estimated the significance of class struggles.   
 
Poulantzas ends with five points concerning ‘general theory’. (i)  He wants to claim that his 
particular notion of the mode of production solves some problems inherent in the Balibar account, 
among others, in that it allow him to understand the relationship between various instances (the 
political, the economic and the ideological) more clearly than competing views.  It also allows him 
to avoid creating a ‘general theory of the state’, instead limiting himself to outlining a theory of the 
capitalist state. (ii)  None the less, a residue of formalism remains, a formalism that leads to certain 
errors, including treating social formations in the abstract. (iii)  In Althusser and the writings of 
certain others, the notion of ‘relative autonomy’ was seen as an invariant across modes of 
production.  In Poulantzas’s case, his error lay in trying to apply this formulation to pre-capitalist 
societies. (iv)  PPSC’s formalism suggests that the various instances – the political, the ideological, 
the economic – were somehow hermetically sealed one from another.  For example, he was unable 
to show how precisely the state intervened in the economy, a problem he tried to solve in Classes in 
Contemporary Capitalism (CCC).  And one way to address the issue is to understand classes not 
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merely in their economic sense, but in the political and ideological dimensions as well. (v) A last 
word on structuralism.  In PPSC, he claims he makes a clear distinction between structures and 
practices, a distinction I do not discern.573  In any event, other critics have seen this distinction and 
found fault with it.  In the Poulantzian view, this distinction precisely addresses the issue of 
structuralism, in that, by assuming all practices into class practices, he introduces a form of 
voluntarism that provides an escape hatch from the curse of structuralism.  It is class struggle 
through which classes exist and through which the state is formed.  It is to the detriment of most 
modern sociology, he argues, that it seems to want to avoid any discussion of class struggle at all.574  
Instead, in CCC, Poulantzas claims, he rectifies this structuralism by examining class struggle first 
and foremost, by showing, for example, the nature of class practice in many forms.   
 
In a 1978 publication, Poulantzas made a further attempt to set the record straight on the state, 
social classes and class struggle.  This is a profoundly political and strategic article, focused 
particularly on the ‘what should be done’ question.575  He starts with the assertion that, east or west, 
the experience in the states of modern Europe suggest the only way forward for the working class 
is going to be statist to the exclusion of mass movements.576  The thinking of the Third 
International was always dominated by instrumentalism as the mechanism that controls bourgeois 
society, and by an open contempt for direct democracy.577  The state is now viewed as a monolith, 
in which no cracks or fissures appear.  Thus the struggles of the popular masses cannot penetrate 
this monolith, and the strategy must therefore be discarded.  The advice that is now meted out to 
the international leftist brethren is thus (1) to produce a frontal assault on the state and encircle to 
establish a dual system of power (2) To propose there is no clear pathway to socialism. (3) To argue 
for the need to seize state power as a means to occupy the higher reaches of the state (4) To 
suggest that after the fortress has been captured, then the second power (the soviets) can take 
charge.578  Stalinism was thus born from the idea of the second state – the soviets.  In the 
Poulantzian view, this is very little different from social democracy – using the state as a technical 
instrument with an ‘intrinsic rationality’.579  The major question that results from all this is how to 
maintain the foundations of freedom through the agency of the state, and how do direct democracy 
and self-management play a part in this process?  This is the dilemma facing the democratic 
socialist movement, and it faces all European countries east and west. 
 
For the moment, the state seems more and more permeated by class struggles.580  But to gain power 
one does not need to follow the ‘dual power’ strategy : 
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The State is neither a thing-instrument that may be taken away, nor a fortress that may be penetrated 
by means of a wooden horse, nor yet a safe that may be cracked by burglary: it is the heart of the exercise 
of political power.581 
 
Any change, any revolution that might erupt, therefore, must take place within that state and not 
outside it.  Is this simply reformism?  It does not have to be so if power comes to reside with the 
popular masses.  The state must therefore be seen as a battleground.582  In this battle, the state must 
change its nature entirely, and this may not be the same as the ‘smashing of the state’, but rather may 
need elements of representative democracy if it is to be successful. 
 
The popular masses must be included in such a transformation, and a range of self-management 
centres may well be established.  Both a transformation of the state and the process of self-
management are required for the change to occur, and to avoid the problem of statism.  The 
question then becomes – how could the two elements of the transformation be aligned?  This all 
very much depends on the active engagement of the popular masses, and would involve the support 
of a left government for the changes occurring outside the state.  But at present : 
 
History has not yet given us a successful experience of the democratic road to socialism … It can 
naturally be argued … that if democratic socialism has never yet existed, this is because it is impossible.  
Maybe … But one thing is certain: socialism will be democratic or it will not be at all.583 
 
The consequences of Poulantzas’s state theory in political strategy are clear here.  If the state is 
where class struggle resides, at least in part, it is also here that any socialist takeover must also occur.  
Coupled with extra-state activities, echoing earlier Luxembourgian arguments, the way forward rests 
on advanced social democracies forming, and gaining, popular support. 
 
There is a last stanza to add to this section of the discussion.  Just six months before his suicide, 
Poulantzas gave an interview to Marxism Today.584  Much of the discussion is political-strategic, but 
there is also an important theoretical exchange in which Poulantzas sets out his final thinking on the 
nature of the state, and this material should not be overlooked.  He comments that among certain 
Marxists : 
 
The state is seen as a kind of closed place which can be taken only by an external type of strategy, 
whether it be the Leninist frontal type of strategy or the Gramscian type of encircling of the state. In its 
place I began to think of the state as a condensation, a relation of forces …585 
 
The discussion focuses on a ‘problem with Leninism’, which refers specifically to his theory of the 
state and direct democracy.  Lenin insisted on the soviets as the only organ of worker representation 
– Luxembourg argued instead for a wider base for democratic movements.  The focus on the rank 
and file, and on direct democracy Poulantzas finds valuable, but the arguments in ‘What is to be Done’ 
are discarded, as is the strategy to smash the organs of representative democracy, since this latter 
move leads to the formation of a state party, centralism and statism.586  Poulantzas also argues very 
powerfully for the theory of relative autonomy.  If the fundamental question is whether one is 
                                                 
581 Ibid., page 81. 
582 Ibid., page 82. 
583 Ibid., page 87. 
584 Marxism Today, July 1979, with Stuart Hall and Alan Hunt, ‘Interview with Nicos Poulantzas’. 
585 Ibid., page 198. 
586 Ibid., pages 197-198. 
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Marxist or not, then the theoretical litmus test rests on acceptance of the theory of relative 
autonomy.587  He appears exhausted and angry.  He ask himself whether or not he is right to be a 
Marxist, not a question he could have asked during much of his life, one would have imagined.  But 
if one sticks to this strategy, he feels little more can be said on the subject.  Discussion then turns to 
Poulantzas’s new book State, Power, Socialism588, which we will discuss fully below, but here we are 
given a taste of the argument to come.  The interviewers comment that Poulantzas seems to be 
arguing that social democracies are taking an authoritarian turn, which he terms ‘authoritarian 
statism’.  Poulantzas is seeking to understand a newly-emerging form of the state.  By this he does 
not mean that fascism is on the horizon, but merely that the present capitalist state is becoming less 
democratic.  He further underlines the argument that this emerging state may take on a market-
liberal quality in some societies, and a more repressive character elsewhere.  Lenin took the view that 
the capitalist state had two stages – the state of industrial capitalism, and the state of monopoly 
capitalism.  The question is whether there is a third kind of state now in operation.  The discussion 
concludes with the discussion of social movements – the feminist movement, the ecology 
movement – and how these social movements and the traditional party of the working class might 
work together.  These questions of political strategy for the future remain unanswered. 
 
 
 
  Brilliant Formulations : Relative Autonomy, Unity and the Power Bloc.   
 
What, then, does Poulantzas add to Marxist theories of the state?  We might underline the following 
significant points : 
 
1.  How well does he meet the challenge of developing a theory of the state by Completing the 
Theoretical Work of the past?  In his early sections of Political Power and Social Classes, he is at pains to 
set out this theoretical project589 as the correcting, refashioning and reformulation of existing 
theories of the state.  Though the tone is frequently schoolmasterly and chiding, and while he does 
routinely take on the role of the scold, in correcting, for example, Marx, for being contaminated with 
his own earlier writing during his later mature phase, he does carry this task out quite thoroughly.  
Many plans go by the wayside, many numbering systems are incomplete, but the task of theoretical 
construction and reconstruction does go on relentlessly.  It takes some intellectual confidence for a 
young academic worker to decide to show Marx, Engels, Lenin and Gramsci the error of their ways, 
but this is the task he takes on, and he is largely successful. 
 
                                                 
587 Poulantzas makes these comments with some feeling.  He says ‘I think that the most that one can do for the 
specificity of politics is what I have done. I am sorry to have to speak like that. 
 I am not absolutely sure myself that I am right to be Marxist; one is never sure. But if one is Marxist, 
the determinant role of relations of production, in the very complex sense, must mean something; and 
if it does, one can only speak of “relative autonomy” - this is the only solution.’ Op cit., page 198. 
588 State, Power, Socialism, Verso, London, 1980, but published in France earlier as L’Etat, le Pouvoir, le Socialisme, Presses 
Universitaires de France, Paris, 1978. 
589 Another problem is embedded here, but we have, perhaps, had enough of problems, so we can perhaps mention it in 
only in passing.  In his 1976 article, he also admits to a certain theoreticism, that is, to the charge that what he is doing is 
starting with existing theory, reworking this theory using Marxist scientific methodology, and creating new concepts, new 
knowledge, without the benefit of connection to the ‘real’ or the historical world at all.  It is a claim that is well founded, 
but not completely accurate.  It is a powerful quality in PPSC, though this is a less plausible charge in relation to the 
works on fascism.  We catch him here, in PPSC, in a theoreticist moment, rapidly rectified in later work. 
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2.  The Theory of the State – what are its key elements?  One must underline some fundamental 
dimensions : 
 
 (i)  The notion of relative autonomy is the centrepiece of the work, and he develops its power 
in a variety of directions. First, he wants to remind us that this term is hardly new, and that it is 
embedded, even if often implicitly, in the work of Marx and Lenin.  Readers have often assumed the 
concept develops de novo from Poulantzas, but nothing could be further from the truth.  Poulantzas 
takes this concept to be fundamental to the Marxist tradition as a whole.  His work, then, is to clarify 
and to reveal what is hidden in the classic texts.  Second, the term is usefully employed, he claims, to 
understand all forms of the capitalist state, whether it be fascist-authoritarian or bourgeois-
democratic.  Thus the notion that relative autonomy only refers to the social democratic form is 
mistaken.  The breadth of this analysis is clearly underlined in Fascism and Dictatorship, where he deftly 
uses the same theoretical apparatus as he does in the analysis of social democracies.  Third, in his 
hands, this is an immensely sophisticated and powerful concept that drives our understanding of the 
capitalist state forward quite markedly in a number of ways.  By separating out the connection 
between the political and the economic, by distinguishing his argument so forcefully from 
instrumentalism, he is able to explain a vast territory of history, though the power of his argument is 
not often made clear.  But fundamentally, the rise of the welfare state cannot be explained without 
the use of the theory of relative autonomy, nor can the rise of the new form of the Portuguese state 
after the dictatorship period, or any number of other historical situations.  By showing that these 
two elements, the economic and the political, do not move lockstep together, we are able to 
understand the apparent ambiguities of state functioning, as well as the flexibility and durability that 
the capitalist state establishes for the capitalist social formation in general.  He is able to show 
nothing less than how the state ensured capitalist survival during the crisis of the Great Depression 
of the 1930s, for example, when the crisis Marx had long predicted broke out on a global scale.  But 
more than this, he is also keen to extend the very limited role previously allowed for the ideological 
state apparatuses, going as far as to suggest that this apparatus, at least in its functioning, stretches 
well beyond the borders of the formal state structures.  The claim that the three elements of 
capitalism – the economic, the political and the ideological – form complex relations between each 
other depending on specific historical conditions, allows for great analytical complexity in 
understanding concrete situations, and it thus immensely powerful.  Indeed, its power is not limited 
to capitalism itself, but is also usefully applied by him to feudalism, and, most importantly, to the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism.  Fourth, he never lets a focus on class struggle fade from 
view.  Thus he sees the state, first as a condensation of classes, and then as a social relation, in which 
classes struggle and compete.  He does use a structuralist argument quite explicitly in Political Power 
and Social Classes, but his discussion of practice is actually routinely focused on class struggle.  He is 
entirely uninterested in the ‘bourgeois problematic’ of the individual,590 but to suggest his argument 
is bereft of agency is patently absurd.  It is simply that he refuses to reduce agency to individual 
action, insisting at all times that the crucial form of agency to understand is class agency through 
class struggle.  Late in Political Power and Social Classes, he attempts a definition.  ‘Relative Autonomy’ 
refers to : 
… the state’s relation to the field of the class struggle, in particular its relative autonomy vis-à-vis the 
classes and fractions of the power bloc, and by extension vis-á-vis its allies and supporters.591 
 
And relative autonomy may take on several forms : 
                                                 
590 He often calls this the humanist deviation, and excoriates a number of theorists with this label, including Lukàcs and 
Marcuse. 
591 PPSC, page 255. 
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 The state, may, for example, present itself as the political guarantor of the interests of various 
classes and fractions of the power bloc against the interests of the hegemonic class or fraction, and it 
may sometimes play off those classes and fractions against the latter.  But it does this in its function of 
political organizer of the hegemonic class or fraction and forces it to admit the sacrifices necessary for 
its hegemony.  To say, therefore, as in the Communist Manifesto, that the state is the managing committee 
for the common affairs of the bourgeoisie in its ensemble is both correct and insufficient: it is 
insufficient if it makes us lose sight of the state’s complex role vis-à-vis the power bloc, and its particular 
relation to the hegemonic class or fraction.592 
 
Fifth, Poulantzas reminds us of history, and the shifting alliances and social forces at work at each 
moment.  In any given society, the remnants of the old modes of production are present, along with 
their concomitant social classes and class fractions – the peasantry from feudalism is the obvious 
example.  As time passes, various class fractions disappear from view, and others emerge.  Thus the 
state’s role is to manage these elements, but always in an unsettled environment.  The state never 
presides over an equilibrium, because capitalism is systematically restless, founded as it is on 
contradictions, exploitation and domination. 
 
From this fundamental understanding follows a further series of theoretical achievements.   
 
 (ii)  The notion of the power bloc, which he draws from Grasmci, allows us to understand 
more fully how it is that the state must seek to organize the various elements of the ruling class 
when they are unable to do this themselves.  In addition, he is able to show how the state works 
towards the disunity of the popular masses.  By the ‘power bloc’ he means the structure of 
relationships between the dominant class fractions of society.  While the state must often manage 
these competing elements so that they may ‘rule’ politically as well as dominate the economic sphere, 
it must also simultaneously hide the class nature of the social world from the dominant classes.  
According to Marx, it is the rise of universal suffrage that makes it necessary for the state to act in 
this way.  Thus the power bloc maintains a complex contradiction in unity.  The maintenance of the 
power bloc is a fundamental element of state functioning. 
 
 (iii) Further, just as he underlines the importance of the ‘isolation effect’, the formation of 
‘individual, free citizens’ under the rise of bourgeois hegemony, he is also able to show how the state 
routinely ties itself to the national project of unity, providing an overlay of legitimacy in which each 
individual citizen is afforded a battery of rights and defences against injustice.  The state thus both 
‘isolates’ in that it constructs free, separate and individual citizens with no attachment one to another 
except in an abstract sense, and simultaneously establishes national unity.  Thus the state becomes 
the embodiment of the national will, even as it manages the class conflicts inherent in the social 
system.  In this argument, he is not willing to suggest that the state is somehow broken up into bits 
and pieces, each one of which is controlled by some element of the class structure, nor is he willing 
to see the state as an agent of equilibrium.  Instead, the task of the ‘uniting state’ is to pay close 
attention to the ongoing struggles of social classes at each level of the bureaucratic structure – 
economic, political and ideological.  
 
 (iv)  Implicit in his theory of the state, therefore, is a new formulation of social classes, a theory 
that he sets out unambiguously in Classes in Contemporary Capitalism.  Classes are now conceived 
through the three dimensions of economy, polity and ideology, replacing the notion widely accepted 
                                                 
592 PPSC, 301-302. 
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until this time that classes are fundamentally economic phenomena upon which some 
superstructural elements may be fitted.  For Poulanztas, this simply will not do.  By failing to pay 
attention in the fullest sense to the political and ideological dimensions of class, we have failed to 
understand the nature of the state itself, and thus we are unable to understand the relation of classes 
to the state, and the mechanisms by which the state acts.   
 
His theory thus provides a highly original account of the workings of the capitalist state.  By 
underlining the notion of relative autonomy as his central theme, he is able to escape the crude 
instrumentalism of the past, and gain the theoretical power necessary to explain the emergence of 
welfarism and the various contradictions inherent in the capitalist formation.  By separating out the 
realms of the economic, political and ideological more clearly, he provides a much more 
sophisticated account of state activity than had previously been available.  Through these accounts 
of the power bloc and unity, he shows the deeply complex games that the state must play in order to 
hold a contradictory society together.  And, finally, because class struggle is now extended deep into 
the heart of the state, he is able to show the uncertain nature of capitalist politics and state structure.  
And almost as an after-thought, he rebuilds Marxist class theory, extending it much more fully into 
the realms of the political and the ideological. 
 
3.  We must end this summary with Criticisms.   
 
 (i) In his 1976 article, he admits to a series of errors that he admits make life difficult for the 
reader and for himself, and for the impact of his writing on political theory.  First, in attempting to 
carve out a new theoretical terrain, to correct the errors of previous thinking, and in adding new 
ideas, he can be said to be guilty of a formalism which is off-putting, obscure and confusing.  
Certainly, anyone who has faithfully worked their way through these materials would agree.  
Poulantzas wants to argue that this difficulty arose because he was not distinguishing clearly between 
the ‘order of exposition’ and the ‘order of research’.  His preoccupation with Althusserian 
epistemology, with attempting to correct and to chide others for their lack of rigour, is an over-
riding theme. This problem of exposition leads to the dramatically obscure nature of the texts.   
 
Closely associated with this problem is the issue of abstractionism.  This refers to Poulantzas’s 
palpable failure to deal with the ‘world of facts.’  At one level this approach is entirely plausible, 
given the theory-laden nature of the factual world.  But at another level, the approach is 
disingenuous.  And it is particularly surprising, given the close relationship that he maintains with 
Marx throughout his work, that he does not, having set out his epistemological and methodological 
stall, delve more deeply into history.  As I argue above, Marx brilliantly depicts the lives of actual 
people, all the while being able to develop sophisticated theories of the everyday, as well as of the 
broader social forces at work.  None of this richness is evident in Poulantzas’s exposition.  He does 
have empirical referents, it is true.  He continually refers to Bonapartism and Bismarck, but as with 
his theoretical influences, these examples sometimes appear to be a million miles from the present 
condition of the capitalist state which he plans to theorise.   
 
There is a rare exception to this widespread error.  In the section on the bourgeois revolutions in 
Political Power and Social Classes in which Poulantzas examines the cases of Germany, Britain and 
France,593 he writes in a brilliantly evocative fashion, blending bold theoretical arguments with dense 
historical evidence.  The result is stunning and compelling, and he maintains this momentum for a 
                                                 
593 Chapter Four, pages 168-184, ‘The Models of the Bourgeois Revolution.’ 
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long chapter of sixteen pages.  But it is a rare example, and, for the most part, even his most ardent 
admirer is forced to admit that his use of the empirical is gestural at best, certainly cursory in many 
instances, and focused almost exclusively on the twin case studies of Bonapartism and Bismarck. 
 
Indeed, there is an altogether anachronistic feel about all the work in Political Power and Social Classes.  
It is not merely that the historical referents are from the 19th. Century, but that most of the 
theoretical debates concern Marx and Lenin, hardly contemporaries of the writer.  It is true that 
functional theory is referred to briefly, and equally quickly dismissed, and other more recent 
theorists are also mentioned, but the constant theoretical and political references, not just to Marx, 
but further back to Hegel, and then, ‘rushing forward’, to Lenin and to Gramsci, give the reader the 
feeling that this is a debate with the dead.  To be fair to Poulantzas, if one takes his whole body of 
work together, this claim does not hold water.  While Fascism and Dictatorship remains embedded in 
the past, as it necessarily must be, nothing could be more contemporary than The Crisis of the 
Dictatorships, in which he is writing surrounded by a constantly changing history, and State, Power and 
Socialism, where he debates vigorously with Foucault and the changing contemporary political 
conditions in Europe and elsewhere.  But the lasting memory from the first book remains one in 
which Marx is sitting side by side with Poulantzas as he puts his arguments together, and he stays in 
this armchair until the last sentence is complete. 
 
 (ii)  There are several lesser problems which may be dealt with quite quickly.  The first minor 
issue is clarity.  He tries very hard to clarify and complete existing texts, and indeed his entire 
argument about the state rests on the well-based assumption that there exists a theoretical lacuna in 
relation to state functioning.  In order to ‘close the gap’ he is at pains to set out a new argument at 
length, often using a numbering system, but rarely following through with it, and writing in an 
extraordinarily dense and ambiguous way that does not aid clarity, but merely adds to the confusion.  
If his aim was for large numbers of people to read and understand this writing, he has failed entirely.  
It is only the deeply committed who will work through this argument, looking for the precious 
theoretical metals hopefully residing in mountains of obscurity.  A second smaller issue is duplication.  
I cannot count the number of times he refers back, as if to some unchanging historical certainties, to 
the cases of Bonaparte and Bismarck, as if all argument can be resolved here, or to Marx, and his 
consistent arguments about the relations of production.  His major theoretical points, the notion of 
relative autonomy, the power bloc, unity and hegemony, are rehearsed, dissected, repeated and 
replicated until he has dismembered every word and every phrase into the smallest dimensions of 
language, as if repetition will finally allow us to understand him, but the text often has the opposite 
effect.  In part, this is because he is working through these problems on the page, but again this 
stylistic strategy often prevents the reader from gaining access to his meaning.   
 
One might argue that there are plenty of arguments about that are plain, simple and wrong, and that 
complex social conditions require complex theory.  This method of duplication arises because he 
sees complications everywhere, and thus aims to try to answer the problems embedded in these 
complications.  But the complications are endless, the questions without number, and therefore the 
answers are, by logical necessity, incomplete. 
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5.  Reinventing Class : Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. 
 
Having fashioned, perhaps for the first time, an exhaustively developed Marxist theory of the 
capitalist state, in Classes in Contemporary Capitalism,594 Poulantzas now takes on an equally impressive 
challenge, that of the reformulation of the traditional concepts of social class to be found in the 
Marxist classics.595  Poulantzas was, at this time (1974), greatly influenced by the rise of the World 
System theorists, and spends much of his first chapter of the new book examining the global 
capitalist situation.596  Here I concentrate mostly on what he has to say that is new about the nation 
state.   
 
In the foreword, Poulantzas sets out his agenda.  He comments, quite strikingly, that he will have 
little to say about the working class, but will instead be concentrating on the bourgeoisie and the 
petty bourgeoisie.  For a Marxist scholar, this is indeed surprising, but his argument is that far too 
little attention has been paid to these two classes, and especially the petty bourgeoisie.  Thus instead 
of the working class, the book concentrates on the enemies of the working class, and their potential 
allies.597  He is rather tentative in setting out this agenda, his prose contrasting sharply with the 
boldness of his assertions presented in the earlier Political Power and Social Classes.  He comments : 
 
Given both the contemporary nature and the complexity of the problems I am dealing with, as well as 
the reasons for the unsystematic and partial character of the work, the arguments presented here are, in 
the end, but propositions put forward for discussion and rectification.  There is nothing definitive about 
them, among other things because this is not a finished text, but one which presents arguments for 
criticism.598 
 
The tone of this cautionary note is somewhat surprising.  It may be the result of some personal 
circumstance, or the result of some dramatic criticism of earlier work, or a loss of political faith in 
the direction of his writing.  Whatever the reason, the dramatic success of Political Power and Social 
Classes,  which had propelled to the front rank of political theorists of his time, would surely have 
sustained his confidence.  In any event, he begins his new theoretical journey with caution.599 
 
But then the tone shifts dramatically.  What are social classes in Marxist theory, he asks 
immediately.600  They are ‘groupings of social agents defined by their place in the ensemble of social 
practice, and in ‘the social division of labour as a whole’.  They have economic, political and 
ideological dimensions.  This place in the ensemble of social practices is determined by the structure, 
and particularly the relations of production.  And classes only exist in class struggle.  Having hinted 
that what is to come is tentative and uncertain, he now instantly takes a very bold step by reshaping 
the theoretical ground of Marxist class analysis in a dramatic and uncompromising way.  While this 
is a novel way of accounting for social class, it is also no surprise to previous readers of Political Power 
and Social Classes, because much of the argument about the definition of classes has already been set 
out in those earlier pages.  After his first foray into class analysis, he turns to ‘Internationalism and 
                                                 
594 Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. (CCC) NLB, 1975, originally published in France in 1974 by Seuil. 
595 I focus in what follows largely on his further development of state theory, rather than on his expositions on class. 
596 CCC, pages 42-69. 
597 Ibid., page 10. 
598 Ibid., page 11. 
599 He also tells us on page 11, that much of the theoretical work presented here has already appeared in PPSC, and in 
FD, op. cit. 
600 Op. cit., pages 14-15.  
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the Nation State’.601  Here he raises the question of whether recent trends in the world system of 
nation states have meant that the very idea of the nation state itself is under attack (Baran and 
Sweezy, Magdoff, Nicolaus).602  Has the American super-state simply taken over political power 
from other states, rendering them helpless?  For others writing about the world system, nothing has 
changed.603  In the pages that follow Poulantzas tries to examine the indices of American capitalist 
penetration in other countries, and he examines the internationalization of the labour process.  What 
do these processes mean for the nation-state?  In ‘Internationalization and the Nation State’, he 
addresses this problem directly.604 
 
The issue first raised is the question of the various national bourgeoisies – can American capitalism 
be resisted, and how does American imperialism affect domestic class structures and the nation 
state?  The national bourgeoisie must now be defined in economic, political and ideological terms.  
In seeking to examine this question, one must face the empirical fact that there is a good deal of 
domestic interpenetration of capital in a variety of countries, including the United States, so that it is 
hard to compare local markets with overseas markets, local ownership with overseas ownership, 
local capital with overseas capital.  It is more useful to think of the domestic bourgeoisie as 
occupying a specific role in the nation state as the dominant fraction of the domestic power bloc, 
thus making it ‘part of the people’, and therefore able to make some alliance with the popular 
masses.605  In contrast, overseas capital, here termed the ‘comprador bourgeoisie’ a term used by 
Samir Amin, are those members of the indigenous middle class who work for overseas enterprises, 
and act as intermediaries for foreign interests.  In the Poulantzian view, none of the changes in the 
world system mean that the nation state is by-passed.  But there are changes to the political and 
institutional systems of nations as a result of overseas capital penetration.  The nation-state must 
now intervene as the manager of national hegemony into a field which is penetrated by international 
capital.  External nations, however, do not directly involve themselves in the management of 
domestic power blocs.  But they are represented in these alliances by members of the domestic 
bourgeoisie who speak for them.  And we must remember that the state is not a mere tool or 
instrument of the capitalist class.606  Instead, as he has often argued before, the state is the agent of 
national unity, an institution established to create cohesion of a society divided into classes.  And 
changes are also occurring among the working class, who are also grappling with the 
internationalization of the labour process.  As well, the petty bourgeoisie are also reproducing 
themselves in new forms.  Thus, dramatic changes are taking place in all aspects of the class 
structure.  But in spite of all these changes, the national state persists.   
 
What seems to be happening is not the emergence of a super-state that is taking a hegemonic role in 
managing other states, but rather the new processes lead to ‘ruptures of the national unity’607 within 
existing states.  Thus, there is a resurgence in regionalism - Brittany, the Basque Country, Scotland 
etc., – and a resistance to the national project.  Poulantzas wants to claim that international capital is 
                                                 
601 CCC, pages 38ff.  
602 Here he is referring to Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, Harmondsworth, 1966; Harry Magdoff, The Age 
of Imperialism, New York, 1969 ; Martin Nicolaus, ‘U.S.A.: The Universal Contradiction’, in New Left Review 68, 1971. 
603 Here he includes Ernest Mandel, Europe vs. America, NLB, 1970 ; Michael Kidron Western Capitalism since the War, 
Harmondsworth, 1968 ; Bill Warren, ‘How International is Capital?’ in New Left Review 68, 1971. 
604 CCC, pages 70ff. 
605 CCC, page 71.  This is language familiar to readers of Crisis of the Dictatorships, in which Poulantzas is thinking 
particularly of the Portuguese case. 
606 CCC, page 78. 
607 His phrase, page 80. 
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at the heart of this movement, though this seems unlikely.  Indeed, many of these movements are, in 
part, forms of resistance to the encroachment of global trends.  In any event, these trends certainly 
undermine the national project. 
 
Do international companies, ‘multi-national giants’, have the power to displace states?  According to 
Poulantzas, to see the problem this way is to mis-specify the question.  States have no power outside 
the class struggle, but they do have the power to intervene.  And with the development of the 
monopoly capital stage, the state has gained considerably more capacity to influence proceedings.608  
This results from the growth of economic functions resulting from the new capital formations.  
These new functions express new modes of class domination, and they are connected with political 
and economic initiatives as well.  This is not a neutral-technical process, but rather the shifting of the 
shape of class domination.  The national state, in this new environment, must reproduce positions in 
the class structure, as well as train subjects to take their places in this structure.609  Now, however, 
this process takes place within an international division of labour, and in the context of the 
international formation of capital.  This does not mean, as some have proposed, that the United 
States is the model for the future, as Marx did with Britain in the 19th. Century.  Each country 
deserves its own analysis.  Whether the so-called ‘strong states’ that are presently being formed in 
Europe will lead to fascism remains unclear. 
 
This argument leads to several early conclusions. First, this (1974) is certainly a period of American 
hegemony, established after World War Two and progressing since then.  But is also true that 
American hegemony is declining : 
 
The smarting defeat of the United States in Vietnam, and the upsurge of national liberation struggles in 
the dominated formations in general, have contributed significantly to the present decline in certain 
forms of American hegemony.610 
 
Second, we must be cautious not to overstate the nature of this decline.  It does mean the end of 
American domination.   What seems to be in crisis is the global world system, with the rise of global 
class struggle, and especially the struggle between American capital and capital from other sources.  
There is thus a struggle in the nature of global hegemony, and this may only be finally be resolved by 
the actions of the popular masses, and this is particularly important in Europe. 
 
One of the most essential arguments in the book centres on the changing nature of the bourgeoisie 
and its relationship to the state.611  And in the next section, the author again contradicts his earlier 
proposals.  At the outset of the book, he tells us that he will be ignoring the working class, but now 
he tells us that the ‘dominated classes’ must be considered as well.612  We are reminded that the 
Marxist classics are not limited to the period of ‘competitive capitalism’, but rather extend their 
reach to monopoly capitalism.  Indeed, Poulantzas wants to claim that to understand the ‘present 
(1974) situation’ of monopoly capitalism, one must return to the classics.  And, to begin with, it is a 
mistake to claim that only monopoly capitalism exists and other forms of capital have disappeared.  
As before, the state remains the unifier of the power bloc, and this power bloc comprises several 
distinct elements.  Monopoly capital, derived from finance capital, does not comprise a unity, but 
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rather is riven with internal contradictions.  As before in other periods of history, the state acts 
politically on behalf of the dominant faction, and sometimes against its immediate interests, to 
secure the political domination of the category.  Again, we must be reminded that the state is not a 
simple tool that can be manipulated by a particular class or class fraction.  The state therefore still 
acts in a relatively autonomous way.  Thus this is not a fusion of the state with the monopoly class, 
nor is the state playing the role of arbiter : 
 
The state does not have its own ‘power’, but it forms the contradictory locus of condensation for the 
balance of forces that divides even the dominant class itself, and particularly its hegemonic fraction – 
monopoly capital.613  
 
The argument is straightforward enough here – in the phase of monopoly capital that he appears to 
suggest, of course with little in the way of empirical referents, is now dominating Europe, nothing 
much has changed.  The state has not suddenly become the simple instrument of capital, or any 
fraction of capital.  It retains is role as a relatively autonomous entity, and it acts, as always, as the 
guarantor of social unity, and as the foundation of the power bloc.  The purpose of this section of 
writing is thus to reinforce the view, therefore, that the present stage of monopoly capitalism has not 
outrun the usefulness or the applicability of his theory of the state.  Moreover, he wants to claim 
that the classic Marxist texts had this phenomenon covered – they had already theorised the relation 
between monopoly capitalism and the state.  There is much repetition and rehearsal of this argument 
that extends over several pages, but this is the gist of the claim.614  The state, he reminds us (again), 
must be considered as a relation, not a thing, or a subject.615 
 
Nonetheless, even if these axioms still hold true, something has still changed, and this is especially so 
with regard to the forms of economic interventions by the state that are now taking place.  These 
changes relate to the expanded nature of imperial capitalism, the closing of ‘of the gap between 
economic ownership and possession’,616 which leads to centralization and restructuring, because of 
the ‘dissolution effect’ that monopoly capital has on other forms of capital, the elimination of the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie, and the expansion of monopoly capital into agriculture, and because of 
the further exploitation of labour and other changes. 
 
The changes are not limited to the economic sphere.  A new relationship is developing between the 
political, economic and ideological spheres, with the play between monopoly capitalism and the state 
now occurring within more narrow limits than before.  But this does not mean that ‘late capitalism’ 
has somehow devised a rational plan that overcomes class conflict.  This is an error that Keynes, 
Galbraith and other have fallen into.617  Indeed, such an idea is mythical.  The state remains as the 
agent of cohesion in the face of contradictory forces.  Others see the state ‘drained of power’, again 
a misguided view. 
 
To stay with the established argument allows us to explain a variety of contemporary phenomena, 
including the current crisis of hegemony in Europe.  Thus while the state is still not an instrument, it 
                                                 
613 CCC, pages 158-159. 
614 He repeats this claim over many pages, and especially pages 160-164, where he refutes other theoretical positions as 
‘fusionist’ or as ‘instrumentalist’. 
615 This comment is made in footnote 7, page 161, op. cit.   The notion of the state as a subject, which sometimes is 
implied in his writing, is here discarded if by this term is meant an entity with its own will and volition. 
616 His phrase, page 166. 
617 CCC, 169. 
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is certainly more limited in its role than before.  The state is not able to take long-term measures that 
would ensure stability, but is instead only able to make temporary shifts in policy to deal with 
immediate crises.  The economic crises have been transformed into political and ideological crises : 
 
The state has thus been transformed from a buffer or safety valve on economic crises into a sounding-
box for the reproduction crises of social relations.618  
 
Every economic crisis now becomes a crisis of the state.  Thus the unity in which the state has been 
routinely engaged is now under threat.   Poulantzas is now admitting, contrary to his earlier 
protestations, that the state is now much more instrumental and can no longer hold the middle 
ground to secure the national project under its umbrella.619  The state seems unable to secure long-
term hegemony over the bourgeois crisis.  Thus, changes in the structure of legitimacy are now 
taking place, in which there is a move afoot from the legitimacy of popular sovereignty to the 
legitimacy of parliament.  This involves a breakdown between the realms of the public and the 
private, a loss in parliamentary democracy, and a gain by private interests over the state. 
 
Poulantzas now turns to the question of the state managers.620  Poulantzas wants to take issue with 
modern theorists who are keen to separate those who own from those who manage – clearly state 
managers are in the latter category.  This writing, he argues, is fundamentally an attack on class 
theory.  In this view, the managerial mind is not driven by profit, but by efficiency, and this category 
is often referred to as a new dominant class.  This line of thinking is found in Galbraith’s work, in 
the writing of Ralph Dahrendorf, who sees classes as stemming from power relations, from 
Touraine, who argues that knowledge is the source of class differences, and from C. Wright Mills, 
who promotes the importance of elites.  Such arguments are confused for several reasons (i) Real 
ownership still resides with capital (ii) If managers hold shares in an enterprise, then they become 
capitalists (iii) It is a mistake to treat a collection of individual agents as a social class because this 
suggests that class finally resides in the motivations of individual agents.  Behavioural motivation is 
not at the core of class location, but rather the objective position of agents in the class structure.  
The managers, therefore, might best be placed as a fraction of the dominant class.621  Does this 
argument stand up to careful analysis? 
 
Marx had already proposed that there are functions of direction and ownership within capital, and 
that these functions may be quite distinct from ownership, and may refer to different categories of 
people.  Supervision and ownership may be separate.  But it seems clear that both these functions 
are part of the process of bourgeois ownership, and that those who carry out these activities are thus 
members of the owning class.  These locations appear to be clearly defined on the basis of the social 
division of labour : 
 
It is not confined to the relations of production, but extends to ideological and political relations that 
these relations of production entail, which are thus also a constitutive factor of structural class 
relations.622 
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This suggests that managers are located in the dominant class because of their structural location in 
that class, but that they cannot constitute a separate fraction of the class separate from the owners.  
This is because what they do is in no way separate from the functioning of owners.  In addition, 
managers do a variety of things in various sectors of the economy, and thus have no unity, and 
cannot comprise a single class fraction.  This is because they belong to finance capital, or industrial 
capital or commercial capital, and are thus divided.   
 
Now we move from a consideration of managers in capitalist undertakings, and examine the heads 
of the state apparatus themselves.623  Galbraith and some in the PCF624 have argued that the higher 
echelons of the state and leaders of the monopoly capital fractions enjoy the same social origin, 
belong to the same social clubs, and thus share a common world view.  The state has thus become 
welded to the capitalist class – they have become as one.  But the truth is that these two categories 
have often been separate, and have clear and distinct interests.  The same mistake was made about 
fascism as the dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie because members of this class filled the ranks of 
the state, but fascism was always a bourgeois state.  And in the contemporary situation, the same 
situation can arise, when the membership of the high offices of the state are not derived simply from 
the ruling class, but from the petty bourgeoisie and elsewhere.  This situation provides a perfect 
shield against those who would argue that one class runs everything.  But this does not mean that 
members of the ruling class do not participate or manage the state.   This has always been the case.  
But this remains a secondary matter.  It has been true of the French case in the 1950’s and 1960’s, 
and it is largely associated with the phenomenon of Gaullism.  But the civil service and the Grand 
Écoles625 also provide agents from other classes, even if many of these people are from the higher 
orders.  This suggests that a technocratic elite is being trained for higher office, and for the higher 
reaches of state management. 
 
The idea that a common social background between the dominant class and the state managers is 
the crucial point at issue is to miss the key question at stake.  We must ask what the state managers 
do –what is their function?  State functionaries carry out specific tasks on behalf of the state, which 
cannot be reduced to class origin or social background.  They form a social category, who, whether 
distinct by social background, or with a social background in common, must exhibit an internal unity 
of purpose, such that the state functions in an organized fashion.  Marx used the English example of 
the feudal bureaucracy running the state on behalf of the industrial bourgeoisie, and Lenin used the 
case of the ‘bourgeois specialists’ running the Soviet state.626  This social category can sometime act 
as a potent social force, and it may intervene in the class struggle on its own.  But it cannot simply 
be seen as the agent of the ruling fraction of the bourgeoisie. 
 
Thus this social category of agents assumes a specific function in conditions of relative autonomy.  
A social category exists within the class structure – it does not reside outside it.  And the members 
of the state bureaucracy do not throw their class origins aside as soon as they enter the state 
structure.  The class position of bureaucrats is various, the senior positions coming from the 
bourgeoisie, the lower levels from various class origins.  The senior people are bourgeois, not 
because of their class origins, however, but because of the work they do on behalf of capital.627  But 
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the state must still act as the agent of social cohesion and national unity.  Thus if the heads of the 
state apparatus are not a separate fraction of the ruling class, it is because of the functioning of the 
state in a broader sense than simply maintaining capital.  Thus compared to managers in other 
sectors of society, the state managers have a far wider role.  They are charged with reproducing the 
conditions under which political and ideological domination can continue to the advantage of 
capitalist undertakings.  As a result of these undertakings, the state reflects the social conflicts of the 
society it represents.  The ideology that results, that of protecting the national interest, can still be 
considered part of bourgeois ideology.  Thus, state managers are best understood as a social category 
that can function in a unitary way to serve the public good.  The class origins of these agents is 
significant but it is not determinant.  But class origin can become significant in the conditions of 
political crisis. 
 
Poulantzas now spends many pages discussing changes in the petty bourgeoisie.  He is keen to show 
that an emerging petty bourgeoisie belong analytically with the traditional petty bourgeoisie, the 
small-holding farmers and the self-employed shopkeepers,  The questions he asks are – is this social 
class divided into fractions?  How are these fractions to be compared to class fractions in the two 
major classes, and what political positions would members of this class hold?628 
 
The new petty bourgeoisie are non-productive wage-earners, and belong to neither of the major 
classes.  And collectively, the petty bourgeoisie are excluded economically from the two major 
classes, but have common political and ideological tendencies.  And it is the political and ideological 
elements that are crucial here in defining the petty bourgeoisie in the structuring of classes.629  What 
is happening in the present stage of monopoly capitalism is that the traditional petty bourgeoisie are 
fading away, and the new petty bourgeoisie are rising.  How this is happening is a matter for careful 
analysis. 
 
What is the nature of the new petty bourgeoisie?  They are clearly not ‘owners’, but rather sit closer 
to the working class as waged and salaried employees.  In making the assessment of class position,  
Poulantzas points to the political function that the new petty bourgeoisie take in the social relations 
of production.  He examines the case of scientists and technicians at length and comes to the 
conclusion that they do not belong with the working class because of the dominant political and 
ideological positions they hold.  Sometimes they may hold bourgeois class positions, and sometimes 
working class positions.  And when the political crisis comes, they may side with either party. 
 
Thus the new petty bourgeoisie do not belong to the working class but are themselves exploited by 
capital themselves.  But it is clear that political and ideological elements are central in the present 
analysis.  First, they are characterised by mental labour, rather than manual labour.630  In a detailed 
examination of this problem, leaning heavily on Gramsci, Poulantzas concludes that while the 
mental/manual division is valuable, it is not a hard and fast rule, and that this division affects 
different members of this category in different ways.631  This suggests, therefore, that there are class 
fractions among the petty bourgeoisie, and that, in the present social conditions, there is taking place 
a great fractioning and division among this class.  Thus the new petty bourgeoisie are characterised 
primarily by mental labour, and they comprise those elements of capitalist personnel to whom the 
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secret knowledge of the system is given.632  But they are also a group who are subordinate to, and are 
dominated by, capitalism.  And within this class, there are many sub-divisions.  The levels of 
knowledge within the ranks of this strata are varied, and this leads to differentiation and inequality. 
 
The various companies that comprise contemporary capitalism undoubtedly establish bureaucratic 
apparatuses similar to those of the state, in some ways.  These apparatuses embody the same 
politico-ideological relationships as in the state, but the predominant element here is the economic.  
They are not defined by their organizational functioning but by their role in the social relations of 
production.  Class relations are the only possible source of authority and domination.  Complex 
corporations are thus not only divided into classes – bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, workers – but 
also divided horizontally into production units.  In addition, the petty bourgeoisie is further divided 
according to the nature of knowledge and authority provided to that strata.   
 
There is a high level of mobility among the petty bourgeoisie compared to other classes.633  Many fall 
into the working class, but the number who move into the owning class is far greater than from the 
working class.  And major changes are occurring within this class.  Poulantzas notes (i) the 
feminization of this class ; (ii) the reduction of the gap in wages between the petty bourgeoisie and 
the working class, and thus the loss of wage privilege634 ; (iii) the development of the manual/mental 
division within mental labour ; and (iv) increases in unemployment among mental workers, leading 
to a reserve army of labour among mental workers.  This leads, in times of crisis, to the 
amalgamation of some elements of the petty bourgeoisie with elements of the working class 
movement.  At the lower end of the petty bourgeoisie, there are obvious alliances to be made, since 
these workers have little power and little authority – we think here of shop assistants and lower-level 
clerical workers. 
 
Overall, the traditional petty bourgeoisie have recently declined in France, and the new petty 
bourgeoisie have increased, a trend which has been seen in several European countries, and which 
affects independent craftsmen and women, as well as small shopkeepers.  The small peasantry have 
declined even further. 
 
Poulantzas ends his book with some political considerations.635  After spending much of his time 
examining the rise of the new petty bourgeoisie under late capitalism, he now focuses his attention 
on the political opportunities provided by this change.  He sees little to suggest that this new class 
will ally any time soon with the working class to bring about the socialist revolution.  The 
significance of this rising class is underlined, however, and Poulantzas argues that its increase in 
numbers will make it a significant force in reproducing the social relations of class.  A socialist 
revolution might be possible, however.  The collapse of the small peasantry, who, in France at least, 
were always a conservative force opposing revolution, means that they are now largely a spent force 
in French politics.  The French bourgeoisie have always known how to buy their loyalty.  But many 
of these small farmers and their children have been proletarianized by the rise of capitalist 
agriculture, and have thus become members of the working class, whether they understand this or 
not.  This loss in support for the bourgeoisie is one of the reasons for the present crisis in France.  
This may lead to new political alliances, though these are by no means certain.  If the working class 
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is to progress, it must do so in alliance with other social forces.  The questions is whether political 
organizations exist that can bring this change about, and whether the working class has the 
leadership among its organizations to bring in elements of the new petty bourgeoisie.  There is thus 
considerable uncertainty about whether the petty bourgeoisie and the working class will form an 
alliance but it is a possibility.  But the political possibilities are still uncertain. 
 
 
 
 Poulantzas, Classes and the State  
 
The great contribution Classes in Contemporary Capitalism makes to Marxism is to reinvent the 
fundamental theory of social class which had long needed a thorough renovation.  By underscoring 
and emphasizing, in his relatively autonomous style, the profound significance of the political and 
the ideological dimensions of class, he opens up a new field of class analysis to other writers, a field 
that soon became rapidly filled by the work of others.  Whether Poulantzas ‘did this on his own’, 
whether he established a new continent of empirical and theoretical inquiry, could be hotly debated.  
It is clear, for example, that Pierre Bourdieu had been hard at work on a parallel project, but in his 
case from the empirical end of the problem, a project that culminated in the highly acclaimed master 
work Distinction, published in France in 1979,636 and a project that can readily be claimed had little to 
do with Poulantzas.  An international project using similar class criteria, and fundamentally an 
empirical undertaking, had used Poulantzas’s work, and sought to chart out the class structure of 
various capitalist nations.637  It is perhaps most sensible to say that, with others, he charted a new 
way forward that suggested the power that class analysis might have in explaining social hierarchies, 
and that on its own, this was a very significant achievement.  He made clear what had laid dormant 
in the classical Marxist texts, and illuminated to the fullest extent the power of these historical 
analyses. 
 
Of particular significance in the present case is the question of what this class analysis does for his 
theory of the state, a history which this book insists on tracing.  Did the reshaping of class theory, and 
the changing political and economic conditions, shift his understandings of state theory to any 
extent.  We might say, as a general summary, that it extended and enriched this theory in certain 
important ways.  Let me summarise this shift in a systematic fashion : 
 
1.  In the present (1974) state of capitalism, Poulantzas argues that the expanding hegemony of 
American capitalism means that nation states now have to manage a more complex hegemony than 
before.  The penetration of American capital into domestic states, with the rise of the comprador 
class in these societies, means that the various fractions of the capitalist class are further divided, and 
thus the management of the hegemonic bloc is made more difficult. 
 
2.  This does not mean that the rise of a ‘super-state’ has taken place that now replaces nation-states, 
as some have argued, but simply that the domestic state is harder to manage than before.  None the 
less, the nation-state persists. 
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637 See Eric Olin Wright, Class, Crisis and the State, Verso, London, 1979.  
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3.  The dominance of monopoly capital under the contemporary conditions means that the state 
actually intervenes more than in the past in order to assist the monopoly capitalist project.  This 
does not mean that the state and the private sector merge into one – the fusionist argument from 
Marx that Poulantzas is at pains to refute - but the relationship is certainly a close one.  He remains 
adamant that relative autonomy still exists between the state and the ruling categories, but it is also 
clear that he admits that the degrees of freedom available to the state are reduced.  Nonetheless, his 
position is that the classical texts had an explanation for monopoly capitalism, and that his theory of 
relative autonomy is fully able to explain present conditions.  But what it means too is that, given the 
state is heavily involved in economic intervention, every economic crisis is a crisis of the state, and 
thus a unified hegemony is hard to maintain. 
 
4.  Having dealt with the threat of world systems theory and the changing nature of capitalism, he 
now addresses the issue of the class structure and the state.  He spends a good deal of time 
dismissing arguments that suggest that the bourgeoisie and the state managers belong to the same 
clubs, come from the same social backgrounds, and are thus part of a single cabal that runs things 
according to the wishes of a small clique of large owners.  The argument he proposes is two-fold. 
First, it is clear from the historical record that this is often not the case – Bonapartism and 
Bismarckism, not to mention the late 19th century British state are clear example - so the claim is 
empirically false.  But much more importantly, to focus on the motivation and behaviours of 
individual agents is to latch onto a false problematic, that is, to misinterpret what the state does, 
independent of the individual qualities of agents in it.  Its national purpose is social unity of a class-
divided society.  This is the function that it carries out, whoever is in charge. 
 
5.  Poulantzas then spends a good deal of time on the rise of the ‘new petty bourgeoisie’.  This 
makes sense given that the book focuses on class.  By this class he refers to the waged and salaried 
members of the private and public bureaucracies.  He sees this class largely defined by political and 
ideological criteria.  Those among the industrial concerns will clearly be more closely aligned with 
economic goals, those in the state with political and ideological purposes.  But overall they are 
brought together by their focus on mental work, as opposed to the menial work forced on the 
labouring classes.  With the loss of the traditional petty bourgeoisie, this new rising class is gaining 
political significance.  Within the state apparatus, there are further divisions among this class 
according to the level of the location of agents within the hierarchy.  At the top, members may come 
from elite schools, elite families, and from privileged backgrounds, but this is not always so, and is, 
of course, beside the point.  The subaltern ranks may come from a variety of backgrounds.  The 
theme that is constantly rehearsed is that this new class is complex, riven with divisions, and 
politically uncertain. 
 
6.  Finally, Poulantzas ends with some political remarks.  Is the new rising petty bourgeoisie an agent 
for socialist revolution?  Ever hopeful, Poulantzas thinks this may be possible, but only if the 
political institutions for this shift are present, a situation he thinks unlikely.  Thus while elaborating 
on his theory of the state, he is not able to suggest a political path forward. 
 
What he is able to do, perhaps, is to show how this theory of relative autonomy might account for 
monopoly capitalism, the role of the state in managing the national and global projects that results, 
and how the agents of the state align to this project.  In itself, this seems a significant achievement. 
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6.  Salvaging State Theory : State, Power, Socialism. 
 
We are now coming to the end of a long conversation with Nicos Poulantzas on the question of the 
state, a conversation that started in the 1960s, and ends with his death in 1979.  In 1978, he 
published his last major work, State, Power, Socialism,638 a book that represents his final attempt to set 
out his case on state theory, to respond to his critics, and to deal, as always, with the political 
conditions of his time, and discuss the way forward.   
 
The book starts with an introduction by Stuart Hall, earlier published in part in Marxism Today.639  
But in this introduction, Hall provides a fuller assessment of Poulantzas’s work than before.  It is an 
entirely appropriate review.  Poulantzas had been publishing with New Left Review for most of his 
intellectual life, starting in 1967 with his critique of British Marxism, and ending in 1978, with a 
discussion of his last book, 640 and Hall had been the founding editor, as well as a long-time 
contributor.  A large part of Hall’s introduction is focused on the state.641  In his examination, he 
points to the profound influence that Althusser had on Political Power and Social Classes.  He critiques 
the confusion between structure and practice, and the well-established formalism of the account, 
which he follows through Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, as well as in Crisis of the Dictatorships.  But, 
and in spite of these difficulties, he confirms that both Political Power and Social Classes and Classes in 
Contemporary Capitalism  were significant theoretical interventions.  He is particularly taken with the 
theory of the state in PPSC – and especially with the separation of the theory of relative autonomy 
argument from instrumentalism, and from a technico-economic reading of the state.   
 
Poulantzas’s writings on the state were early criticised as making the state overly political, a view he 
first resisted, and then acceded to.642  His contribution to class theory, and especially his attempt in 
delineating the boundary of the working-class, is also confirmed.  From the beginning, each of these 
accounts was steeped in politics, and especially in the consistent speculations Poulantzas made 
concerning the prospects for the working class and the socialist revolution.  Hall reminds us that his 
later work, and especially Crisis of the Dictatorships, is much more conjunctural than the earlier efforts, 
and much affected by changes in particular societies, especially by changes in Chile, France, 
Portugal, Spain and Greece.  His interview with Henri Weber is especially noted as a point at which 
his thinking changed.643  Hall is right to argue that the interview is filled with political urgency, but 
then that urgency was always there, even if frequently hidden behind a barrage of dense language.  It 
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is inescapably part of the argument in Crisis of the Dictatorships, and the same urgency can be found in 
all his writing, to a greater or lesser degree.  
 
Then Hall turns to the question of Michel Foucault’s writings.  In the new book, Hall sees a new 
mentality developing in Poulantzas’s work, an attitude of openness to new ideas, a willingness to 
escape from the classics and to look forward.  This results in the book having a very uncertain and 
incomplete feeling about it.  Poulantzas begins in his introduction by setting out three major themes 
to be discussed.  First he repeats something he first said in Political Power and Social Classes, that there 
can be no general theory of the State within Marxism.  He spends time attacking various forms of 
Marxist dogmatism, and especially Balibar’s theoretical attempts.  Poulantzas is also at pains to 
attack ‘The New Philosophers’, who threatened to take over Foucault.  The second section deals 
with the Gramscian notion that the state is merely force hidden behind the velvet glove of consent.  
And Poulantzas begins to make use of the Foucauldian vocabulary – discourse ; discipline ; 
techniques of knowledge – all these now come into play.  And in part three, he focuses particularly 
on Foucault, with his tendency to disperse the power of the state through a series of micro-powers.   
The main text then covers three issues – the processes of the capitalist state ; the state and political 
struggles ; and the state and the economy.  Each, says Hall, is a novel presentation.  The first argues 
that ‘the institutional materiality’ of the state is a complex of apparatuses.  I cannot concur that this 
is a new argument, since similar phrases litter Political Power and Social Classes, Fascism and Dictatorship, 
Classes in Contemporary Capitalism and The Crisis of the Dictatorships.  Again, in the second section, there 
is nothing new –merely a repetition, as we have seen above, of the notion of the state as a 
condensation of forces.  Finally, in section three, he examines the economic dimension of the state, 
arguing that the state, in the era of monopoly capitalism, enters directly into the relations of 
production,  But Poulantzas has already made this argument in Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, as 
any careful reading will show. 
 
Hall argues that the most interesting section is the chapter on ‘institutional materiality’.  Here 
Poulantzas makes use of Foucault’s vocabulary, while at the same time arguing against Foucault’s 
dismissal of the state’s power.  But Hall finds the work decidedly unfinished.  Foucault’s terms are 
everywhere, but the argument is not complete.  While Foucault’s arguments add to Poulantzas’s 
explanations, the problem lies with the distinct problematic that Foucault is providing, and thus this 
attempted synthesis seeks to amalgamate two separate theoretical universes.  In the end, Poulantzas 
seems to want to return to a series of all-encompassing truths, while scolding Foucault for the error 
of his ways.  Foucault is, in the end, an anarcho-libertarian, and does not wish to reduce economic 
relations to class relations or any other single source.  His work is profoundly individualist.  It is not, 
Hall wants to claim, merely a ‘second-order epistemological discourse’, as Poulanztas proposes.644  
Nor does Poulantzas take advantage of Foucault’s insights to develop his own argument further, as 
he might have done in discussing the role of the organic state intellectuals, or the state and political 
struggle. 
 
The chapter on the state and the economy is more orthodox, according to Hall.  The familiar 
debates with Balibar, the PCF, the ‘logic-of-capital’ school and so on, all are there, as in earlier 
writing, until ‘the book picks up steam’ when dealing with the capitalist state in crisis.  But Hall 
senses Poulantzas fails to discern how authoritarian statism has been secured by popular consent, 
                                                 
644 Hall, xv. 
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which, by Hall’s reckoning, has been managed ideologically, not least by Thatcherism.645  Thus, in 
the Hall view, authoritarian statism needs to be associated with a theory of ‘authoritarian populism’, 
an argument we shall follow in the pages to come.646  Poulantzas also show the distance he has 
travelled politically by giving up the dictatorship of the proletariat dogma in favour of the concept of 
a new dual power, and emphasizing the value of both parliamentary democracy and direct 
democracy.  As the debate with Henri Weber shows, I don’t think he has given up the idea of ‘dual 
power’, as Hall suggests, but has rather reconfigured it. 
 
Thus, in summary, Hall finds the book ‘unsettling’ and incomplete : 
 
The book opens up a series of Pandora’s boxes.  Often, there is a too-swift attempt to secure their lids 
again, before their untameable genies can escape.  This produces a real theoretical unevenness in the 
book.  Yet, this very unevenness also constitutes, by its reverse side, the stimulus of the book is its 
generative openness.647 
 
This section of commentary is perhaps most useful in providing an overview of Poulantzas’s work.  
His early work, sure-footed, encyclopaedic and theoretically rigorous, is contrasted with this latest 
version – fluid, uncertain, open-ended – and Hall wants to claim, this is fertile territory on which 
other theorists can work.  This book, in contrast to the certainty of his early work, is ‘coming apart at 
the seams’, a writer putting his theory at risk.  Let us leave the last word with Hall for the moment : 
 
This is Poulantzas adventuring … The example it leaves to us – above all, in its determination, at the 
end, to address questions of the utmost and immediate political relevance – is in a very special way, 
exemplary.  The ‘perfectly complete and rigorous text’ must wait for another moment.648 
 
There is an alternative explanation for the structure of the book.  This is Poulantzas despairing, 
admitting to a friend moments before his suicide, only a few months after this book’s publication, 
that his writing has been useless, his books a waste of time, then throwing his books out of the 
window, and throwing himself after them.649 
 
In any event, let us turn now to a detailed consideration of this final book, and see whether or not 
Hall’s assessment stands up to critical analysis.  In the very first page, in the Preface, we certainly 
face an emotional Poulantzas – one who is full of political urgency – this much is unchanged, but 
also someone filled with uncertainty.  Here is a sample of this sensibility : 
 
It should be said … that the attempt to escape from comfortable habit encounters certain problems 
that I have not always been able, or know how, to avoid.  These all come down to the tendency, in one 
respect or the other, to do both too much and not enough.  In the theoretical sense, I could not deal 
with all the problems that arise in these fields, but nor could I exhaust all the ones I do tackle.  The text 
therefore has no systematic order … For there can be no such thing as orthodox Marxism.  No-one 
                                                 
645 Of course, Poulantzas could hardly be blamed for not understanding Thatcherism, since Thatcher did not come to 
power until after Poulantzas had died. 
646 Hall, pages xvi-xvii. 
647 Hall, page xvii. 
648 Hall, page xviii. 
649 ‘The Nicos Poulantzas I Knew,’ interview with Michael Lowy, Verso Books website, retrieved December 2, 2016.  
Michael Löwy was speaking to Alexis Cukier, Razmig Keucheyan and Fabio Mascaro Querido. Translated by David 
Broder.  Mike Watson is listed as the author of the article.  Retrieved from http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/1908-
michael-lowy-the-nicos-poulantzas-i-knew. 
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can presume to behave as the keeper of holy dogmas and texts ; and nor have I sought to clothe myself 
in them.  It is not that I claim so speak in the name of some genuine Marxism, but rather the opposite.  
I assume responsibility for what I write and speak only in my name.650 
 
How is one to read this beginning if not as a loss of faith, an apostasy?   When we remember back to 
the beginnings of the Poulantzian journey, we are startled by his absolute surety in the first pages of 
Political Power and Social Classes, in which a Marxist science of the social world is carefully proposed, 
with an intense rigour, clarity and thoroughness insisted upon.  Coupled with this, there is a 
powerful emphasis on the structure of the argument throughout the book, so that completeness and 
orthodoxy are everywhere on display.  Then, as we read the books that follow, Poulantzas certainly 
bears the mantle of orthodox Marxism very proudly, celebrating the brilliancy of Marx, Engels, 
Lenin and Gramsci in particular, correcting, adjusting and completing their writings to be sure, but 
always in a reverential tone.  This is the task of polishing and shining what already illuminates the 
theoretical and political skies.  Thus, when he admits that no-one can be the keeper of the faith, he 
can be speaking of no-one but himself, a role he now rids himself of.  No longer will he speak for 
Marxism, but rather for himself, and himself alone.  The horror of not being able to say enough on 
any topic, not to be able to solve the many problems of the Left – the text is transparently self-
confessional.   This is a sharp auto-critique, and what follows are disparate thoughts, an inevitable 
incoherence.651 
 
“On the Theory of the State’652 underlines the significance of the State and state power, a topic, that, 
apparently, in 1978, was on everybody’s lips.  The key question during the 20th century among 
political theorists has been the relationship between the State,653 power and social classes.  All 
political theory during this time has either been Marxist, or an attack on Marxism.  But the key 
question still remains – what is the relationship between the State and the dominant classes?  A 
variety of answers has been proposed, but the most common one is the State as an instrument of the 
ruling elements.  Others sees the State on one side and class struggle on the other.654  Yet further 
arguments focus on the State’s increasing power and its influence over the economic sphere. 
 
Poulantzas then returns to arguments proposed by his earlier books.  The State, he reminds us, has 
always been involved in the relations of production.  Political, economic and ideological elements are 
bound up, one with another, from the first.  The State has never been separate from the economic, 
and in the present phase of monopoly capitalism, this remains true.  No general theory of the state is 
possible, but it is certainly appropriate to propose a regional theory of the capitalist State.  No 
general theory of the State is found in the Marxist classics.  Indeed, Poulantzas claims, it is to the 
great merit of Marxist theory that it throws aside grand claims to theories that explain everything : 
 
… it is precisely one of the merits of Marxism that … it thrusts aside the grand metaphysical flights of 
so-called political philosophy – the vague and nebulous theorizations of an extreme generality and 
abstractness that lay claim to lay bare the great secrets of History, the Political, the State, and Power.655 
                                                 
650 SPS, pages 7-8. 
651 While we can appreciate the generosity of Hall’s comments about a fallen comrade, the openness we can perhaps see 
in Poulantzas’s book is rather more chaotic and less consciously creative than Hall proposes. 
652 SPS, pages 11-27.   
653 As with his first two books, he returns to capitalizing the word ‘State’, so I follow his convention in the following 
discussion. 
654 He is referring to Henri Weber in this aside. 
655 SPS, page 21.  This seems, evidentially, to be an attack on Foucault and the ‘New Philosophers’, but it could equally 
be said to be an attack on his own early attempts, following Althusser, to establish a ‘science of society’ in Marx’s name. 
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He thinks of some emerging new claims to knowledge as ‘escapism’ in the face of crisis, flooding 
‘the concept market’ with the grand ideas of ‘The Master’.   But the problems at hand are too serious 
to be dealt with by such foolish writings.656  This does not mean that there are no problems with the 
Marxist theory of the State, but none the less, Marxist theorising presents the only sensible way 
forward.  But just as there can be no general theory of the State, nor can there be a single theory of 
the transition from capitalism to socialism.  Then follows a rambling section that makes uncertain 
philosophical points in order to skewer the pretensions of the New Philosophers.  In these pages,657 
Poulantzas makes general comments about the space between theory and the real, and he argues that 
Marx, Jesus, Rousseau and Voltaire are no more responsible for outrages committed in their name 
than anyone else.  Marxism is not able to provide ‘an infallible formula’ to resolve problems any 
more than any other system of thought.  This could not be a more defensive Poulantzas.  We are 
now far from the reaches of Marxist science here, instead reduced here to defending what has 
appeared to many to be Marxist dogma in the face of sharp attacks from the right. 
 
The early material in the book is surprising.  Having suggested that he will reiterate his theoretical 
achievements of the past, he reviews very little of this ground-breaking theoretical work, but instead 
turns his attention to his critics, thus suggesting by default that little has been achieved theoretically.  
On page twenty five, he seems to catch himself, however, and he spends the last two pages of the 
chapter outlining his case.  Thus we must be reminded that while the relations of production ‘delimit 
the given field of the State’,658 the State has a role in establishing these social relationships.  The State 
is bound up with the relations of production through class struggle.  The State’s relative autonomy659 
from the economy establishes the structure of the social formation.  Political and ideological 
relations form a large part of this structure.  They neither consist of simple extensions of the 
relations of production, nor are they external to them.  They are central to our understanding of 
classes and class struggle.  Thus classes never reproduce themselves without the involvement of 
political and ideological elements.  The economy is never ‘by itself’.  Thus the system of domination 
and exploitation established by capitalism involves economic, political and ideological elements 
every step of the way.  There are no classes outside class struggle, and thus the State is engaged with 
this struggle from the first. 
 
What is unsettling about this material – the introduction to his last book on the State - is 
Poulantzas’s failure to provide a thorough account of his own achievements, achievements that he 
appears to overlook and discount, as if events and alternate theories have over-run him.  For 
example, he makes no mention of the theory of relative autonomy, and doesn’t use the term here, 
even though it is a central element of his State theory.  It is everywhere implied, but the naming of 
the term would certainly help his case, as would an indication of its power to explain.  There is no 
discussion of the ‘isolation effect’, or of the role of the State in uniting the bourgeoisie and of the 
‘power bloc’, nor how the State acts to disorganise the popular masses.  Instead there is a half-
hearted attempt to dismiss critics and alternative arguments – the stuffing seems to have gone out of 
him for the moment. 
 
                                                 
656 He refers particularly to B.H. Lévy (La barbarie à visage humain, Paris, Éditions Grasset, 1977) and André Glucksmann 
(Les maîtres penseurs, Éditions Grasset, Paris, 1977) in this passage. 
657 SSS, pages 22-25. 
658 SSS, page 25, his phrase. 
659 Though this is not a phrase he uses here.  The argument, none the less, is familiar. 
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In the second chapter660 he returns to the question of ideology.  In his debate with Miliband, he had 
argued that neither he nor Miliband, though both have discerned the importance of ideology in 
explaining the State, have done a good enough job in explaining it.  Here he attempts to complete 
the task.  The State is not merely repression shielded by ideology.  Indeed, ideology comprises a 
series of ‘material practices’661  They are fundamental to the process of ownership and possession.  If 
violence is the legitimate domain of State action, then ideology legitimizes that violence.  And it is 
always class ideology, embodied in the State apparatuses.  He refers again to his earlier argument that 
the ideological State apparatuses refer to structures of the State itself, such as State education, as well 
as institutions outside the State that undertake the same kind of ideological work, such as the 
Church.   
 
Repression is certainly fundamental to the State’s workings.  The establishment and maintenance of 
power certainly depends on the capacity to coerce and threaten the body.662  The body can be 
conceived itself as a political institution.  The State both coerces bodies directly through repression, 
but also determines how those bodies should be formed : 
 
As a material reality, the State is synonymous with a kind of stunting regimentation and consumption 
of persons’ bodies – in other words, with its incarnation in the very flesh of the subject-objects of the 
state violence …663 
 
Gramsci may have been right to extend discussion into the realm of ideology, but this form of 
analysis suggest either the State acts repressively, or it does so through lies, illusions and falsehoods.  
In the Althusserian view664 the State acts to set down the rules that must be followed in order that 
the economy can work.  Political power thus ‘frames the economy’.   But this tells us very little about 
how the State actually operates.  Instead, we must see the State as creating the reality in which the 
economy works.  The State is thus not merely repressive, but rather continually undertakes tasks to 
the material benefit of the popular masses.  Thus the ideological activities of the State cannot be 
reduced simply to propaganda or repression.   
 
The State is also accused of providing an all-concealing mask of secrecy that covers all its activities.  
But no such claim can be sustained.  The State produces a variety of discourses, as it undertakes its 
work to reproduce the power bloc, and to sustain the social formation of a class-divided society : 
 
The truth of power often escapes the popular masses.  But the State does not intentionally conceal it 
from everyone: rather, for infinitely more complex reasons, the masses do not manage to hear the state 
discourse directed by the dominant classes.665  
 
                                                 
660 Chapter Two, ‘The Ideological Apparatus : Does the State equal repression plus Ideology?’, State, Power, Socialism, 
pages 28-34. 
661 SPS, 28. 
662 Here we see the impact of Foucault’s thought for the first time.  The introduction to Discipline and punish: the birth of the 
prison ( New York: Vintage Books, 1979), is invoked by this passage.  Discipline and Punish was first published in French in 
Paris by Gallimard in 1975. 
663 SPS, page 29.  This could be Foucault writing.  Poulantzas, who has scrupulously avoided any discussion of 
individuals, except through discussion of the emergence of individual citizens with the rise of the bourgeois democratic 
State and the ‘isolation effect’, is now talking about the impact of the State on the human body.   
664 Poulantzas is citing Althusser’s ‘Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses’, from Lenin and Philosophy, New Left 
Books, 1971. 
665 SPS, page 33. 
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Furthermore, to speak only of repression-ideology leads to some further foolish formulations.  In 
this alternate view now being proposed, there are only repressive and ideological State apparatuses.  
Thus the economic State apparatuses disappear.  And a variety of apparatuses can move from one 
sphere to another, depending on circumstances.  Thus the State can only be seen as repressive-
ideological at the purely descriptive level. 
 
In ‘State, Powers and Struggles,666 Poulantzas completes the introduction to the book.  Class 
struggle is very much an activity in which the State engages, and in which it is involved in class 
reproduction.  The early attempts at Marxist theorising failed to account for State activity, as we 
know, but more recent attempts have been accused of reducing all power to State power.667  Class 
powers, associated with the establishment, management and reproduction of the economy, are 
central to any capitalist formation.  These powers then become exhibited in the struggle between 
exploiters and exploited in the class struggle.   Thus Foucault and Deleuze are at fault in suggesting 
that relations of power sit outside in other relationships, beyond economic relations.   In fact, 
power starts with classes in capitalism, and with the economy.  And again, contrary to Foucault and 
Deleuze, power is not reduced to the State.  Indeed, power relations go far beyond the State.  All 
the apparatuses of hegemony are involved with power, and they are doing the work of the State.   
 
Here Poulantzas seems to have fallen into a trap he has set for himself.  He is following up his old 
argument that many institutions do the ideological work of the State, such as the Church, and thus 
should be included within the State.  In this view, nothing is beyond the State, and Foucault and 
Deleuze are correct – power cannot escape the State.  But he escapes the noose quite quickly when 
he reminds us that social classes and class struggle also exist well beyond the State.  And even while 
the present capitalist state is extending its powers ever further, class powers still stretch beyond the 
State.  Thus, while Poulantzas is certainly claiming power outstrips the reach of the State, he is not 
allowing that any meaningful source of power can outrun social classes and the class struggle. 
 
Ideological struggles, he claims, always go beyond the State, a somewhat contradictory comment, 
and these ideological struggles always involve power.  And we must remember another key point.  
If classes outrun the State, it is because they have primacy over the State apparatus.  But does this 
mean that in order to escape the vision of a totalizing state, we have to put the State to one side?  
This is not the Poulantzian view.  He wants here to reassert the State’s role of maintaining a class-
divided society.  This is in contrast to some syndicalist and libertarian views that push the State to 
one side, a vision that hardly connects with reality at all, but is merely wishful thinking.  In order to 
further the cause of the socialist revolution, the State must be taken seriously, and the dual strategy 
of parliamentary democracy along with direct, rank-and-file democracy, must be followed.  As soon 
as class struggle comes into being, the State emerges as a political power.668  Thus the State marks 
out the delineations of class struggle from the first : 
 
It organizes the market and property relations ; it institutes political domination and establishes the 
politically dominant class ; and it stamps and codifies all forms of the social division of labour – all 
social reality – within the framework of a class-divided society.669 
 
                                                 
666 Chapter Three, and the last part of the introduction, SPS, pages 35-46. 
667 This appears to be the Foucauldian critique hovering in the background. 
668 SPS, page 39. 
669 SPS, page 39. 
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In any class-divided society, this is the case.  Thus if all history is the history of class struggle, then 
the State was there from the first.  This means the end of class struggle will result in the end of the 
State. 
 
What are the ‘New Philosophers’ doing?  They are proposing that the State is the founding principle 
of every social relation, of every form of social reality.  Thus all power is reduced to the State, a 
theory outside Marxism.  This suggests there can be no struggle of any kind except through the 
relations between persons.  Marxism thus claims : 
 
1.  Class power is the cornerstone of power in class-divided societies. 
2.  Political power is primordial. 
3.  In capitalism, political power occupies a field distinct from others, and which intersects with 
other fields. 
4.  This power is concentrated in the State, which is the central ‘site of the exercise of power’.670 
 
Foucault and Deleuze reject this set of propositions and instead propose that power is everywhere in 
every social situation.  Thus classes, class struggle and the State are under-estimated.  This suggests 
an old pluralist argument about the widely distributed nature of power.  What seems particularly 
absurd is that this claim towards the importance of micro-powers is happening just at a time when 
the State is claiming more and more power to itself.  In contrast it must be argued that: 
 
The state plays a constitutive role not only in the relations of production and the powers which they 
realize, but also in the totality of power relations at every level of society.671 
 
Poulantzas appears to be pulling back here from a modified position in which the State is only partly 
the source of power back towards a totalising argument in which the State is everything again.  But 
clearly he wants to end on a critical note towards the theory of statism –that the state is everything.  
Struggles are everything, he seems finally to be claiming, and the State has the role of managing 
these struggles, an argument we have heard many times before. 
 
In his introduction to this volume, Stuart Hall argues that the section on ‘The Institutional 
Materiality of the State’672 is the most original part of the book.  Poulantzas starts this chapter by 
reviewing his earlier works.  He reminds us of the problem at hand – that we cannot see the state as 
a separate apparatus of political domination somehow ‘off to one side’, as it were, but rather in its 
relationship to the relations of production and the social division of labour.  This argument that the 
state is constituted by class struggle and social classes is entirely familiar. Then he rehearses the 
argument he made in Political Power and Social Classes : 
 
The question I tried to answer in Political Power and Social Classes was the following : why, in order to 
assert its political domination, does the bourgeoisie dispose of the quite specific state apparatus that is 
the capitalist state – the modern representative State, the national-popular class State?  From where 
does this State’s original material framework derive?673 
 
As so often with Poulantzas’s writing, we are thrown off our stride here with his exposition of his 
argument in Political Power and Social Classes.  What is he trying to infer with the phrase ‘the 
                                                 
670 SPS, page 44. I paraphrase the listen given here. 
671 SPS, page 45. 
672 SPS, pages 49-120.  This constitutes Part One of three parts. 
673 SPS, page 49. 
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bourgeoisie dispose of the quite specific state apparatus’?674  Presumably he is leading us in the 
direction of the theory of ‘relative autonomy’ but this is not at all clear until the next few sentences, 
where he confirms that the ‘the materiality (of the State) results from the relative separation of the 
State and the relations of production under capitalism’.675  Thus the state is organised into its various 
apparatuses (courts, army, administration, police etc. ) and ‘representative institutions’, such as 
parliament and the voting system, as a result of its relation to the social division of labour 
established under a particular capitalist régime.676  He then rehearses his old argument about the 
instrumentalist theories of the State within Marxist orthodoxy, as well as theories of the separation 
of the State from ‘civil society’, hardly an innocent term.  The process in which the capitalist state 
emerges thus creates an abstract formalism in which individual citizens are ‘free’ to exercise their 
rights in the labour-capital markets under the rule of law.  Civil society thus comprises a contractual 
relationship between the State and the individual.  In Political Power and Social Classes, Poulantzas tries 
to argue against such theories.  The problems with such an approach are now transparently obvious 
for the Poulantzas reader who has reached this stage of his writing.  Nowhere in this latter 
formulation is there are place for the class struggle. 
 
Recent work in France and elsewhere has pushed the field substantially forward, but still old 
problems persist.  Criticisms of his work have arisen, calling it ‘politicist’, suggesting he is guilty of 
failing to connect the State and the economy.  Other theorists have tried to derive the nature of the 
capitalist state from the structure of the economy. (so-called derivationist theories)  Either such 
theories fall back into the ‘exchange, circulation of capital, creation of individual citizens’ model, 
which seeks to derive the structures of the State in this way, or the State is derived from its specific 
economic activities.  But again the ‘essential point’677 is missed.  These activities are not the primary 
functions of the State.  And these forms of explanation do not allow us to understand the ‘peculiar’ 
and singular nature of the bourgeois-democratic state, whose purpose is to establish and maintain 
national unity in the face of a class-divided society.  The State is not just the instrument of class 
domination, but neither is it merely an appendage to the economic system.  Rather, the central role 
of the State is to manage class struggle. 
 
In the last paragraph of this section, Poulantzas offers a self-criticism of Political Power and Social 
Classes.  The book was published during the May 1968 events, and this event and others like it blew 
away many old misconceptions.  It is Poulantzas’s view that he paid too little attention to the social 
division of labour, an error he corrected in relation to social classes in Classes in Contemporary 
Capitalism, and which he plans to correct in relation to the State in this volume. 
 
In Chapter One, Part One,  Poulanztas focuses on mental and manual labour, knowledge and 
power.  We can see Foucauldian references emerging again, and we can also see the reference to his 
extended treatment of mental and manual labour that so characterised several chapters Classes in 
Contemporary Capitalism.  The capitalist state is, in part, a rule-governed juridical structure established 
to carry out the bureaucratic functions of the capitalist economic system.  Feudalism depends on 
kinship ties.  The distinguishing features of the modern State, in contrast, involve the separation of 
the political from the economic.  The producer is dispossessed from the products of labour, in 
contrast to the feudal economic structure.   
                                                 
674 SPS, page 49. 
675 Ibid. 
676 This listing occurs on page 49.   
677 His phrase, page 52. 
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Fundamental to the rise of the bourgeois State is the development of a radically new social division 
of labour.  One of the cleavages that becomes fundamental to this shift is the increasing distinction 
between mental and manual labour, which becomes separated as the capitalist system emerges.  This 
cleavage has particular importance in establishing a particular form of the State, because : 
 
… the State incarnates intellectual labour as separated from manual labour.678 
 
There thus establishes in this newly-forming State a close alliance between intellectual labour, 
political domination, power and knowledge.  The state apparatuses ‘involve the practical supremacy 
of a knowledge and discourse … from which the popular masses are excluded’.679  The State enjoys a 
permanent monopoly over these powers.  Thus intellectual labour, which he also calls ‘knowledge-
power’, is ‘materialised in state apparatuses’.  Gramsci expressed this understanding by terming 
agents of the state apparatus intellectuals.680 
 
Theorists of the State have routinely referred to the scientific nature of the emerging State and to the 
‘apodictic episteme’681 that establishes the law and politics as practical and legitimate activities.  Thus 
there is a claim made that the State has access to a form of fundamental ideology that allows the 
State and its agents to be the bearers of a profound knowledge and authority.  Science now has 
become incorporated into the structure of the State, and has become part of its discourse.  And thus 
intellectuals have become an ‘intellectual scientific corps’682 in the service of the new State structure.   
 
Pre-capitalist States came to an understanding of legitimacy through divine revelation, in the form of 
a Prince or a King.  The modern State bases its legitimacy on its sovereignty over the nation-state.  
The discourse it now employs is one of strategy and planning based on science.  State discourse has 
no particular unity, and what is especially important is that its discourse is understood.  Thus it must 
establish a national discourse through which it must be heard.  The State’s knowledge and power 
must then be lodged within the structures of the State : 
 
Down to the last detail, the framework of the capitalist State incarnates the capitalist division between 
intellectual and manual labour.683 
 
In this process, writing plays a significant role in distinguishing mental work from manual work, and 
establishing the codes to be followed under the new régime.  Through ‘state writing’, the knowledge 
of the new discourse is spread far and wide.  In establishing a certain monopoly over speech, 
knowledge and writing, the popular masses are excluded from the levers of power.684  This does not 
mean that the relation between the State and the relations of production can be reduced to the 
distinction between mental and manual labour.  Rather Poulantzas is suggesting that the State is not 
formed merely by commodity relations.  But the State does actively engage in the economy – 
                                                 
678 SPS, page 56.  Italics in the original.  Poulantzas uses ‘state’ and ‘State’ in different locations in this text.  He uses 
‘State’ when we are talking about ‘The State’, but he uses ‘the state apparatus’ when the word is used adjectively.  I follow 
his usage here in the present writing.  
679 Poulantzas’s phrase, SPS, page 56. 
680 Ibid.  The italics are in the original. 
681 Forms of knowledge that are beyond question.  This phrase appears on page 57. 
682 Ibid.  Italics in the original.  
683 SPS,  page 59. 
684 This new line of argument resonates closely with Bourdieu’s work on the origins of the State and the monopoly over 
legitimate discourse. 
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through training of the workforce, through the family, the school and various specialised training 
programs, and through the vast variety of cultural and ideological organs (media, cultural 
apparatuses, parliamentary and party systems) that support the economic system. 
 
In the case of France, it is clear that the State gained its original hegemony through the use of a 
corps of licenced intellectuals.  It ensured their loyalty by rewarding them in certain ways.  This 
created a cadre of bureaucratic workers that are strongly opposed to fascism, but very distant from 
the struggles of the popular masses.  This leads to an anti-intellectualism among workers, and a 
distrust of the State apparatuses. 
 
In ‘Individualisation’685, Poulantzas focuses on what he has earlier called the ‘isolation effect’ – the 
process by which the rise of the modern State leads to the emergence of the individual, State-
structured citizen who forms the basis of the bourgeois-democratic social formation.  This process 
he calls the ‘atomization’ of the citizenry.  At the same time, the State claims sovereignty over the 
monadic structure of citizenship that it has created.  This individuation does not arise from the 
market and commodity exchange, but from the social relations of production in which the ‘worker’ 
is formed as a free, ‘naked’ individual who confronts the needs of the workplace.  This process 
establishes a material ‘frame of reference’ for the process of individuation.  Such a phenomenon is 
clearly seen in the structure of Taylorism, in which each worker has a slot in the economic system, 
and in which all work is then systematised, timed and structured in a linear, rigorous and logical 
format.  From these beginnings, the State inscribes into its very structure the elements of the 
workplace.  But the State does not merely reflect the materiality of the economy.  Instead it actively 
participates in its formation.  And it aids the process of individuation through the instruments of 
ideology.  This form of ideology serves to mask and obscure the class-divided nature of society.  It 
also forges individuality through a series of techniques of knowledge which Foucault calls 
disciplines.686  In the end, though, the story of the rise of the State does not begin and end with the 
body as a political institution, as Foucault proposes, or with the body as a consumer.  Instead the 
origins of the State and of individuation result from the social division of labour. 
 
A critique of Foucault, through Deleuze, then follows.  Deleuze is at pains to point out the 
differences between the Marxist position and Foucault’s arguments.  While Poulantzas is willing to 
give credit to Foucault’s work for, we might infer, filling in concretely some of the gaps left by 
Poulantzas’s continually abstract and abstruse theorising, this is no easy intellectual cosying up.  
Poulantzas is at pains to point out how Foucault resists mentioning classes at any cost.687  And then 
he subjects Foucault to a three-way criticism.  First, he argues that, with Deleuze, he is part of the 
idealist camp.  Second, this has the effect of creating a neo-functionalist approach of Parsonian 
dimensions.  Finally, Foucault’s account is characterized as a ‘second-order epistemological 
discourse’.688   
 
Instead, he wants to make a very different case from that proposed by Foucault’s mysterious 
workings.  Poulantzas reminds us that in Political Power and Social Classes he had already referred to the 
‘isolation effect’ to refer to the way in which the State, through its juridical and ideological 
apparatuses, created the separate, unique individual citizens required in a bourgeois-democratic 
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State.  But now he turns from critique to acknowledge Foucault’s contribution in setting out the 
details by which power shapes the corporality of the subjects over which the State has dominion. 
 
Poulantzas then turns aside abruptly to take up the issue of totalitarianism again.  He returns to 
Political Power and Social Classes, and engages in further self-criticism.  What he failed to see before is 
that while the State creates individual citizens, the freedom thus formed dissolves in the face of the 
State’s power to dominate society in general and impose the general will.  There is no limit under 
bourgeois political ideology to the degree that the State will intervene in the private sphere.  And this 
capacity has within it the seeds of totalitarianism.  The family is simply an institution proscribed by 
the State, and thus is formed, shaped and managed by the State.  Thus the establishment of 
individualism opens up for the State new vistas of power.689  Representative democracy still 
comprises a method by which the popular struggles and resistance are inscribed in the State, even 
though the dominant classes manage the higher reaches of the State apparatus.  
 
Poulantzas now turns to the topic of the law and terror.690  He picks this up as the third of four 
examples of the institutional materiality of the State at work.  In this arena, as well as others, the 
State takes a particular form under capitalism that was not present before.  The establishment of law 
was supposed to protect the citizenry from arbitrary violence.  Unfortunately, most régimes of the 
past, full of violence and attacks on citizens, have been based on law, Stalin’s 1936 constitution 
being perhaps the most appalling.  As Weber reminds us, this is the state with the monopoly over 
the legitimate use of violence, and over the capacity to wage war.  Thus the law and violence are 
closely tied together.  The State organizes the conditions for physical repression.  Foucault makes a 
similar claim in La Volonté de Savoir.691 Here he argues that the opposition established between 
legality and terror is false, because the two have always gone together.  Second, he argues that 
modern societies exercise power in more subtle ways than in the past.  These new methods rest on 
technique and normalisation, on control, not on punishment : 
 
As Castel puts it, following Foucault, the exercise of power involves a passage from authority-coercion 
to manipulation-persuasion ; in other words, the famous ‘internalization’ of repression by the dominated 
masses.692 
 
Foucault may under-estimate the role of the law and the State.  He may also fail to understand the 
role of the repressive state apparatus.  There is another argument that must be dismissed – the view 
that modern power is not based on repression and physical violence, but rather on manipulation, the 
organization of consent and the ‘internalization of repression’.693  This view emerges in the early 
bourgeois State, a period that gave rise to the view that the State would limit violence, and from 
which an argument developed that was taken up by the Frankfurt School, carried through to 
Marcuse, as well as Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic violence – the idea of the softening of violence.  
The argument has two main parts – the under-estimation of the role of physical violence, and a 
notion that power consists entirely in the relationship between repression and ideology, and that this 
relationship comprises a zero-sum logic – more of one means less of the other.  There is little 
difference in these forms of analyses from those that argue that consent lies in the hearts and minds 
of the masses, or lies in the love of the Master.  All these forms of analysis ignore the role of 
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physical repression.  Such reasoning looks for the sources of obedience.  The law is seen as a 
codification of repression.  Foucault’s notion of the positivity of power is also dramatically 
misplaced., since it avoids the issue of repression and the role of ideology in the system of consent.  
He, too, plays down the role of physical violence.  While Foucault usefully introduces the concept of 
‘normalization’, he ignores much else.  He fails to account for the sources of resistance of which he 
is much enamoured.  Physical violence must be involved because struggles and resistance are 
ubiquitous.  And struggles (one imagines Poulantzas is inferring class struggles) are always at the 
centre of power. 
 
Weber was correct in suggesting the State has the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence.  
European states were constituted in the shadow of feudal conflicts.  The rise of the law took place 
as the State gained a monopoly over violence.  As this monopoly was established, the use of violence 
was reduced, but its capacity was always there.  Thus violence always plays a determining role in the 
rise of State institutions – schools, universal suffrage, cultural institutions –it is always there, hidden 
but available : 
 
To take just one example, the national army is consubstantial694 with parliament and the capitalist school.  But this 
consubstantiality does not rest only on a common institutional materiality stemming from the social division of 
labour … it also rests on the fact that the national army, as an explicit part of the state monopoly of legitimate 
physical violence, gives rise to the forms of existence and operation of institutions – parliament, school – in which 
violence does not have to be materialized as such.  The regular existence of and even the constitution of a law-
enacting parliament is unthinkable without the modern national army.695 
 
The argument that physical violence lies behind the institutions of the State seems entirely plausible.  
The notion that they are made of the same ‘material’, whatever that is, seems confused and 
unconvincing.  The argument is more convincing when he reminds us how close this violence is – 
the three contemporary dictatorships are the best example, but there are many immediate examples 
of police violence to call upon.  To ignore the power of the state when it is called upon in a variety 
of crisis conditions seems an entirely sensible criticism of alternative theories. 
 
The law is more than prohibition.  It has, since Roman and Greek times, also promoted positive 
behaviour.  Law does not only stop people speaking.  Sometimes it compels them to speak, as in the 
case of bearing witness, taking part in legal proceedings, denouncing people and so on.  But the 
law’s main purpose is to create consent.  Law makes material the dominant ideology, and it masks 
the violence of the State.  It provides a version of ruling class reality, and organises the consent of 
the dominant classes, providing guidance on the locations that people must occupy in the class 
structure.  But it also creates and sustains a system of ‘real rights’696 for the dominated classes.  What 
this suggests is that the hand of the State stretches far beyond the reach of the law.  The State does 
not always follow ‘the rules’ and State activity often outruns the law.  In many cases the State acts 
against the law.  Every State can declare a ‘state of emergency’ in which the nation is at risk, and the 
rule-book can be discarded.  In a class-divided society, it is always the State that takes primacy over 
the law.  The law is never just words, just language.  Repression is never far away. 
 
The law comprises an abstract set of rules.  Some have argued that under capitalism, individual 
subjects can be seen as entering the sphere of the circulation of capital and commodity-exchange, 
and are thus to be considered as ‘free traders’.  But the character of the modern state and modern 
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law needs to be grasped within the structure of a class-divided society.  The abstract nature of the 
law is closely connected to the task of the law to establish social cohesion in a world in which 
producers are dispossessed of the product of their labour.  The law inscribes the separateness of 
individuals, while simultaneously constructing the unity of the social world : 
 
… it also helps to establish and consecrate individual and class differences within its very structure, 
while at the same time setting itself up as a cohesive and organizing system of their unity-homogenization.697 
 
The sacred becomes the law as societies move from the feudal to the capitalist form of society.  The 
law replaces religion as the discourse of legitimation.  It forms the cement on which dominant 
ideology rests.  The law represents a framework for social cohesion.  Modern law is able to express 
the relation between power and knowledge.  It gives expression to the process whereby the 
intellectual elements of production are separated from the producers to the benefit of the ruling 
class and the State.  Thus, in one sense, every state agent is an intellectual because he (sic.) needs to 
know the law.  But the popular masses, ignorant of the law in most cases, remain subject to the 
agents of the State. 
 
Poulantzas now turns to his last case study – that of the nation.  There is, he says, no Marxist theory 
of the nation.  The term appears to mean ‘something else’ other than the State.  The idea of the 
nation may appear in the transition from feudal to capitalist society.  Thus even the Marxist classics 
argue that the nation will survive even the ‘withering away of the state’ in communist, classless 
society.698  What, then, is the reality of the nation?  It seems clear that the State cannot encapsulate 
the idea of the ‘nation’.  It has both a specific character, and it is, at the same time, bound up with 
the State.  The State seems generally to encompass a single nation, and modern nations exhibit the 
tendency to form their own States.  According to certain economic arguments, the capitalist state 
requires the internal unity of a market.  Thus the State acts to homogenize the environment within 
the nation to ensure the smooth working of the market.  In this view, the State’s specific function is 
to establish, under law, a society in which individual citizen-subjects can engage in the realm of 
commodity-fetishism, workers are free to work, and owners are free to make money.  But such an 
argument is very limited, and prevents us from analyzing what is present in the modern nation.  In 
the first place, the circulation of commodities is only part of what is going on.  For one thing, there 
is nothing that suggests that the creation of the market should occur at the level of the nation.  And 
it also presupposes a very clear idea of what constitutes the nation – common territory, common 
language, common traditions – these elements are proposed frequently as trans-historical elements 
of a social formation which is unalterable.  And these same elements are then considered to be the 
building blocks of the emerging modern State of capitalism.  But why should these elements be the 
components of the nation and the origins of the modern State? 
 
If territory, language and historical tradition constitute the nation, then in the present world-system 
setting, it would be easy to argue that the nation is dissolving.  But, Poulantzas argues, the emerging 
world-system has done nothing to reduce the role of the State, and thus not of the nation.  Territory 
and tradition have quite novel meanings under present conditions.  A conceptual matrix of space 
and time have been orchestrated by the latest phase of monopoly capitalism.  Traditional historians 
have already written about the changes in world view and ways of thinking associated with the shift 
to capitalism.  In Marxism, these questions of space and time have been side-lined as issues relating 
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to the cultural and ideological spheres, and thus of little importance.  However, these issues are 
fundamental to the social division of labour.  These matrices appear in the materiality of the State.  
The State forms these matrices in its own sphere of domination and power.  Within these matrices, 
it is able to form a conception of the nation (economic unity, territory, tradition).  The nation 
acquires ‘flesh and blood’699 through the actions of the State. 
 
First, then, what of territoriality?  Spatial matrices clearly vary with the mode of production.  We 
need to follow the sequence of events in which towns emerge from the country, in which 
communications, transport and military apparatuses develop, and in which territories and boundaries 
are established, all mechanism by which social space is organized.  None of this development 
follows a simple pattern.  Indeed, discontinuity is at the heart of it.  Space usage changes profoundly 
with the change in the mode of production, but never simply. 
 
Pre-capitalist states establish a space that is ‘continuous, homogenous, symmetrical, reversible and open.’700  But 
such states have no clear external boundary, as do modern States.  They are States that look inward.  
For some writers, (Deleuze-Guattari) feudal, personal bonds, the links between peasant and the soil 
result in the ‘territorialization’ of space and social relations, but the freeing of the direct producer in 
capitalism results in ‘deterritorialization’.  
 
Surprisingly, people moved a great deal in the middle ages.  Poulantzas comments : 
 
In point of fact, people have never moved about as much as they did in the Middle Ages ; peasant 
migration, both individual and collective, was a major demographic phenomenon in medieval society.  
On the road were to be found knights, peasants travelling during the rotation period of crops and fields, 
merchants, clerics, either undertaking a regular trip or running away from their monasteries, students, 
pilgrims of all kinds, crusaders – it was the great age of the wanderer.701 
 
This is an arresting claim, but a claim that Poulantzas seems to document with a long list of 
examples.  But to suggest that the peasantry of the Middle Ages moved more than people in 
contemporary capitalism does seem misguided.  His point is to argue that the sovereign power of 
the State lives within the individual body of the peasant.  Religion reigned everywhere, however 
much movement might or might not have occurred.   The writing here is fluid, literary in tone, and 
full of ambiguity, a far cry from the reaches of abstract formalism by which we were beset in Political 
Power and Social Classes.  Here the key issue on which he focuses is the issue of territory.  If the 
producer is now separated from the means of labour, as happened under large-scale machine 
production of the 19th century, then the spatial matrix is necessarily changed.  The spatial matrix of 
the new society is ‘serial, fractured, parcelled, cellular and irreversible.’702  These conditions reflect the 
Taylorist nature of the production line.  This new matrix has breaks, gaps, fracturings and divisions 
built into it, and it is open-ended, suggesting a global system.  In this new space, people change 
position frequently.  At the same time, frontiers become much more important.  The new frontiers 
proscribe the limits of capital and labour.   
 
National territory has nothing to do with the geography of the land – it is entirely political.  The 
modern State is the mechanism, through its various apparatuses, that creates the modern territory of 
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the nation.  The State is embodied in modern individuals created by the new State.  National 
territory is thus merely the space over which the State has control.  But territory is only one element 
of the modern nation.  The matters of homogenization and unification also need to be attended to 
by the State.  The State seeks consciously to establish the modern nation.  The State also turns to 
external issues – how to expand markets, capital and territory.  Thus the modern State cannot be 
anything but international, since labour and capital move across national borders.  As it aims to 
expand, the modern State crushes differences, nationalities and languages in the hope of 
homogenizing societies.  Here the roots of totalitarianism are to be found. 
 
Second, Poulantzas concerns himself with temporality.  A common history is normally a key element 
in the establishment of a nation.  And it is clear that antiquity and feudalism were at variance on this 
issue.  But in both societies, the means of production were still in the hands of the direct producer ; 
there is no capitalist division of labour.  But these societies are still at the mercy of chance, as in 
Antiquity, or the eternal verities of the Church, as in Medieval Christianity.  There appears to no 
future and no past. Time is of the present.  In medieval feudalism, there is a temporality, it must be 
admitted.  Since there is a Creation and a Last Judgement, history has found a place.  The body-
politic does not, however, make history.  The nature of power does not change, even though 
sovereigns come and go.  But capitalist temporality is quite different.  Machine production requires 
new conditions, and these include : 
 
… a segmented, serial, equally divided, cumulative and irreversible time that is oriented towards product and, thereby, 
towards expanded reproduction and capital accumulation.703 
 
Time now becomes measurable, and there is a strict control of time through a régime of clocks.  
Capitalist time becomes universal.  Modern history now has a progressive quality to it.   A scientific 
conception of society is now possible, as Marx has indicated.  But Poulantzas now agrees that the 
break between ideology and science that was propagated in earlier years (indeed Poulantzas was a 
party to this Althusserian claim) was far less significant (and less radical) than may have been 
thought. 
 
This part of the commentary appears as a volte face in Poulantzas’s reasoning.  Long a reverential 
debater with the classics, and having set himself the task of celebrating, correcting and finishing 
these classics, he is now entirely unclear about whether he is propagating a Marxist science or not.  
But to return to the question in hand – he now claims that the modern capitalist State now manages 
and controls time, schedules, planning, procedures and programs.  In this phase of development, the 
nation and the State come together.  The State undertakes the tasks of individualization and 
unification simultaneously.  And it now comes to drive history forward – to plan for the future.  The 
State embodies some traditions and eliminates others in order to secure unity.  But this new 
structuring also has within it the seeds of totalitarianism.  The new structure of the State is required 
for control to be made absolute, or as absolute as actual conditions will allow.  It makes possible, for 
example, the establishment of concentration camps.  It makes genocide possible, to root out the 
‘foreign bodies’ with society.   And the modern State requires a common language in which to carry 
out its work. 
 
Third, Poulantzas considers the relationship between classes and the nation.  Spatial and temporal 
matrices arise from the class struggles inherent in capitalism.  The modern nation, and thus the State, 
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are not merely the product of the bourgeoisie, but result rather from the relationship of forces that 
exists between modern social classes.  How this precisely occurs is clearly a product of specific social 
conditions in a given social formation.  But it is accurate to say that the fundamental core of the 
nation rests with the capitalist relations of production.704  As the various stages of capitalism 
develop, through primitive accumulation, mercantilist periods, competitive capitalism and monopoly 
capitalism, so too do the State and the nation take on various forms. 
 
The relationship of the State to the national bourgeoisie depends on the fraction of that class who 
appear to be dominant.  In this case, Poulantzas is talking about the national character of the 
bourgeoisie, rather than the fraction of the power bloc to which they belong.  Thus he is concerned 
with whether they represent a national bourgeoisie, an international bourgeoisie, or whether this is 
an ‘internationalized’ bourgeoisie, by which it seems he is referring to a bourgeois class with 
comprador elements built into it – a bourgeoisie penetrated by international elements.  The State 
always has a class nature, and it takes this nature in part from this relationship to the bourgeoisie, 
though never entirely, of course.  Since the bourgeoisie express self-interest, rather than the interests 
of the nation as a whole, one can anticipate a series of both betrayals and identifications.  The more 
fundamental issue is that of the relationship between the working class and the State.  The particular 
qualities of the working class vary with social conditions and their particular moment in history.  But 
in this variation lies a problem for the international working class movement, a movement that must 
overcome these various national differences to be effective.  This tendency seems unlikely to 
emerge, and thus the political prospects for revolution beyond a single country appear dim.  Instead, 
the best that can be hoped for is a national transition to socialism.  We now see an old theme 
repeated, that of the nation-state as the site of class struggle.705  Then Poulantzas rehearses a series of 
questions that he cannot hope to answer, and one senses a feeling of exhaustion in his writing.  No 
longer are there high hopes of scaling the walls of Marxist science and erecting a new edifice. 
 
We are now finished with Part One, the ‘Institutional Materiality of the State’, a very long section 
that comprises almost half the book, and we turn now to Part Two, ‘Political Struggles’.  Here again, 
we sense Poulantzas treading water, and making little progress against a sea of problems he has yet 
to solve.  There are many repeated arguments, arguments we have heard before many times.  But in 
this section there is a chapter called ‘Towards a Relational Theory of Power’ that does bear fruit, and 
which does offer up the promise of theoretical progress.  But first, we must consider what is new in 
these early pages of Part Two.706   
 
Poulantzas begins by rehearsing yet again the theory of the class-divided nature of the State.  When 
states change their shape, this is a result of fundamental changes in the class structure, and 
predominantly in the kind of capitalism we are talking about – competitive capitalism, mercantilist 
capitalism, monopoly capitalism, and so on.  This again we have heard before, and one cannot 
escape the feeling that old arguments are being continually rehashed, and old ground endlessly 
recovered, as if either to find new inspiration, or to insist on the rightness of his old arguments.  In 
these pages, he argues powerfully against naïve theorizations about the State, and the significant 
political failings that result.  What remains to be done, in his view, is to say more precisely how the 
class struggle has inscribed its shape into the very nature of the modern State. 
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The familiar story of the State’s role in managing the power bloc is now retold.707  The theory of 
relative autonomy is revisited, as if for the first time.708  The notion of the power bloc is extended 
over several paragraphs, and Poulantzas appears to be refashioning the argument to fend off critics 
from the French Communist Party, (the PCF) rather than saying anything new, as if the act of 
repeating himself continuously will allow them to understand the error of their ways.  Then, at the 
end of page 128, we see something novel emerge : 
 
Some of my earlier formulations may now be made more precise.  The (capitalist) State should not be 
regarded as an intrinsic entity : like ‘capital’, it is rather a relationship of force, or more precisely the material 
condensation of such a relationship among classes and class fractions, such as this is expressed within the State in a 
necessarily specific form.709 
 
This is certainly a new emphasis, and he takes pains to dissect the various elements of this novel 
definition.  By treating the State as a relationship, one can bypass the problems associated with seeing 
the State as an object or an instrument.  It also avoids ceding to the State a will of its own, treating 
the State as a subject, with interests quite separate from class interests.  But it is also a specific material 
condensation of a relationship between classes and class fractions.710  This contrasts to the position of 
the French Communist Party, which suggests that the State has welded with capitalism, especially in 
the present condition of monopoly capitalism, though he also comments that recent writings have 
moved in his direction in seeing the state as ‘the condensation of a relationship’.  But even in these 
kinds of formulations problems remain.  Classes are still considered external to the State, knocking 
on the door from without, as it were.  Thus classes are seen as influencing the State from outside.  
But a more useful analysis imagines the State itself to be constructed from class struggle, to be a site 
of class contradictions, to be the very embodiment of class struggle, especially in its ideological and 
political forms.  Thus we must discard the notion of the State as an instrument that can be wielded 
by whichever class that can manage it, just as much as we must discard the notion that the State has 
a will of its own, and can impose that will on society in general.  Neither of these approaches will 
allow us to explain the internal contradictions of the State, which can only be understood through an 
argument that focuses on the class-divided nature of the State.  The complexity of the State allows it 
to represent and to manage various class interests, interests of the several segments of the power 
bloc, and simultaneously to manage to allocate real resources to the popular masses.  And the 
contradictions that continually exist among the various classes and class fractions can only be 
managed by the State. 
 
We must therefore discard the idea of the State as a completely unified and well-orchestrated 
bureaucratic hierarchy.  In fact, the State comprises five essential elements711 : (i) a ‘structural 
mechanism’ that filters information (ii) a system of decisions and non-decisions (iii) a system that 
establishes priorities (iv) a hierarchical system whereby measures are managed towards final 
execution, and (v) a set of strategies established to deal with day-to-day issues.  The State can thus 
appear incoherent and chaotic.  This results from the complicated conditions that exist within the 
State itself as it grapples with many complex situations.  As with other political conditions, there are 
various factions, clans and fiefdoms that struggle for power, and thus there is no single voice of the 
                                                 
707 SPS, page 127. 
708 At the bottom of page 127, Poulantzas catches himself in this repetition.  He comments : ‘I have developed these 
analyses and shall not take them up again.’  Bu then he goes on to rehearse arguments heard many times before. 
709 SPS, pages 128-129. Italics in the original.  
710 This paraphrases Poulantzas on page 129. 
711 This summarizes the argument on page 134. 
 137 
State calling for action, but many voices.  Thus the uncertainty of the State and the unevenness of 
State policy merely result from the struggles inherent within the state structure. 
 
The State can also be seen as a field of strategy and power networks.  This is another way in which 
to understand the vast array of conflicts and confusions that reign within the State.  In spite of all 
this, the State still displays a unity of state power.  It still acts, despite the confusions, the cul-de-sacs, 
the changes in tactics on behalf of the power bloc and the bourgeoisie, and at the present moment, 
on behalf of monopoly capital.  Unity comes from the very structure of the State, not from the 
capacity of one class or another to control it. 
 
Thus the connection between monopoly capital and the State is complex.  Certain areas of the state 
become locations to which only privileged members of the ruling class have access.  And given these 
penetrations of the State by dominant interests, we might ask the question – how do the popular 
masses approach the control of the State in the transition to socialism?  Such a strategy would not 
stop at the control of the State.  The entire State apparatus would need to be transformed.  This is 
because a large variety of state apparatuses are already permeated712 by bourgeois interests.  A 
thorough purging of the apparatus and its agents would thus be required.  And even when this is 
done, it does not mean that a Left government would hold sway.  The State is not a simple pyramid, 
in which control of the top necessarily allows control of the rest of the structure.  It is best 
considered as a field, a strategic field, in which struggles for control routinely take place.713  Thus 
there are many sites of power, and each of these need to be won over if the Left is to succeed. 
 
Poulantzas now turns to the question of the ‘State and Popular Struggles’.714  Again, old arguments 
are rehearsed.  The State acts in a two-fold fashion, to organize and manage the ‘power bloc’ for the 
bourgeoisie, since they are unable to do this for themselves, while at the same time disorganizing the 
broad masses, creating the universe of individuated citizens that apparently have no common 
interests.  Thus the State organizes the relationship between the power bloc and the dominated 
classes.  Popular struggles permeate the State from top to bottom.  These struggles extend far 
beyond the State as well, but they infuse the State at every level.  The State provides concrete 
concessions to the popular masses, and the purpose of the State is not to confront the working class 
in a ‘to-the-death’ struggle, but rather to hold the social structure together – to maintain social unity 
in the face of widespread domination and subordination.  In this strategy it is commonplace to use 
elements of the petty bourgeoisie in significant roles in order to split them off from the working 
class.715  This was especially true in Italy and France during key periods, and especially during the 
fascist régimes in Italy and Germany.  But the State cannot be said to be in the hands of the popular 
masses without a dramatic change in State structures.  The State is complex, and centres of power 
can shift as certain areas become more vulnerable.  But, as well, the very structure of the State is 
established to maintain and reproduce the conditions of ‘domination-subordination’716 that 
characterise society at large.  This does not suggest a ‘siege’ mentality would work, as if the working 
class could slowly penetrate the State from outside.  Instead, the working class has always been in 
the very heart of the State, but they have yet to change the essential structure of the State. 
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Disunity is routinely prevalent among elements of the power bloc.  There is disunity over the nature 
of political tactics to be employed in relation to the popular masses, disunity over the nature of the 
bourgeois State and what it should do, and what kind of régime would work best.  The popular 
masses may be inscribed in the State, but they are not circumscribed by it.  And on the other side, 
there is never a single power with a single voice at work. 
 
After this brief chapter, which indeed has little to say about the popular masses and the State, 
Poulantzas now turns to one of the potentially most interesting elements in the book, the topic of 
relational theory.  In Part Two, Chapter Three,  ‘Towards a Relational Theory of Power’,717 he 
extends his new formulations, only briefly glanced at before, into a full-blown argument.  Here he 
engages directly with Michel Foucault, who he names in the first paragraph of the chapter.  He 
admits that the arguments he has proposed in this book so far merely rehash old theories set out 
before Foucault wrote Surveiller et punir and La volonté de savoir.  He comments : 
 
Some of us did not wait for Foucault before proposing analyses of power with which his own 
investigations now concur in certain respects – although we cannot but rejoice in this development.718 
 
This is a fascinating comment since it suggests that Foucault is bringing little to the theoretical table 
that hasn’t already been considered.  Poulantzas focuses on Foucault’s conception of power, and he 
uses the following quotation to set the argument up : 
 
Power is not something that is required, seized or shared out ; nor is it something one keeps or lets slip 
… It is undoubtedly necessary to adopt a nominalist position : power is neither an institution, nor a 
structure, nor a certain might with which some are endowed : it is the name given to a complex strategic 
location within a given society … Wherever there is power, there is resistance ; and yet, or rather for 
this very reason, resistance is never in a position of exteriority with regard to power.719 
 
Poulantzas at first does not appear unsympathetic to such a view.  He agrees that power is not a 
quantity or an object of possession.  He claims that in Political Power and Social Classes he already 
deduced that power designates a field of struggle and relations between social classes.  Thus power 
depends on the social relations between agents in particular places.  Power in the State refers to the 
‘power organization’720 of a given class, and how that position is used strategically against other 
interests.  But then Poulantzas turns in a critical direction.  Unlike Foucault and Deleuze’s 
proclamations about Marxism, Poulantzas wants to claim that he has never characterised the State as 
a thing endowed with an intrinsic essence.  State power can only ever be the power of a class, and is 
exhibited through the strategic relationship between classes through the state.  The State is the site in 
which power is exercised.  But there are also fundamental differences to be rehearsed with Foucault 
as well.  Power is always embedded for Poulantzas in the structure of exploitation and domination 
that arises from capitalism.  This fundamental condition explains the existence of classes and class 
struggles.  For Foucault, power is situational.  But there never seems to be a source of this power, 
and the resistances that emerge seem to take on the character of guerrilla warfare, brief skirmishes 
against a fleeting enemy.  If power is everywhere, why should there be resistance?  Foucault seems to 
have discovered the source of the resistance to power in the concept of ‘plebs’.721 ‘something in the 
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body of society – in classes, groups and even individuals – which somehow escapes the relations of 
power’.722  But, Poulantzas claims, the concept is empty and meaningless, and in the end nothing is 
left outside power relations. 
 
Poulantzas concludes with two arguments.  The State as a political and social terrain does not 
exhaust the locations in which power is exhibited.  It is a ‘material condensation of forces’.723  
Moreover, the State is not a fortress surrounded by a trench.  Rather it is a structure permeated on 
every side by political struggles.  Indeed the dictatorships in Portugal, Greece and Spain collapsed 
not because of some frontal attack on them, but because of internal contradictions and struggles 
within them.  Whether one plays the game of the State or not depends on the political strategy one 
choose to employ.  But these strategies can also take place elsewhere, in the organs of direct 
democracy, for example.   And one might ponder the question that to take the struggle outside the 
State is to leave the field open for statism, to the further monopolization of power by the State. 
 
The chapter is, in the end, a great disappointment.  Poulantzas does tackle Foucault head on, but his 
own reformulation is limited.  Some uses might have been made of Foucault’s deliberations in 
outlining, in much greater detail, how power operates in specific locations and particular conditions.  
The lack of an ‘original source’ for power in Foucault’s work is clearly underlined, and for 
Poulantzas this always lies within the logic of capitalism, with exploitation and domination, and with 
classes and class struggle.  He might here have added to his theory, allowing other sources of power 
– between men and women, for example - to add to this general formulation.  But he could never 
give arguments other than class arguments any theoretical weight.  Thus, in the end, after a brief 
skirmish with part of the Foucauldian exposition, he returns to his old theoretical haunts. 
 
He seeks to elaborate on these familiar theoretical positions in his next chapter, ‘The State 
Personnel’.  Here he hopes to show the specific struggles that occur within the State.  The State 
forms social categories, and these categories are not beyond the class structure.  And this structuring 
is separate from the question of the class origins of State personnel.  Again, these arguments are 
familiar.  Contradictions and confusions permeate the higher reaches of the State and the power 
bloc, and these struggles continue throughout the hierarchy.  ‘Complexity’, ‘division’, ‘breaches’ are 
the terms Poulantzas repeatedly uses in these pages to describe what form State action takes within 
its various apparatuses.  But many old arguments are repeated.  The notion of the dominant ideology 
as the cement that holds the state apparatuses together is again rehearsed :724 
 
In this ideology, a neutral State appears as the representative of the general will and interest, and the 
arbiter among struggling classes ; the state administration or judicial system stands above classes ; the 
army is the pillar of the nation, the police the guarantor of republican order and civil liberties, and the 
state administration is the motive force of efficiency and general well-being.725 
 
There is clearly nothing new about this exposition.  We have seen such an argument in the 
Poulantzian texts for ten years.  What is new, perhaps, is the clarity of exposition, but this is not new 
theory, but rather the restating of the old. 
 
                                                 
722 Foucault, Interview with Michel Foucault, Révolte logiques, number 4, Winter, 1977. 
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State personnel are able to work for the popular masses under the banner of justice and fairness for 
all, but they are up against the limits of the State as the manager of the bourgeois social order.  Thus 
they cannot fundamentally question the functions of the State and their role in that social order.  If 
the left were to control the State, there would still remain much to do.  The State personnel might 
‘shift to the left’, and some personnel might well have sympathies with the left, but the institutional 
materiality of the State means that only so much can be done without a wholesale restructuring of 
the State apparatuses.  Thus it is only by understanding that the elements of domination and 
subordination are inscribed into the very structure of the State that we can understand how such a 
transformation might be achieved.  And each particular conjuncture has its specific qualities and 
conditions which must be analysed carefully before political action is possible.  These strategies also 
depend on the state of development of capitalism in a given society, the nature of the power bloc, 
and the alliance of forces against these interests. 
 
In ‘Part Three’,726 Poulantzas moves in another direction to consider the economy and the State.  
Poulantzas claims immediately that what we are witnessing in the politics of his day is the emergence 
of statism.727  The emergence of this new level of state activity is a result of a change in the economy, 
and this shift is of the utmost political importance.  The neo-liberalist view is that the State has now 
reached technical perfection that allows it to ride out the many economic and political crises that 
comes its way.  Nothing could be farther from the truth.  There has been, Poulantzas tells us, 
widespread discussion about the role of the State in furthering the accumulation and reproduction of 
capital in the present (1978) phase of monopoly capitalism.  But this phenomenon did not begin 
with monopoly capitalism, but was already present in earlier stages of capitalist development.  But 
certainly a qualitative shift has recently occurred.  A series of fields, once thought to be separate 
from the State, have now been incorporated into its structure.  These fields include the training of 
labour power, town planning, transport, health, the environment, which are receiving the State’s 
attention in a new way.728  What seems to be of paramount importance is that the role of the 
economy in state activity has now become predominant.  This raises issues for the state apparatus in 
which its economic role, and its role in achieving consent, are now at odds.  Indeed, Poulantzas goes 
so far as to say that the economic well-being and interest of society in general is now being 
threatened.729  It now becomes impossible to square the economic wellbeing of society in general 
with the economic wellbeing of the dominant social class.  One of the consequences of these 
changes is the diminution of the role of parliamentary democracy and the institutions of democratic 
process in favour of the power of the executive, and the reduction in the power of political parties.  
There are false arguments around that suggest the State is splitting into two – a technical component 
of the state dealing with merely administrative issues, and then a separate ‘State’ which deals with 
political-economic questions.  This is also clearly a misguided view.  There is no neutral, technical-
administrative element of the State.  The class struggle penetrates the State through and through, 
and no technical elements can be separated out as ‘merely administrative’. 
 
It appears that the State is presently intervening into economic affairs to counteract the falling rate 
of profit.730  Some theorists of the left have argued that this problem no longer affects contemporary 
capitalism.  But it is Poulantzas’s view that this trend is merely a tendency, not an iron law, and that 
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it is this tendency that the State is presently resisting.  Contemporary thinking now suggests that 
what is happening is that the main forms of state interventions, which include state subsidies and 
investments, certainly support monopoly capital by resisting the falling rate of profit.  The State is 
thus assigned the role of reproducing labour power, which now involves a whole series of tasks - 
education, health, training, transport, social welfare, urban development and collective 
consumption.731  Much of this discussion he has been covered already in Classes in Contemporary 
Capitalism, so they are only briefly touched upon here : 
 
These measures make of the State the direct promoter of the concentration and centralization of capital 
… which … involves important changes in the relations of production.732 
 
These changes alter the way labour is produced and shift the locations in which profits are made.  
The process allows technological innovation, and the further exploitation of labour.  Not only this, 
but the State is also active in the process of consumption.  This is especially important in the 
support of the collective wage, which is indicated by the benefits collectively available in housing, 
health, transport, education and so on, compared to the private wage the workers gain from an 
employer.  All these measures improve the productivity of workers, and thus aid the relative surplus 
value being accrued in the productive process.  Thus the State is drawn more and more into the 
productive cycle.  The shift into collective consumption is thus not merely a technical matter, but a 
way of guaranteeing profits for monopoly capital.  The management of labour power constitutes a 
new stage in the economic activity of the State. 
 
What, then, is meant by statism?733 While this is not a linear trend, it seems to suggest an enlarged role 
for the State, especially in economic life, that aims to secure profits for monopoly capital, and ensure 
the reproduction of labour power. 
 
The movement of the State into the realms of collective consumption is a deeply political move.  It 
cuts across the hegemony that monopoly capital enjoys in other realms of the State.   This allows us 
to see more clearly the range of the statist moves.  It is largely taking place in the field of the 
reproduction of labour power.  When we consider the relation between economics and politics,734 
we must ask the question – why does the State intervene in some areas and not in others?  This is 
particularly interesting since there are few economic activities that the State can carry out on its own.  
Often the argument has been made that the State takes on unprofitable activities.  But the areas of 
activity vary with historical circumstances, and to some extent this explains the variation in State 
involvement.  Indeed, the State does act in areas which are profitable for capital, and so the 
‘unprofitability’ argument does not hold for all cases.   Generally speaking, the State intervenes when 
needed to reproduce the social capital of society as a whole.735  When society as a whole is 
threatened, the government intervenes, even in highly profitable arenas, such as the oil crisis in the 
1970’s in the United States.  In every case, the interventions largely advance the interests of 
monopoly capital, though they do, at the same time, maintain the stability of society as a whole.  But 
the major moves that the State is making concern the popular masses.  The State does intervene 
when large companies are threatened, under the guise of the management of the workforce for those 
employed here, as in the case of Renault in the 1970s in France.  In addition, the State intervenes in 
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the reproduction of labour-power through the process of retraining in such circumstances.  But its 
interventions cannot be reduced merely to ‘welfare state’ engagements.  Factory legislation is a case 
in point – in the early days of  industrial capitalism, the State was involved in limiting conditions in 
the workplace which the capitalists failed to limit, and thus were damaging, and threatening to 
exterminate, their own workforce.  The State thus intervened to protect the workforce, and, in the 
end, the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie.  Thus the struggles involving the State range from the 
workplace to the welfare state and beyond.  And these mobilizations depended to a large degree on 
the mobilization activities of the working class.  But in each case, both the popular masses and the 
bourgeoisie were advantaged by such moves.  Thus the entire system of class hegemony and 
domination is reproduced.   
 
At the same time, all these welfare measures are backed up by the violence of the state, and the 
willingness to use the police to ensure these policies are followed.  Castel has argued that the State is 
going through a transformation from an authoritarian structure to a more consensual-manipulative 
model.  Thus the State is seen as moving from the old semi-military régime of the workhouse to the 
more loosely structured networks of social workers and health care systems.  But this shift may 
result in a form of symbolic repression in which each citizen watches every other citizen, and we are 
no freer than before, even if the system of repression has changed its form.736 
 
The education and training that the State now employs has a powerful ideological element built into 
it, an element that sharpens the division of labour between those engaged in mental work, and those 
who are manual workers.  Poulantzas then describes, in the most abstract terms, the way in which 
the welfare state works differentially on behalf of various class fractions.737  A rise in the productivity 
of labour, he concludes, requires the submission of the working class to capital.  It requires more 
workers, and a strengthening of the ladder of qualification into skilled and unskilled, the expansion 
of the mental/manual labour split, and changes in technological innovation.  These changes are 
closely connected to the changes in the welfare state we have rehearsed above.  All these measures 
are embedded in the ‘institutional materiality’ of the State : 
 
The institutional structures of health (Social security, medical practice, hospitals, asylums) social 
welfare, town planning, community services and leisure are all stamped with the bourgeois ‘seal’.738 
 
In ‘The Limits of the Moloch-State’,739  Poulantzas examines the limits of state intervention into the 
economy.  In this analysis, he guards us against the image of the ‘omnipotent state’ which can plan 
its way towards socialism, a view that left technocrats were taking at that time.  The present State is 
not omnipotent, but is limited in a variety of ways.  The State only exists to protect the core 
activities of capitalist production and reproduction.  Thus it cannot directly intervene in the 
productive process.  It can only provide the conditions under which such production can take place.  
Thus, in a sense, the State acts after the forces and relations of production have been set down, and 
works in an ad hoc fashion to support such activities as conditions arise.  Thus in the planning 
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process, it is not in a position to predict, with any certainty, what will happen, only what may be 
needed.  
 
Profits on capital set the limits on what the State can do, as do the demands of the popular masses 
for resources.  Even when the State takes over control of most of the private sector, all that happens 
is the rise of state capitalism.740  Gaining this position would give rise to a host of resistances, both 
from outside the State and within, and it rarely happens.  The resistance of the bureaucracy in this 
movement towards state capitalism results from its complete compliance in a previous era with 
bourgeois production and its concomitant supports.   
 
What, then, can be said by way of ‘Provisional Conclusions’?741  If the left were to come to power, 
what would the role of the State be?  Not only would bourgeois control of the economy need to be 
wrested away from them, but the State apparatus itself would need to be transformed.  The sheer 
inertia well known in the State apparatus would ‘weigh heavily’ on a new leftist régime.  Could, 
indeed, the change in ownership of the core activities of the economy take place without a flight of 
capital and the other inevitable problems?  Could a wealth tax be installed effectively?  But then, in 
addition, how could the State itself be changed satisfactorily?  Clearly the State on its own cannot 
make this happen.  The popular masses would have to become involved.  In one view, one that sees 
the State as merely a technical apparatus, the popular masses can come to control the State through 
a process of self-management, a sort of rank-and-file democracy, bringing the technocrats under 
‘mass supervision’.742  But direct democracy has many difficulties, and the needed changes cannot 
occur simply through this process.  The very nature of the state economic apparatus presents further 
challenges.  Changes must affect all the elements of the State.  The State will still need to secure the 
workings of the new economy, but now under very different conditions.  Many critics claim that the 
‘Super-State’ can be crushed by an attack of popular forces.  But there is no perfect ‘technical’ side 
of the state that can be kept, and a ‘bourgeois’ part that can be destroyed.  All are part of a whole.  
The only way forward in in stages, transforming the whole bit by bit.   
 
The fact that this road to socialism is democratic allows the bourgeoisie to sabotage it at every turn.  
The economy must be kept going, because without it, all is lost.  Experiences in Chile and Portugal 
are useful to learn from here.  The loss of the economy could lead to the loss of revolutionary gains. 
 
Poulantzas now concentrates on a theme that has hovered in the background since his writing in 
Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, and this is the rise of a new form of authoritarian statism.  As a 
child of the dictatorships, and with a deep interest in the fascism of the past, there is a part of 
Poulantzas’s thinking that believes that dictatorship is the natural condition of capitalism, and that it 
will return there in times of crisis in order to survive.  In Part Four,743 he returns to this theme in a 
section he calls ‘The Decline of Democracy : Authoritarian Statism.’, and extends his argument on 
the present state of capitalism.  Again, the shadow of the ‘new philosophy’ and of Foucault is never 
far away.  He begins in this fashion : 
 
Some of our latter-day power theorists have just discovered the Gulag.  We can only congratulate them 
on this ; they may have taken their time, but it is never too late to do the right thing.  However, judging 
by the current function of the term, we may suppose that had Gulag not already existed, it would be 
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necessary to invent it.  Otherwise, how could one dare, when talking about our present western societies, 
even to utter all the nonsense about advanced liberal democracy and ‘permissive societies’ – societies, 
by the way, whose virtues have simultaneously and very conveniently been discovered by our ‘new 
philosophers.’744 
 
We see again the polemicism that haunts his work.  Since the earliest days of Political Power and Social 
Classes, we have seen in his style a capacity to debate and argue throughout his texts.  This is not 
simply a reference to other similar works in the field.  Instead, it is an extended debate with other 
views that never ends.  In Political Power and Social Classes the purpose of the debate was to correct 
and add to the master texts.  At the last, in this book, it is ward off enemies, and to reassert the value 
of his own work. 
 
He believes that the ‘new philosophers’ are deluded if they cannot see the authoritarian qualities of 
the western democracies.  What he sees rising all around him is a new form of state to which he 
gives the term ‘authoritarian statism’.745  This means intensified control of larger areas of the social 
realm, combined with a decline in democracy, and of the ‘formal liberties’.  This is a trend he sees 
occurring in all western capitalist countries because of the crisis in international capitalism.  
Something fundamentally important is occurring in the class structures of these societies to make 
this happen.  And these changes make any change to the left, any socialist revolution, even less likely 
than before.  Though the current crisis he is writing about appears to be of real importance, it is 
hardly the death rattle of capitalism.  The whole weight of his theoretical argument for the last 
fifteen years has been against such a view, and supportive of the notion that the capitalist state is 
immeasurably flexible, and able to support the uncertain and shaky economic apparatus through 
thick and thin. Thus he characterises the State as ‘Strong/Weak’,746 able to flex its muscles or 
disappear behind the curtains as required by the needs of the system.  There is a strong version of 
Marxist functionalism at work here, though he spends some time in this chapter criticising orthodox 
functionalism.  Thus the State is not in crisis, but merely changing its form to deal with the present 
economic shifts.  And, if we are thoughtful, the present situation offers opportunities for the Left.747 
 
Is this new authoritarian statism a form of totalitarianism, as some ‘new philosophers’ have 
proposed?  These theorists were willing to call France’s social democracy ‘fascist’ in 1972, and they 
were wrong to do so, even though this social democracy is hardly a progressive move forward to a 
new liberalism.  There are perhaps elements of fascism in the present situation, especially, perhaps, 
in the stages of fascist growth that occurred as these régimes first developed, such as in the early 
days of the Rooseveltian state or the French Republic, but these societies did not produce a fascist 
state in the end. 
 
Thus, Poulantzas concludes, the present (1978) conditions of the bourgeois State do not represent a 
move towards fascism, and as a result of his very detailed work on the fascist issue, his argument 
bears the stamp of authority.  Instead : 
 
(the State) … represents the new ‘democratic’ form of the bourgeois republic in the current phase of capitalism.748 
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Thus this new phase is not fascism, and for precisely one important reason.  It does not constitute a 
decisive defeat for the popular masses that is characteristic of all those moments in which fascism 
rises to power.  This does not mean that fascism will never rise in Europe.  Indeed, he wants to 
claim, every capitalist state has within it the seeds of fascism.  But we have not reached that stage in 
Europe at the present.  So authoritarian statism has within it the seeds of totalitarianism – (indeed, 
Poulantzas refers to the ‘establishment of an entire institutional structure serving to prevent a rise in 
popular struggles’749 without actually saying what this structure comprises) - and if totalitarianism 
were to arise, it would not need a major change in the structure of the State to bring this about.  
 
This change in the State points to a change in the class structure, but what exactly has happened?  
First, it is clear that massive inequalities of income and education have developed in many advanced 
social democracies.  Then, there has clearly been a rise in the forms of resistance throughout 
Europe.  And these changes, and increases in inequality have also affected children and the aged, 
women and various elements of the peasantry, and these shifts have led to other forms of resistance. 
Further, dramatic changes have also occurred among elements of the dominant classes.  Monopoly 
capital and non-monopoly capitalism are still at odds.  The domestic bourgeoisie in many countries 
are at odds with comprador bourgeois elements entirely dependent on foreign capital. 
 
Given that there are increasing struggles within the power bloc, the State must intervene to secure 
stability.  Thus the State finds itself more and more directly involved with economic activities.  As 
well (as he has commented before) the State is enlarging its activities in town-planning, transport, 
health, the environment, community service and so on.750  The State is also engaging itself to 
encourage international capital through the development of special areas in which such capital can 
gain particular advantage.  The particular role of the State in securing economic activity is of 
particular importance.  It is almost as if the State is creating an economic crisis, as in the case of 
unemployment and inflation.  It is not clear what Poulantzas is doing here.  He appears to be 
exasperated at the lack of State capacity to manage the crisis, rather than seriously promoting the 
notion that the State is causing these crises.  In any event, the upshot is that there are many sources 
of unrest that now give rise to new popular struggles. 
 
He turns now to a new question – what is the relationship between political democracy and socio-
economic democracy?  Given that inequality is rising all the time, it is hard to see how the large 
numbers of people affected can be involved with political democracy.  He intends to examine this 
case with the use of a single example – the State bureaucracy and its relation to the political party 
system.  What has happened, then, in this period of authoritarian statism, is the decline in 
parliamentary democracy, and an increase in the power of the executive.  This leads to a more 
instrumentalist use of the State by the executive branch.  The proposing of laws has now become 
almost the exclusive task of the Executive, and this process reduces the significance of the law, since 
it can no longer represent ‘the will of the people’.   
 
Poulantzas then introduces the term parties of power,751 by which he means those large parties who 
consistently involve themselves in government in a substantial way, and these include the social 
democratic parties of Europe, as well as the Communist parties in France and Italy.  What we appear 
to be witnessing in the present moment, he argues, is a loosening of ties between these parties and 
                                                 
749 This phrase appears on page 210. 
750 This list appears on page 213. 
751 SPS, page 220. 
 146 
the power bloc.  The shift is associated with the narrowing popular base for monopoly capital.  
Today, the executive dominates control of the State as it in turn manages the power bloc.  Strong 
limits are set on the power of parliament, and parliamentary authority has everywhere been curtailed.  
In addition, the close connection between elected representatives and the State has also be reduced.  
Thus it is no longer possible in many cases for representatives of the people to intercede directly on 
behalf of citizens through the agency of state connections.  The State has become a ‘water-tight 
container’752 that no longer allows outside influences to impede its actions as before.  Thus political 
parties and their agents are both excluded.  In the French case, the familiar structures of the ENA753 
and similar grandes écoles produce graduates that inhabit the ministries and, with their ministers, 
who may well have gone to the same schools, manage the State.  Indeed, the ministers themselves 
appear sometimes to have little authority over their departments.  This conception may not be true, 
of course.  None the less, something significant is going on, and this significant shift is the 
increasing control of the upper echelons of the State by elements in the Executive under 
authoritarian statism, and the bureaucracy’s increasing independence from parliament.   
 
The State thus has an enhanced role, not just as a bureaucratic apparatus, but as a site where policy is 
made.  Various economic interests are now directly represented by elements of the State.  And the 
key issue is not the social origins of the managers of the State, but the fact that large economic 
interests are represented within the State as a whole.  It thus becomes the State’s responsibility to 
represent an ever-narrowing interest, monopoly capital, as if this narrow interest represented the 
wishes of the people at large.  But this does not mean that other class interests are not involved.  
Other elements of bourgeois interests have their representation within the State, and the reformist 
trade unions, as in the case of Sweden, can be closely aligned with the State.  Secrecy has now 
become the order of the day, and provides a shield behind which the State can act unobserved.  
Under this umbrella, within this shroud, the State now acts to determine policy and the future 
direction of the social formation.  
 
None of this is perhaps surprising, Poulantzas argues.  The State has always resisted parliamentary 
democracy.  This means popular demands now face more obstacles than before.  This also means 
that power is more and more concentrated at the heights of the administration and in the Executive.  
All this has powerful effects on the so-called ‘democratic liberties’.754  This results, too, in the 
personalization of the Executive, and something of a ‘cult of personality’ embodied in the figure of 
the leader in some instances. 
 
All this must be considered, Poulantzas insists, as a tendency rather than an iron law.  Still other 
interests play a part.  There is no monopolistic ‘Super-state’ developing in the hands of monopoly 
capital.  Instead, the same contradictions still exist throughout the State, but with a different 
concentration and a different emphasis.  Today, instead of genuine parliamentary control, we have a 
condition in which the plebiscite or referendum are used to establish legitimacy, and in which the 
media play a significant role.  In addition, the political choices available are now reduced to two 
parties in most countries, in which the two dominant interests swap power with consistent 
regularity, and who exclude every other interest.  These parties become the sounding boards for 
ideas, but decisions are routinely made by the Executive.  All these shifts move societies from social 
democracy towards authoritarian statism.  The parties were always a useful mechanism in providing 
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754 His phrase, page 227.   
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some control over the Executive.  This reduced role thus shifts the basis of power dramatically from 
the popular masses towards narrow interests.  This leaves parties with few choices.  Either they 
subordinate themselves to the administration, or else give up any sense of power at all.  It is not 
surprising that there is considerable distrust of the parties at present. 
 
In ‘The Dominant Mass Party’,755  Poulantzas examines the way in which certain parties have 
become the party of the State, as with Gaullism in France.  But even when a party changes the 
personnel of the State at the higher levels after elections, there remains a good deal of resistance to 
change within the State apparatus.  The State is never universally transformed into the State of a 
particular class or class fraction.  As one reads this text, it is impossible to believe that this argument 
does not directly contradict the argument in the earlier chapter, in which the demise of parliamentary 
parties is being discussed with an air of loss and dismay.  Here the case is being made that the state 
party needs to manage the state bureaucracy, give it direction and maintain hegemony, an argument 
that chapter two seems to contradict.  For example, Poulantzas comments : 
 
The dominant party plays the role of policing the administration – of watching over and protecting the 
bureaucratic apparatus.756 
 
It is entirely unclear what Poulantzas is arguing here.  At first glance, he appears to be continuing his 
argument from the earlier paragraph concerning corporatism, but he clearly argues that even in 
corporatism the party does not control the State.  Then, by the next page, it is more obvious he is 
talking about contemporary France, De Gaulle, Giscard D’Estaing and social democracy.  Thus the 
confusion with his previous chapter remains.  The dominating party, he claims, does not need to 
represent the simple interests of monopoly capital.  They already have mechanisms throughout the 
State by which they can achieve their goals.  So the main problem for the State is that it is now so 
deeply politicised that it is hard to argue that it still represents the needs of the people at large, rather 
than the narrow interests of capital.  At this stage, the administrative positions, and particularly 
senior positions, come under direct threat, and, rather than following civil service rules, patterns of 
meritocracy and traditional hierarchy, new agents are inserted into the structure of the State, difficult 
incumbents are shunted to one side, and a new State is slowly formed.  As a result, civil servants 
now gravitate towards the dominating party, forming a two-way flow of individuals.  Thus the 
government and the dominant party now come to be controlled by the civil servants.  A variety of 
kinds of corruption are thus inevitable.   
 
Dominant parties rule for a long time without change, as in the cases of the UDR757 in France, and 
the Christian Democrats in Italy and Germany.  Even when two parties are involved, and swap 
control of parliament, as in the example of Great Britain, there is such a circulation of personnel 
between the State and parties that the total system comprises a single circuit of control that 
‘functions as a single-party centre’.758  These connections go well past personal connections and shared 
biographies – such practices are rather embedded in the structures of the parties and in the 
materiality of the State itself.  But in this case of one-party domination there is the capacity to 
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establish direct domination of the State, and to identify those outside the broad umbrella as the 
‘other’. 
 
The question arises concerning the alternatives that exist in such a system.  Given that the dominant 
parties are all ‘much of a muchness’, genuine alternatives outside the dominant discourse are limited.  
And while Poulantzas is not willing to call the present state of the State a form of disguised 
totalitarianism, he is clearly claiming that we are getting close.  There emerges a close and symbiotic 
relationship between the ‘dominant mass party’759 and the State, and what is important here is the 
nature of the mass party.  It cannot afford to be openly ideological but must rather retain the flavour 
of a ‘large tent’ strategy, within which many interests might be served.  But at the same time, this 
symbiosis is connected very closely to the decline of democratic processes. 
 
The consequences for the Left, and especially in France, are clear.  One problem is that parties of 
the Left may be led into taking up the role of the dominant mass party.  But unless that State can be 
dramatically altered by the Left in power, there are negative consequences to follow.  This is 
especially true for the Socialist party in France.   
 
Authoritarian statism has a series of important consequences : 
 
… greater exclusion of the masses from the centres of political decision-making; widening of the 
distance between citizens and the state apparatus, just when the State is invading the life of society as a 
whole ; an unprecedented degree of state centralism ; increased attempts to regiment the masses through 
‘participation’ schemes ; in essence, therefore, a sharpening of the authoritarian character of political 
mechanisms.760 
 
More than this, Poulantzas argues, the State is engaged in finding new ways to manage the populus, 
and this leads to a condition that is far away from its traditional role of establishing the law and 
other practices that enable free, separate and autonomous citizens to emerge into the modern world.  
These new matrices of power761 spread everywhere, both within the structures of the State, and well 
beyond.  Thus authoritarian statism is not fascism, or even a precursor to fascism, but it is none the 
less a new form of state compared to its social democratic precursor. 
 
In ‘The Weakening of the State’762, turns the previous arguments on their head, or more accurately, 
modifies the previous argument.  We have been hearing for pages now that the contemporary State 
is strengthening, and that statism is everywhere developing.  We hear that the State is permeating all 
forms of social life, gradually expanding its role further and further into economic and social life.  
Now we hear of its weakening.  This is a familiar Poulantzian trope.  Having set down an argument 
with considerable certainty,  he now wishes to introduce an element of ambiguity and complexity 
that we may have missed.  Rather, he will now claim that what has been happening is a 
‘strengthening-weakening’,763 and that the State, while expanding its role, is also entering a deepening 
crisis.  The State is now deeply politicised, especially among the top echelons.  But at the same time, 
the State is imbued with deep concerns for the general interest.  The changes that have occurred at 
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the highest State levels has put this appearance of the general interest at risk.  Technical neutrality 
and political efficiency is put at risk by the economic crisis facing many social democratic states.  At 
the same time, a significant group of senior administrators are allied with the Socialist Party.  Social 
divisions are deepening, and the social cement that used to represent the ideology of the public 
interest, is now less firmly in place.  These tendencies allow certain elements of the State to move in 
a leftward direction. 
 
The class struggle of the popular classes is now coming more fully into play.  This is especially true 
of the new petty bourgeoisie, the wage-earning middle classes.  These groups now find themselves 
engaged more and more in popular struggles, especially around collective consumption issues, such 
as health, education and the environment.764  And this alliance exacerbates a break between the 
bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie.  Given that these agents of the petty bourgeoisie penetrate 
the state at every level, the state structure itself is now more vulnerable to transformation.  At the 
same time, the state apparatus is now becoming the target of popular struggles.  Now that political 
parties have been reduced in importance, (though this view is contradicted by some of his own text) 
the State is openly vulnerable to direct confrontation – the party structures no longer provide a 
buffer.  Thus, what results is a crisis of legitimation.  
 
The State is no longer able to provide the hegemonic cover that monopoly capital requires in order 
that the State and the economy can flourish unproblematically.  With a truly representative party 
system, conflict can be managed.  There is always the hope that the party in question can gain 
power, and implement the needed policies.  Without these mechanisms, conflict is out in the open.  
Thus government policies become incoherent and piece-meal.  Long-term strategy goes out of the 
window.  The administrative structure becomes fractured, as each element in the structure seeks to 
secure advantage for itself and those it represents.  Attempts to serve the public interest are now 
fragmentary are incomplete, and the national strategy dissolves.  Class hegemony is now deeply 
threatened.  Authoritarian statism itself brings into being new forms of popular struggle.  There are 
widespread efforts now to develop systems outside the State, and the emergence of anti-state 
sentiments that were not there before.  These new movements, the women’s movement, the 
ecological movement and other associated groupings, represent political entities that cannot be 
controlled by the authoritarian State and that represent ‘a veritable explosion of democratic 
demands.’765 
 
We have now reached the last chapter of State, Power and Socialism, and we meet again a familiar text, 
‘Towards a Democratic Socialism’.766  We have rehearsed the arguments set out here before, and it is 
sufficient at the present time merely to remind ourselves of what is discussed above in a summary 
form.  We can begin by remembering that this is a highly political article, and that theory is now a 
long way in the distance.  We may have started this long journey in a theoreticist moment, but we 
are now arrived at political strategy tout court.   
 
This is not to suggest that Poulantzas had suddenly discovered politics – quite the contrary.  From 
the very first pages of Political Power and Social Classes he has been preoccupied with politics and 
political strategy, and one could reasonably argue that the entire purpose of his writing is to unlock 
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the secrets of the capitalist state in order to gain control of it for the popular masses.  None the less, 
it is also entirely obvious that his early preoccupations were with Marxist science and with 
completing the theoretical tasks begun by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Gramsci.  The pendulum has 
swung now in the other direction, and now, close to his death, his attention is focused almost 
entirely on ‘what is to be done’. 
 
The way forward through the agency of the state seems to be thwarted for the popular masses.  And 
the present analyses from traditional communist parties seems entirely misguided, in his view.  And 
given his claim that class struggle permeates the State, it is clear where the struggle must now take 
place – within the state itself.  Thus the State must gradually be won over, and elements of 
representative democracy may well be retained, along with systems of self-management outside the 
State.  This is the ‘dual strategy’ he proposes.  A leftist government that would support such self-
management strategies might do the trick.  Here we repeat his final comment : 
 
History has not yet given us a successful experience of the democratic road to socialism … It can 
naturally be argued … that if democratic socialism has never yet existed, this is because it is impossible.  
Maybe … But one thing is certain: socialism will be democratic or it will not be at all.767 
 
 
  
 Poulantzas at a Glance 
 
What more needs to be said about State, Power and Socialism?  Has the book added substantially to the 
Poulantzian theory of the State, or is it just an attempt to fend off critics ‘after the Gulag’?  Is it just 
political strategy, rather than any theoretical elaboration?  Certainly his last chapter is predominantly 
concerned with political strategy, and the rise of the statism movement, both in Western and 
Eastern Europe.  In France, there seemed, according to Poulantzas in 1978, two streams of leftist 
thought running side by side – the statist one, stretching from the Jacobins through Bonaparte to 
Lenin, and ending with the contemporary Communist movement, and, by its side, the self-
management trend, focused on rank and file democracy.768   
 
Here, in his last chapter, he spends some time considering the question of the ‘withering away of the 
state’.  Lenin’s view was that the existing Russian State of his time must be attacked, to be replaced 
by the soviets, a second structure which, in turn, will wither away.  In this view, the old state must be 
completely eradicated in order to set up the new order.  Lenin was aiming for direct democracy.  
Poulantzas reminds us of Rosa Luxemburg, the ‘eagle of revolution’, as Lenin called her,769 who 
criticized Lenin for his exclusive reliance on council democracy, and his willingness to eliminate 
representative democracy.  She thought this approach crushed many freedoms – freedom of the 
press, free speech, free assembly, free expression of opinion.  Only the bureaucracy would remain.   
 
What happened after Lenin and Luxemburg ?  In the hands of the Third International, everything 
was twisted out of shape, and an instrumentalist conception of the State emerges.  In this view, the 
State has no internal contradictions, but rather it was to be considered a monolithic bloc.770  The 
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popular masses stay outside the State, and the only way forward is a frontal attack on the existing 
State-fortress.  There is no strategy for undertaking this process, nor any clear indication of the way 
forward.  The State initially exists in parallel with the emerging soviets.  The State must be broken 
down for progress to be made.  The State holds all the power, and thus power must be ‘taken’.  The 
ramparts, trenches and defences must be captured and replaced by the soviets, and this second 
power sits outside the State.  There is a profound distrust of representative democracy as a tool of 
the bourgeoisie, so it must be swept away. 
 
But what of the soviets?  They are no longer the direct democracy institutions of the past.  Instead, 
the soviets have become a parallel State in the hands of the proletariat.  It is managed by a 
revolutionary party.  By this mechanism, Stalinism is brought to life. 
 
Thus traditional social democracy, which distrusts direct democracy, has something in common with 
Stalinism in that both forms of government deny the value, and are fearful of, the direct control of 
the masses.  What is proposed, therefore, is a new proletarian State run by left intellectuals, 
technocratic experts – the techno-bureaucratic State.  In both cases, there is a worship of the State.  
Poulantzas proposes, instead, a Luxemburgian solution771 – keep the social democratic state, in a 
dramatically revised form, in order to keep hold of bourgeois freedoms, and, at the same time, 
encourage direct democracy and self-management, a new form of dualism.  At least, to be more 
precise, he tells us that the problem before us now is how to see the transition to socialism through.  
Gramsci, with his ‘war of position’ and ‘war of movement’, did not solve the problem.  And it is a 
problem that is pertinent not just in the West in the so-called advanced societies.  In every case, the 
question is how to achieve a democratic form of socialism.  And it seems that Poulantzas is hopeful 
that in Europe at least, real possibilities exist : 
 
With regard to this socialism, the current situation in Europe presents a number of peculiarities : these 
concern at one and the same time the new social relations, the state form that is being established, and 
the precise character of the crisis of the State.  For certain European countries, these particularities 
constitute so many chances – probably unique in world history – for the success of a democratic socialist 
experience, articulating transformed representative democracy and direct, rank-and-file democracy.772 
 
He then reasserts his familiar claim that the State is riven with struggles throughout its structure, and 
especially in the contemporary Europe of his time.  Power, he reminds us, is a relationship between 
classes.  The State is not an instrument or a thing, but a condensation of forces.  All this we know, 
and have heard many times before.  Thus the State must be taken gradually in a series of struggles, 
and its functions transformed through the systematic infiltration of the state apparatus by the 
popular masses.  This is not, in the Poulantzian view, a reformist strategy, as the Third 
Internationalists might have claimed.  Instead, this is an approach that will lead to the State 
becoming a terrain on which the popular masses will predominate.  The changes must reach across 
the State into the repressive state apparatus, even though substantial problems exist in trying to 
bring this change about.  But, as in the Portugal case, even the repressive apparatuses have struggles 
within them, and change is possible. 
 
At the same time, popular struggles must simultaneously take place outside the state if direct 
democracy is to have any foundation.  The two forms of struggle, both within the State and without, 
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must be combined.  Authoritarian statism can only be avoided by following the ‘two struggle’ 
approach. 
 
The State must undergo a sweeping transformation in order for this change to occur, but two major 
problems present themselves.773  The ‘smashing of the state’, a relic of Marx’s time, has come to 
mean the destruction of the so-called ‘formal liberties’, and instead, we must now argue that these 
institutions of representative democracy must be retained.  The second issue relates to the 
transformation of the State itself.  It must take place with the direct involvement of the popular 
masses, not just through the intermediate agencies of the trade unions and through parliamentary 
means, and there can be no thought that these changes will be minor – they must be transformative.  
And they must be associated with the development of new forms of self-management.  Both 
initiatives must therefore take place simultaneously.  On its own, the transformation of the State 
alone will lead inevitably to statism.  But direct democracy on its own would allow the State to 
develop separately in a techno-bureaucratic direction.  Such views are widespread at the present in 
Poulantzas’s 1978 depiction of France,  a place where some theorists were arguing that the proposed 
Leftist state that was appearing on the horizon might be chaperoned by a ‘self-management 
commissar’,774 which seemed acceptable to those who held this view because they knew the State 
would decide in the end.  Libertarians liked the idea of the State being smashed and dissolved into 
many parts. The key issue at stake, Poulantzas claims, is the withering of the state.  As the State 
becomes transformed, and direct democracy unfurls, how will this ‘withering of the state’ occur?  
The problem still remains that the bourgeoisie will not remain silent, and if the process of 
transformation is slow, then chances for resistance are increased.  The only solution is the arousing 
of a mass movement, and if this doesn’t occur, there is little possibility of real change occurring.  In 
this regard, the importance of other social movements long disregarded as secondary, must now be brought into the fray 
– the ecological movement, the women’s movement, and the anti-racist movement.775  In addition, we must 
consider how these two processes will be articulated.  What must be avoided is the subsumption of 
one process into the other.  In the case of Portugal, such a situation led to two forms of power and 
the possibility of conflict, and finally to a new type of social democracy, and it could lead, in other 
cases, to a new kind of dictatorship.  In both cases, the State wins in the end.  There could always be 
a fascist reaction to all this, and strong repression.  In each of these situations – dictatorship or 
social democracy – the bourgeoisie wins.   
 
So what is the ‘final solution’?  Self-management experiments are taking place all over Europe, but 
there are no simple answers, and history has not provided an example.  We know what to avoid, but 
we are not quite sure what we want and how to get it.  The democratic nature of socialism is 
paramount, to be sure, and we are certain no iron laws of history will get us there.  Risks are 
everywhere, and we could face ‘camps and massacres’, but this is surely preferable to massacring 
people ourselves.  We could avoid all risk, of course, but then we would be doomed to live as we 
are.   
 
Poulantzas ends on a despairing note, yet two changes seem to me to have occurred here.  There is 
that moment when he declares, in a moment of wild optimism, that democratic socialism might just 
have a chance in Europe at that particular time, and perhaps most especially in France.  This is an 
optimism that he rarely, if ever, allows himself, and we shall talk about this more in the context of 
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French political life at this time below.  But, second, he allows space for other social movements to 
take their place, and not in a secondary fashion, but rather next to the comrades of the working class 
as essential elements of the popular masses that might ensure revolutionary success.  He argues now 
that the revolutionary party of the working class is no longer adequate to the task, however, much it 
might seeks to change.  In one sense, this is only a gestural comment.  Nowhere do I see him taking 
these movements seriously to any extent, or suggesting how the organs of the class struggle and 
these other grouping might come together in concrete terms.  But he is certainly moving in a new 
direction, and in principle, he is opening the door to creative possibilities. 
 
He talks about this exact issue again in his 1979 interview with Marxism Today.  Here, he much more 
clearly suggests that the new social movements must take their place in collaboration with the class 
struggle if anything significant is to occur, but the details concerning how this might be achieved 
precisely are still lacking.  Nonetheless, this is a very significant step for somebody for whom the 
entire social dynamic of all human societies is founded in class struggle.  He comments : 
 
I think that (the) conception of the party (of the working class) as the unique centralizer, even if it is a 
very subtle centralization, is not necessarily the best solution.  I think more and more that we must have 
autonomous social movements whose type of organization cannot be the same as that of a political 
party organization.  There must be a feminist movement outside the most ideal possible party because 
the most ideal party cannot include such types of social movements even if we insist that the 
revolutionary party must have certain conceptions of the woman question.776 
 
Thus this is a shift in his thinking, and a genuine one, a possibility that was never to be realized. 
But to return to France in 1978.  What was it in these political conditions that gave rise to this 
irrational hope of genuine change in the Poulantzian breast?  We have him talking in an interview in 
1978 about the collapse of the Programme of the Left,777 a profound setback for the popular masses, 
yet above we see him outlining the possibilities for social transformation in just the same 
circumstances.  To understand the complexities of the situation, we must return to 1978 and to 
France, and rediscover what was in Poulantzas’s head, as he wrote at during this time, and how these 
contradictory feeling, both despair and hope simultaneously, came to be present.  From the ‘New 
Philosophers’ it seemed that the Left was winning, and that Marxism was predominant everywhere.  
It was not a view shared by many on the Left, though there were grounds for optimism. The 
Socialist Party (PS) had come into being in 1969 at the Alfortville Congress, and what was most 
significant at this time was the suggestion that a dialogue be established with the Communist Party.  
This provided the possibility of a union of the Left.  Under Mitterand’s leadership, a ‘Common 
Programme’ was signed with the Communist party. (the PCF)  In 1973, the Socialist Party gained 
some electoral power, and its leader Mitterand himself almost won the election.  By 1977, the Left 
were winning municipal elections, but they had failed to update the Common Programme of the 
Left, and while the polls in the 1978 elections suggested they would win the national elections, they 
failed by a slim majority to gain the necessary advantage.  The Socialists gained higher levels of 
support than the Communists, and the Communists denounced the Socialists because of their 
alleged turn to the right.  Mitterand was later again chosen as the leader of the Socialist Party, and 
became Prime Minister in the election of 1981, and after his election, the banks were nationalized, 
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along with the insurance and the defence industries.  But these apparently significant socialist 
successes came too late for Poulantzas to experience.  By the end of 1979, he was gone. 
 
One is left, therefore, with a simultaneous sense of incompletion, despair and, at the same time, with 
possibilities.  There were elements in Foucault’s treatment of power that were not incompatible with 
the Poulantzian vision of the State, though this possibility was never fully realized.  A strategy that 
might, at one and the same time, accede to the power of the State, but simultaneously might argue 
that the ‘institutional materiality of the state’ might be comprised of micro-powers, was not beyond 
the realms of possibility.  The possibilities inherent in a coalition between workers, members of the 
women’s movement, ecological activists and anti-racist workers was proposed in the most general 
terms, but never brought to fruition in his writing.  And the possibilities residing in the Common 
Program of the Left were still alive in 1979.  That none of these possibilities could be actualized was 
a major disappointment, and, in the end, a tragedy for Poulantzas himself. 
 
What, then, at the last, can we say about the contribution that this passionate, revolutionary, 
profoundly intellectual man provided for the Left?  I would argue that three elements of his work 
are of considerable importance. 
 
1.  From first to last, Poulantzas wrote about politics, political strategy and the possibilities of a life 
beyond capitalism.  Whether this interest stemmed from his own family’s involvement with Greek 
autocracy, or whether these sentiments stemmed from more personal sources, is unclear.  But what 
is beyond dispute is that he never ceased to think about the future, from the very beginning of his 
writings to the very last.  He was always urging better thinking about what might happen, where 
power resided, how the power of the State might be directed in more democratic and 
communitarian directions, free from domination and subordination.  That this future be must also 
be free from capitalism was self-evident from the first.  But the questions concerning what the 
future looked like, and exactly what pathway might be followed, consumed him until the end of his 
life. 
 
2.  His major theoretical contribution lies clearly in his analysis of the State, his arguments 
surrounding the notions of relative autonomy, the power bloc, and the strategic-relational qualities 
of the State as the condensation of class forces.  A State riddled with class conflict was at the center 
of his thinking, a State of a society riven with class contradictions that was able to hold the social 
formation together on behalf of the power bloc, and to disorganize the popular masses 
simultaneously.  This complex structure further provided ordinary citizens with a raft of rights, 
responsibilities and concrete material benefits as it creates a universe of ‘free’, individualised, voting 
members of democracy.  Through this explanation, he was able to free himself, and us, from the 
straight-jacket of instrumentalism that had haunted the Left since the time of Lenin, and provided us 
with a way forward politically that stemmed directly from this thinking. 
 
3.  He was able, at the same time, to reinvent class analysis through his extension of class criteria, 
more fully than anyone else, into the realms of the political and the ideological.  This elaboration on 
the classics enabled us to envisage classes as cultural and ideological forces, as well as merely 
instruments of economic exploitation.  Thus the epiphenomenal role of politics and ideology in 
class-structural analysis was pushed to one side, and a new theoretical and political door was opened 
for us.  Whether this opening was the basis for the extraordinary later work on class of Pierre 
Bourdieu, or the path-breaking cultural work of Stuart Hall is not at all certain.  But Poulantzas 
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certainly contributed to the expansion of the very creative work of the 1980s, and the 1990s that was 
to come, and in this way he transformed the field of class analysis. 
 
Of course state analysis and class analysis were inseparable in his work.  Placed together, these 
innovations turned orthodoxy on its head.  Whether his hopes for a Marxist science were realised is 
clearly open to debate.  It appears to be largely an Althusserian dream that he quickly forgot.  
Whether he ever answered all the questions he set himself is also clearly open to argument.  There 
were too many questions and too few answers.  Whether in his personal and political life he was ever 
able to respond adequately to the needs of the feminist movement, and the arguments of the women 
closest to him, including his wife Annie LeClerc, is also unclear.  At the end, he seemed to move in 
this direction without fully elaborating a clear resolution.  And whether the New Philosophers and 
Michel Foucault offered unanswerable critiques of his state-driven argument is also unclear.  He 
seemed almost too willing to give up too much ground to the latest theoretical fashion, because that 
it what these currents were. 
 
There is an immutability about the State that will not go away.  Whether we wish it or not, whether 
we see the State as a necessary component of democracy or of authoritarianism, no serious political 
theorist can avoid the task of assessing its role.  Poulantzas, more than anyone else in the 20th 
century, took this challenge head-on, not because he thought the State was the gateway to a socialist 
paradise, or because he thought it was the devil’s workshop, but simply because it embodied human 
and social possibilities, as well as human and social misery.  In either case, understanding it was of 
the very highest importance, and he gave himself, as much as he could, to this task.  This was his 
contribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
